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USSR Report

PROBLEMS OF THE FAR EAST

No. 3, Jul-Sep 1982

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19 April 1983

USSR REPORT
PROBLEMS OF THE FAR EAST
No. 3, Jul-Sep 1982

Translation of the Russian-language journal PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA published quarterly in Moscow by the Far East Institute, USSR Academy of Sciences.

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JOINT SOVIET-INDIAN DECLARATION

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 4, Oct-Dec 82 pp 11-15

[Text] **T**he Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Republic of India, Recalling the tradition of friendship and cooperation between the governments and peoples of the two countries and expressing their resolve to further develop and deepen Soviet-Indian relations,

Reaffirming their commitment to promote international peace and cooperation in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter,

Convinced that the establishment in international relations of the principles of peaceful coexistence serves the interests of all peoples,

Concerned over the deterioration of the international situation, the escalation of the arms race and the increasing threat of war, and aware of their responsibility for the preservation of international peace and security,

Determined to make common efforts to promote international understanding and detente, to support the national independence of peoples and to oppose all manifestations of imperialism, colonialism, neocolonialism, racism and apartheid,

Declare their resolve to continue to develop and strengthen their friendly relations, consolidated by the Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation, in the interests of the peoples of the two countries and the cause of international peace.

I

The Soviet Union and India express their profound satisfaction at the effectiveness of their multifaceted cooperation, which constitutes a valuable asset for the two countries. Soviet-Indian relations are characterised by respect and trust between the leaders and peoples and by the diversity of spheres and forms of cooperation between the two countries. These relations are based on the strict observance of the principles of sovereignty, equality, independence, mutual respect and non-interference of any kind in each other's internal affairs. This is a shining example of peaceful coexistence of states with different socio-economic systems.

The two sides reaffirm that the Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation concluded between them is a symbol of the traditional friendship between the USSR and India and of their commitment to international peace and detente.

Both sides note with satisfaction the large scale and high level of their cooperation in the fields of economy, trade, science and technology, which is being carried out on a planned basis and is of a mutually beneficial and long-term character. They agreed to examine possibilities

for the further expansion of cooperation in such areas as ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy, coal, petroleum, machine-building and power industries.

Both sides reaffirmed their resolve to ensure a 1.5 to 2-fold increase in the volume of trade by 1986 as envisaged in the long-term programme of economic, trade, scientific and technical cooperation of March 14, 1979, and to maintain a high growth rate in trade over the period up to 1990. For this purpose they will make efforts to increase further the trade turnover and to identify new forms of commercial relations.

The Soviet Union and India welcome the expansion of cooperation between them in the field of fundamental and applied sciences and technology. The two sides agree that there is scope for expanding their cooperation in several key areas of science and technology. They consider it necessary to continue to improve and strengthen their ties in the sphere of science and technology as well as their search for new areas and forms of such cooperation in the interests of accelerating the scientific and technological progress in both countries.

The two sides stressed the important role of the inter-governmental Soviet-Indian Commission on Economic, Scientific and Technological Cooperation in organising and coordinating the work related to the fulfilment of mutual obligations as well as to the search for and the identification of new areas and modes of trade, economic, scientific and technological ties between the USSR and India. They noted with satisfaction the progress made at the recent seventh session of the Commission which set concrete targets for the organisations of both sides in this area for the immediate future.

The Indian side appreciates the significant contribution made by the Soviet Union towards India's efforts to achieve self-reliance in various fields.

The two sides noted the successful development of Soviet-Indian exchanges in the field of culture. They reaffirmed the great significance they attach to the further strengthening of these ties in the interests of deepening mutual understanding and mutual enrichment of the cultural life of the Soviet and Indian peoples.

II

The two sides express their grave concern over the aggravation of the international situation, the acceleration of the arms race, above all in the field of nuclear armaments, and the development of new types of weapons of mass destruction, the preservation of old and the emergence of new hotbeds of tensions. In this context, they call for fresh efforts to defuse tensions, improve the international situation, strengthen detente and extend it to all parts of the world.

The Soviet Union and India reiterate their firm commitment that international relations should develop on the basis of strict observance of the universally recognised fundamental principles such as renunciation of the threat or use of force, equality, respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of states, inviolability of borders and non-interference of any kind whatsoever in each other's internal affairs.

The Soviet Union and India are agreed that in the present disturbed situation in the world persistent efforts are needed on the part of all states regardless of differences in their social systems, to strengthen international peace and security, to eliminate the threat of war, to curb the

arms race, above all in nuclear weapons, and to implement concrete measures in the field of disarmament.

Both sides believe that mankind's supreme interests urgently demand strict compliance with the principles of peaceful coexistence in relations among states, consolidation of confidence and mutual understanding between them, the exercise of restraint and implementation of practical measures for an early elimination of the existing hotbeds of armed conflicts and tension and prevention of the emergence of new ones.

The Soviet Union and India are firmly convinced that the cessation of the arms race, above all in nuclear weapons, and the implementation, without further delay of effective measures towards general and complete disarmament under effective international control and the prevention of nuclear war is the task of paramount importance facing the world today. Both sides reiterate their willingness to cooperate fully with each other and with all other states in achieving this goal.

The Indian side welcomed the Soviet Union's Declaration not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. Both sides consider this to be an important step towards a complete ban on the threat or use of nuclear weapons. The adoption of similar obligations by other nuclear powers would contribute to the achievement of this objective.

Both sides stressed the special responsibility of nuclear powers in taking urgent measures towards general and complete disarmament, especially nuclear disarmament. They expressed their willingness to give serious consideration to all constructive proposals towards this end.

The Soviet side supported the Indian proposal calling for the negotiation to draft a convention on the non-use of nuclear weapons. Both sides stressed the importance of a freeze on the production and deployment of nuclear weapons, as well as the production of fissionable nuclear materials for the purpose of manufacturing nuclear weapons.

Both sides support the immediate suspension of all nuclear weapons tests and the speedy conclusion of a treaty on complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapons tests.

The two sides call for an early prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons and for the prohibition of the development of new types of weapons of mass destruction.

A part of funds which will be released in the process of disarmament should be channelled towards rendering assistance to developing countries.

The Soviet Union and India reaffirm the importance of international cooperation in the preservation and consolidation of peace and stability in Asia and in the world as a whole on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence. They are convinced that outstanding international issues can and should be resolved by peaceful means so as to enable the countries of the region to devote their energies to the task of national development.

The two sides expressed their concern over the serious deterioration of the situation in the Middle East resulting from Israel's expansionist and aggressive policy which is in flagrant violation of the principles of the United Nations Charter and elementary norms of international law. They resolutely condemn Israel's unprovoked invasion of Lebanon and the brutal killing of Lebanese and Palestinian civilians and demand the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon. The two sides emphasise the urgent need for a comprehensive, durable and just settlement of the Middle East problem based on the complete withdrawal of Israel's forces from all the Arab territories occupied by it, the satisfac-

tion of the just demands of the Arab people of Palestine, whose sole and legitimate representative is the Palestine Liberation Organisation, and securing their legitimate rights, including their inalienable right to the establishment of their own state as well as ensuring the right of all states of the Middle East to independent existence and development.

The Soviet Union and India express themselves in favour of a speedy peaceful settlement of the armed conflict between Iran and Iraq. They support the efforts of the United Nations and especially of the non-aligned movement towards this end.

The two sides express serious concern over the continuation of the hotbeds of tension in Southwest Asia and reaffirm their conviction that the problems of the region demand peaceful political solutions with full respect to the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and nonaligned status of the countries of the region. They call upon the countries of the region to expeditiously terminate the armed conflicts, to exercise restraint and cooperate constructively for reducing tension and restoring peace. The Soviet Union and India reiterate their opposition to all forms of outside interference in the internal affairs of the countries of the region. They are confident that negotiated political solutions alone can guarantee a durable settlement of the existing problems of the region.

The Soviet Union and India support the desire of the states in Southeast Asia for the normalisation of the situation in that region and for making it an area of durable peace and stability. They also support the efforts of the countries of Southeast Asia to develop relations of goodneighbourliness and cooperation. The Soviet Union and India strongly oppose outside interference in the internal affairs of these countries.

The Soviet Union and India express their grave concern over the dangerous situation in the Indian Ocean and call for the dismantling of all foreign military and naval bases in the area, for preventing the creation of new bases and condemn any attempts to build up foreign military presence in the Indian Ocean.

The two sides call for the early implementation of the United Nations Declaration on the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace and support the decision of the United Nations General Assembly to convene a conference on the Indian Ocean in the first half of 1983. They reiterated their support for the just claim of Mauritius to sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago, including Diego Garcia.

The Soviet Union and India give full support to the rights of the peoples still under colonial domination to independence and demand that the United Nations decisions on decolonisation be strictly complied with. They confirm their solidarity with the struggle for the complete elimination of racism and apartheid in Southern Africa.

Both sides call for the prompt and full implementation of the United Nations decisions on the independence of Namibia, an immediate cessation of its occupation, the withdrawal of South African troops from its territory, and reiterate their full support to SWAPO, the sole representative of the Namibian people. The Soviet Union and India demand the termination of acts of armed aggression by the racist regime of South Africa against independent African states.

The two sides favour the restructuring of international economic relations on a just and democratic basis and the establishment of a new international economic order. The solution of this pressing task would serve the interests of all mankind. They condemn any manifestations

of the policy of neocolonialism, discrimination and methods of pressure of any kind in interstate economic relations. Both sides favour the ensuring of fair and equivalent prices for the exports of developing countries. They favour the early launching of global negotiations on major economic problems in accordance with the decisions of the United Nations General Assembly.

III

The Soviet Union and India agree that regular contacts and reciprocal friendly visits by their leaders have become a good tradition in the relations between the two countries and contribute significantly to the further development of friendship and cooperation between them. The two sides agreed to continue this practice of contacts and consultations.

Both sides noted the special significance of Soviet-Indian summit meetings which promote the advancement of the entire range of relations between the two countries, deepen their mutual understanding and cooperation and make a significant contribution to the strengthening of international peace and security.

The two sides expressed profound satisfaction with the results of the official friendly visit paid to the Soviet Union by the Prime Minister of India, Indira Gandhi. The visit has further strengthened mutual trust between the leaders and the ties of close friendship between the peoples of the USSR and India.

Prime Minister Indira Gandhi expressed sincere gratitude to the leadership and the people of the Soviet Union for the warm welcome accorded to her and her party. The Prime Minister of India invited the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, L. I. Brezhnev, and the member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, N. A. Tikhonov, to visit India. The invitations were accepted with gratitude.

LEONID BREZHNEV,
General Secretary
of the Central Committee
of the CPSU,
Chairman of the Presidium
of the Supreme Soviet
of the USSR

INDIRA GANDHI,
Prime Minister of the
Republic of India

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JAPANESE-SOVIET ROUNDTABLE ON INTERNATIONAL ISSUES HELD

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 4, Oct-Dec 82 pp 16-26

[Article by T. B. Guzhenko, chairman of USSR-Japan Society and USSR minister of merchant marine: "Soviet-Japanese Relations"]

[Text] **T**he Third Soviet-Japanese Round-Table Conference, co-sponsored by the Japanese Association of Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, the Japanese-Soviet Friendship Society, the Society of Japanese-Soviet Relations, the Parliamentary Association of Japanese-Soviet Friendship and the Japanese-Soviet Trade Association on the one hand, and the Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries and the USSR-Japan Society on the other, took place in Tokyo in April of this year.

The Conference was attended by over 500 Japanese and Soviet public figures—politicians, leaders and activists of mass organisations, scientists, journalists, cultural and art workers, sportsmen and businessmen. Thirty Japanese MPs from the ruling and opposition parties took part in the plenary sessions and the work of the committees.

The plenary sessions and the five committees discussed the international situation, the state of and outlook for the development of the political and diplomatic relations between the two countries, ways and means of expanding cooperation and exchanges in the trade, economic, cultural, scientific, sports and tourist fields, the role of the mass media and their responsibility for the promoting better understanding between our peoples, and the further development and strengthening of the movement for friendship.

IMPORTANT STEP TOWARDS MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING

As a participant in all three Round-Table Conferences I should first like to say that the initiative of Soviet and Japanese mass organisations, which had decided to sponsor periodically in the USSR and Japan a candid discussion of the international situation and Soviet-Japanese relations in an atmosphere of mutual understanding and goodwill unaffected by momentary considerations, received a further fillip at the Third Conference and, it may be said, has become a good tradition reflecting our peoples' desire to live in peace and friendship and to strengthen goodneighbourly relations and cooperation. This is especially important today, when the policy followed by the US Administration has sharply aggravated the international situation and when Soviet-Japanese ties are stagnant as a result of the activity of the forces both within and without Japan to impair them. It should also be said that the co-sponsors of the Conference put in the maximum effort to ensure high-level representation and productive sessions of both the Conference in general and its committees.

This was the first conference of its kind to be attended by so highly and widely representative Soviet delegation. It consisted of 75 representatives of more than 30 ministries, departments and organisations, as well as of organisations directly occupied with promoting ties with Japan.

We highly appreciated the fact that the conference was attended by so many Japanese, for it enabled us to exchange views with MPs of both the ruling and opposition parties, and consequently holding differing viewpoints, with journalists, with well-known public figures, leaders and members of organisations that are friendly towards the USSR, representatives of cooperative societies and commercial firms, scientists, cultural workers and sportsmen.

We regarded as evidence of sincere interest in the work and results of the Third Round-Table Conference the attendance as guests of honour of Y. Asukata, Chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the Socialist Party of Japan, M. Makieda, SOHYO President, Z. Yano, Komeito General Secretary, Y. Kono, President of the New Liberal Club and representatives of other political, women's, trade union and public organisations.

There were considerably more Liberal Democrats than at the preceding conferences, and this made possible a useful exchange of views with prominent members of the ruling party.

I should like to say in this connection that our meetings and talks with H. Fukuda, President of the House of Representatives, and Tokunaga, President of the House of Councillors, as well as with other members of the ruling party, outside the Conference, once again convinced us that many Japanese officials of the highest rank agree with us that peace and the interests of the Soviet and Japanese peoples require from our countries to maintain good relations and to develop them by using mutually acceptable steps.

For justice' sake it should be said that by far not all in Japan think alike about the idea of strengthening and expanding Soviet-Japanese contacts in every way. The Foreign Ministry, it seemed to us, was quite wary of the Round-Table Conference. We noted with regret that, as before, there were no heads of the leading Japanese economic organisations and no big businessmen present, although it seemed to us that the themes discussed at the Conference itself and especially by its committees created an opportunity to exchange views on diverse aspects of bilateral relations in an unofficial atmosphere.

Speaking of the character of the speeches and discussions at the Conference, one must say that, despite the different approaches to the questions raised, they were on the whole constructive and enabled the participants to find new ways and means, if they so wished, of setting to improve Soviet-Japanese relations in diverse fields and taking joint action to strengthen peace in Asia and the Far East.

The most important result of the Third Round-Table Conference, in our opinion, was the joint communique on its work which was unanimously adopted by all the participants. It said that "the participants in the Round-Table Conference believe that there is no task more important today for the Soviet and Japanese peoples, and for all the people in the world, than that of preserving peace. The most reliable way to it is through the limitation and reduction of arms all the way to their total liquidation. We stand for the complete and general prohibition of nuclear, neutron, chemical and all other mass-destruction weapons.

"The participants in the Conference are also for the intensification in Asia of efforts in the search for ways of reaffirming interstate rela-

tions the principles of peaceful coexistence, particularly the efforts to build up mutual trust in the Far East and conclude a convention guaranteeing the security of the nonnuclear states as well as agreements on the non-siting of nuclear weapons in countries that do not have them at present.

"The participants in the Conference affirm that the development and consolidation of Soviet-Japanese ties are useful in every way to both countries, and are simultaneously an element in the strengthening of peace and security in Asia and the whole world.

"The participants in the Conference have come to the conclusion that it is necessary to exert efforts to prevent deterioration of relations between the Soviet Union and Japan, and seek to reduce the sphere of differences between the two countries.

"Different points of view were voiced at the Conference on some of the questions linked with the search for ways of strengthening Soviet-Japanese relations. At the same time the participants in the meeting believe that it is important to put the development of Soviet-Japanese relations on a solid contractual basis. They urge the governments of the two countries immediately to draw up a document that would secure the generally recognised principles of relations between countries with different social systems and facilitate the two countries' progress towards the conclusion of a peace treaty, and have decided to appeal to the Soviet and Japanese public to spare no effort in promoting relations of friendship and cooperation between the USSR and Japan.

"The participants in the Conference have decided to help in every possible way to create an atmosphere of trust and goodwill between our countries through the further promotion of ties and dialogues at all levels, to expand and strengthen links between the mass organisations of the two countries, to exert every effort to expand political contacts and trade and economic cooperation with the objective of concluding an intergovernment long-term agreement in this field, and to build up scientific, technical, cultural, sport, tourist and other exchanges and ties.

"In the economic field in particular, the participants in the Conference believe that the economic sanctions applied against the USSR latterly in the conditions of deteriorating international situation ought to be lifted because they hamper the development of Japanese-Soviet economic cooperation and run counter to the interests of the peoples of the two countries.

"The participants, representing different organisations in the two countries, seeking to expand cooperation and relations between their countries and recognising that the continuation of the dialogue between the representatives of different sections of the population is useful and productive, have agreed to hold the next Round-Table Conference in Moscow and to ask the organising committees of the two countries to agree on concrete dates and forms of the conference."

No less important were the jointly drawn up final documents of the five committees.

The Soviet and Japanese peoples' anxiety about the development of the international situation was recorded in the final document of the First Committee of the Conference which condemned the concepts of "limited nuclear war" and "preemptive nuclear strike" and other similar ideas, for attempts to realise them would plunge the world into a catastrophe and lead to the extermination of mankind. The participants in the discussion declared that reduction of armaments and not the arms race, detente and concrete steps to ensure international security and not

buildup of tension are the sole way to save civilisation and ensure a peaceful sky for the future generations.

The discussion in the Second Committee led to the important conclusion that it is necessary for the USSR and Japan to continue their dialogue at governmental level. The participants in the discussion urged their governments to bring Soviet-Japanese relations out of the state of stagnation which militates sharply against the vital interests of our peoples. We fully approve of such a viewpoint and believe that Soviet-Japanese relations should be put on a contractual basis by means of negotiations and elimination of such manifestations as confrontation and whipping up of distrust between our countries. In our opinion, a big step forward in this direction was made at the Conference.

Realising the importance and the growing role of economic cooperation for Soviet-Japanese relations in general, as stressed in the final document of the Third Committee, the sides voiced their determination to exert greater effort to help develop this cooperation on the basis of equality and mutual benefit. They stated that the recent aggravation of the international situation and notably the policy of "economic sanctions" against the Soviet Union were hampering the normal development of mutually beneficial trade and economic ties between Japan and the USSR.

Bearing in mind the mutually complementary nature of bilateral trade and economic ties and the factor of geographical proximity, the sides expressed readiness to expand the scale of these ties and improve the forms of their realisation, and agreed that it was essential to strive for:

- the conclusion of an intergovernmental agreement on the principles of economic cooperation and the elaboration of a long-term programme of such cooperation;

- the solution of the issue of granting by Japanese banks of credits (without any strings attached), which would make it possible for more Japanese firms, particularly small and medium-sized, to trade with the Soviet Union;

- the expansion of coastal and cooperative trade;

- the quest for new forms and methods of bilateral trade and economic relations, notably through cooperation in "mini-projects" on a compensation basis, cooperation in production, and so on;

- the positive solution of organisational questions contributing to the development of trade and economic ties, notably the opening of USSR Trade Mission branches and V/O Dalintorg (Far Eastern Foreign Trade Organisation) agency in Japan and of agencies of Japanese firms in the Soviet Union.

In the course of the exchange of views and in the final document, the members of the Committee positively assessed Soviet-Japanese relations in the fishing industry and expressed the wish that they would further develop to mutual benefit and through rational use of the biochemical resources of the North-West Pacific. They agreed that it would be expedient to continue cooperation in the procurement of marine products.

The sides unanimously censured "economic sanctions" against the Soviet Union as hampering the normal course of trade and economic ties and the promotion of truly goodneighbourly relations between the two countries. They reaffirmed their determination to exert efforts to remove the obstacles on the way to the development of Soviet-Japanese trade and economic relations, and to strive to create a climate of mutual

understanding and trust. On some of the questions requiring a special study it was agreed to continue working consultations.

In the Fourth Committee, which discussed the question of expanding exchanges in the spheres of culture, science and education, the sides noted with satisfaction that Soviet-Japanese ties in these spheres developed successfully in 1981-1982 despite diverse difficulties, and at the same time stressed the need to exert joint efforts to activate contacts where they are as yet inadequate. In the Committee's final document, the sides noted the successful exchange by universities and institutes of students and trainees, and agreed that there were still greater possibilities for the further expansion of exchanges of researchers, students and scientific information, and for scientific symposiums and exhibitions.

The sides agreed that there was also ample opportunity for activating exchanges between writers, composers, artists and book publishers, particularly those putting out children's books. The participants in the discussion underscored the special role played by cultural ties in the spiritual makeup of the young generation of the two countries, in enriching them morally and aesthetically. It is all the more important, therefore, to exchange specimens of immortal classical heritage, modern cultural values of Japan and the Soviet Union.

The members of the Fifth Committee discussed the significance of the mass media, sports ties, tourism, friendship societies, women's organisations and contacts in the religious sphere for the promotion of deeper mutual understanding and development of friendly relations between the USSR and Japan. As pointed out in the Committee's final document, progress in Soviet-Japanese political, economic, cultural and other ties depends to a large extent on the press, television and radio. The participants in the discussions said the mass media had ample opportunity better to cover life in the two countries and their relations, and urged Soviet and Japanese journalists to spare no effort to this end. They are of the opinion that it is necessary further to expand ties between Soviet and Japanese journalists both with the help of the Union of Soviet Journalists and the Association of Japanese Newspaper Publishers and Editors and by direct contacts between the mass media.

The participants in the Conference noted with satisfaction that although Japanese sportsmen did not take part in the Moscow Olympics, sports ties between the USSR and Japan remain at a high level. The two sides expressed a desire to expand the forms of cooperation, particularly in organising exchanges in the spheres of sports science and medicine and in making wider use of visits of sports delegations to arrange meetings with sports lovers with a view to promoting better mutual understanding and friendship. Also discussed was the question of promoting tourist trade between Japan and the USSR, it being stressed that tourism is the most massive form of communication between people and plays a big role in promoting international understanding and trust. Concrete proposals were advanced for the further development of tourist trade, and the sides agreed that wide and objective publicity given by the mass media to the sights in the USSR and Japan would help expand tourism.

The Soviet members of the Fifth Committee welcomed the Japanese suggestion that there should be more Soviet and Japanese twin towns, friendship houses, libraries, etc. The participants stressed the importance of meetings between Soviet and Japanese women at which unanimity was achieved on the question of women's participation in the struggle for peace and international detente and of the need to bring up children

in the spirit of peace, and backed the idea of continuing such meetings.

Stress was laid on the importance of communication between the Orthodox and other Christian churches and organisations, as well as between representatives of other religions in the USSR and Japan. Christians, Buddhists, Shintoists and people of other faiths are to some extent responsible for the solution of the problems of peace, international security and disarmament.

Summing up the results of the Third Round-Table Conference, it may definitely be said that it was a major nongovernmental, bilateral meeting, an important step in strengthening understanding and friendship between the Soviet and Japanese peoples.

The Conference underscored once again the big role public opinion plays in the development of international relations, in strengthening peace and international security. This is also evidenced by the interest shown in the Conference by the Soviet and Japanese mass media. They gave it wide coverage in the form of reports and commentaries. This and the decision of the participants to go on holding such conferences testify to their significance and exigency at the present stage of development of Soviet-Japanese relations.

IN THE INTERESTS OF THE TWO PEOPLES

During the discussions at the Round-Table Conference and the meetings and talks between the Soviet and Japanese participants in this representative forum one heard time and again appeals to improve relations between our countries. Both the Soviet and the Japanese parties to the dialogue often turned to the history of our postwar contacts. That is only natural, for if one is to chart correctly the course of further progress, one must look back on the path traversed and see where and why one deviated from the road leading straight to the goal both sides want to attain—to peace and goodneighbourliness for the good of our two peoples.

The quarter-century since the normalisation of relations between the USSR and Japan have been years of high and low tides. There have been periods of vigorous promotion of ties and contacts and periods of slack activity and stagnation. Perhaps the most fruitful were the first two decades after the signing on October 19, 1956, of the Joint Declaration on the Restoration of Diplomatic Relations Between the USSR and Japan. This was a period marked by positive tendencies in Soviet-Japanese relations: the two countries signed a number of treaties and agreements on trade, air and sea communications and fisheries. Political consultations became a regular affair. The first exchange of visits by the Soviet and Japanese Foreign Ministers took place in 1966 and a consular convention allowing the two countries to open general consulates in Osaka and Sapporo and in Leningrad and Nakhodka was signed in Tokyo. Ties were established between the USSR Supreme Soviet and the Japanese Parliament and they exchanged delegations. The Parliamentary Association of Japanese-Soviet Friendship was formed in Japan in 1973 and simultaneously a Soviet-Japanese section was set up by the Parliamentary Group of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Acting in the spirit of the Joint Declaration, the Soviet Union waived its claims to reparations from Japan. What is more, it agreed to second Japan's application for UN membership. Japan thus acquired wide opportunities to take an equal part with other countries in solving international issues.

The biggest event at that time was the summit meeting in Moscow in October 1973. The leaders of the two countries had every reason to voice satisfaction with the way Soviet-Japanese relations were developing since their normalisation, and the confidence that "the strengthening of goodneighbourly, friendly relations between the USSR and Japan on the basis of the principles of noninterference in internal affairs and mutual benefit and equality was not only in the interest of the peoples of the two countries, but also a major contribution to the cause of peace and stabilisation in the Far East and the whole world".

An especially big step forward was made in the sphere of trade and economic ties, i. e., the material foundation of bilateral relations. From 1966 on, when the USSR and Japan began to conclude long-term agreements on trade and payments, the volume of their trade doubled every five years. Cooperation has made headway in the exploitation of the natural resources of Siberia and the Far East. A number of general agreements and big deals on a compensation basis well benefited both countries. They helped to develop productive forces in the eastern areas of the Soviet Union and provided Japanese industry with sizable orders and raw materials.

Two general agreements on the exploitation of forest resources in the Far East have already been implemented. Our countries have concluded a third such agreement, providing chiefly for the exploitation of the gigantic tracts of forest along the Baikal-Amur Railway. The South Yakutia coal basin is being exploited on a compensation basis and very soon Japanese industry will start receiving high-grade coking and power coal from Yakutia. Exploration for oil and gas on the shelf of Sakhalin Island has yielded pretty good results. After the completion of surveying and the solution of other technical problems it will be possible to build the necessary facilities and start delivering Sakhalin gas and oil to Japan.

The Japanese-Soviet and Soviet-Japanese committees for economic cooperation have already discussed the possibility of jointly exploiting the copper deposits of Udokan and building a concentration works and an iron-and-steel mill in the Far East. There were also promising plans for the exploitation of the Molodyozhnoye asbestos deposit.

Objective conditions exist for the steady expansion of mutually beneficial trade and economic relations between the USSR and Japan. It is above all their geographical proximity which has a no small effect on the cost and duration of transportation. Another factor of no little importance is the possibility of the economic structures effectively supplementing each other. It is a well-known fact that the Japanese economy depends a great deal on imported raw materials and fuel, while Siberia can become a major exporter of diverse industrial raw materials and fuel. The Soviet Union is the biggest market for Japanese complete plant after the Middle East and accounts for 60 per cent of the Japanese exports of equipment for the chemical industry and about 50 per cent of large-diameter pipes. This by far does not exhaust the possibilities of Japanese-Soviet trade. While the United States and West European countries raise customs barriers on the Japanese goods' way to the world markets, the Soviet Union is interested in considerably expanding trade with Japan.

Many businessmen in Japan clearly see the advantages of such contacts, believing not without grounds that exports to the USSR enliven the Japanese economy. The Japanese press compared the contract for

the delivery to the Soviet Union in 1975-1977 of four ammonia-making plants by the Mitsui Bussan and Toyo Engineering companies to a "long-awaited rain" for about 800 large, medium and small enterprises. Of great significance for building up business in the ferrous metallurgy were the contracts for the delivery to the Soviet Union in 1976 of 1,478,000 tons of steel pipes and 1,528,000 tons of rolled metal for a total sum of \$1,062 million.

In the mid-1970s, however, there appeared signs of deterioration of Soviet-Japanese relations. On the threshold of the 1980s the freezing of these relations became an official Tokyo policy.

THE REASON FOR THE DETERIORATION

It was the Japanese who announced limitation of political contacts, put a brake upon negotiations for new mutually beneficial trade and economic deals, and evaded signing the already drawn up agreement on cultural cooperation. One clear manifestation of this course was Japan's boycott of the Olympic Games in Moscow, which dealt a telling blow to Soviet-Japanese contacts in the sphere of sports. Attempts are also being made to curtail transport ties between our countries.

While in the 1970s Tokyo extolled the "diplomacy of equidistance", i. e., balanced development of relations with the United States, China and the USSR, in the 1980s Japanese diplomats began to lay stress on the "solidarity of the Western camp", the membership of which, they say, Japan must prove by its deeds. It is not hard to see that under the impact of external forces or, to put it more simply, under Washington's pressure the US ruling circles' turn from detente to confrontation entailed changes in Japan's attitude towards the Soviet Union.

With the connivance and then the participation of the Japanese authorities a hostile propaganda has been mounted against the Soviet Union. The provocative campaign of groundless territorial claims upon the USSR (apropos of the so-called "northern territories") is gaining momentum, and nationalism and anti-Communism are being whipped up. It is perfectly obvious that actions like the Premier's trip to take a look at the Kuril Islands are meant to sow hostility towards the USSR and whip up revenge sentiments, with the view to using chauvinism to militarise the country and strengthen the military-political alliance between Tokyo and Washington.

The Japanese mass media clamour about the "threat from the North", using for this purpose the information provided by the Pentagon and CIA-compiled schemes, diagrams and other strategic estimates of the balance of forces in the Far East and the world that are capable of substantiating any lies. All this is constantly fed to the man in the street who finally yields to persevering indoctrination.

Encouraging the Japanese generals' militaristic ambitions, Washington is dragging Japan deeper and deeper into the orbit of its strategy in the Far East and urging it to take a direct part in military activities in that region: for instance, in patrolling the waters of the Pacific and cooperating with South Korea by supplying it with arms and helping it with building its military strength. A plan is being discussed to get Japan to take an active part in blockading the straits which are important for the Soviet Union's trade and economic communications.

An important US outpost in the Pacific, Okinawa Island has in recent years been turned into a base for the "rapid deployment force", whose mission is to interfere in the affairs of other countries. It recently be-

came known that the Pentagon intends to arm Seventh Fleet warships with cruise missiles carrying nuclear warheads. And these ships are based in Japanese ports. If one bears in mind the numerous facts that nuclear weapons had been brought to Japan time and again in the past as well, one will see that in the final analysis this violates the three nonnuclear principles of Japanese foreign policy.

These Washington actions are designed to turn the Japanese Isles automatically into a potential target in the event of a nuclear conflict and thus divert the danger of retribution from the United States itself.

Thus, under pressure from the United States and not without the consent of Tokyo, Japan is sailing in the wake of Washington's adventuristic policy. I hope the readers will forgive me this sea terminology, but the men at the helm of the American ship care little not only about the international navigation regulations, but about the safety of their own ship. The adventurism of the ship's captain may cause it to run into a rock. And the same may happen to those who obediently sail in its wake. The Americans are not likely to rush to the rescue of their friends if they get into a fix. One need only recall the tragedy of the *Nissyomaru*, which became a "symbol" of Japanese-American cooperation at the present stage.

Pursuing far from selfless aims and, more specifically, seeking to complicate the economic position of its Far Eastern ally and rival and thus elbow him aside in the world markets, the US Administration insisted on Japan joining it in its economic "sanctions" against the Soviet Union. As a result, the development of Japanese-Soviet trade and economic relations slowed down noticeably. Among other things, difficulties were deliberately created for crediting trade with the Soviet Union, and this at a time when about 60 per cent of Japanese exports to the USSR are made up of goods requiring crediting by the Export and Import Bank of Japan.

As the developments revealed, the effect of these steps was diametrically opposite to that expected. The ones to suffer worst from the institution of economic "sanctions" were the Japanese businessmen (which, incidentally, suited their American rivals). Japan lost orders for the delivery of polyethylene and acetic acid plants which were given to British firms, of a \$180 million worth equipment for the production of drilling rigs (the order was placed with French firms). Estimates that are far from complete put the losses suffered by Japan as a result of this policy at upwards of \$5,000 million.

As a result, Japan slipped from second place to fifth in the list of the Soviet Union's trade partners in the capitalist world. And that was not the end of it. Such actions badly impaired the prestige of Japanese businessmen on the Soviet market.

IS THERE A WAY OUT OF THE IMPASSE?

I should like to stress once again that it is the Japanese who are guilty of wrecking the understandings reached by the Soviet Union and Japan in 1973 with the aim of further improving Soviet-Japanese relations. The Soviet Union has never taken any step to subvert Soviet-Japanese goodneighbourliness and curtail our cooperation. On the contrary, it has undertaken quite a few concrete actions and advanced quite a few proposals to improve the ties between our countries and strengthen peace and security in Asia and the Pacific. Let us take the past few months as an example.

The foreign press has qualified the activities of the USSR in this period as "an unprecedented Soviet peace offensive against Japan". Indeed, for the first time in the postwar years the leaders of the CPSU and the Soviet Government have within a few weeks made a number of peace proposals to Japan.

Concretising the proposal to build confidence in the Far East made at the 26th CPSU Congress, Leonid Brezhnev offered all the countries in March of this year to discuss the question of extending confidence-building measures to the seas and oceans. There is no doubt that such an initiative should be of special interest to Japan which is seeking to ensure the safety of its merchant marine. According to newspaper reports, Japanese leaders have repeatedly expressed fear that the routes by which this country is supplied with fuel and industrial raw materials pass through waters which may at any time be the scene of military conflict if it flares up in the Northwest Pacific or the Indian Ocean. A similar danger could imperil deliveries of Japanese goods to other countries. In other words, only the safety of sea routes could ensure the security of Japan itself.

Judging by everything, the Japanese leaders realise that, for the theme of the last political discussion in Japan was the question of how many hundreds of miles of aquatorium off the Japanese coast should be patrolled by Japanese naval and air outposts. Billions of yen are being appropriated for strengthening the so-called Self-Defence Corps. (We shall leave aside in this particular case the question of the legitimacy of such actions, which definitely run counter to the Japanese Constitution, actions which fully justify the wariness of Japan's neighbours who have not forgotten its attempts to set up a "Greater Co-Prosperity Sphere" in East Asia. In the final count it is up to the Japanese people themselves to decide whether or not their country is to be peaceful.) But would it not be wiser to look for possibilities of ensuring the country's security by diplomatic means and not on the slippery path of the arms race? For the Soviet Union, as evidenced by Leonid Brezhnev's statement, is prepared to take part in serious and responsible negotiations and make its contribution to the solution of so vital a problem for Japan.

No less interest in Japan, in my opinion, should be evoked by another proposal advanced by the Soviet leader, namely, to discuss mutual fears and anxieties and to agree on mutually acceptable confidence-building measures if not on a collective basis, then at least on a bilateral one. Even a most suspicious person will hardly discover in such a proposal an attempt to force upon Japan any agreement liable to impinge upon its sovereignty or even a hint that such an agreement would put Japan in a unequal position.

The Soviet Union's readiness to guarantee Japan, and incidentally all other nonnuclear countries, that it will not use nuclear weapons against it, if the country refuses to manufacture and acquire such weapons and does not have them on its territory, should be regarded as further embodiment of Soviet proposals to build up confidence between our countries. There is no need to say that the Soviet Union is not demanding any political or economic concessions from Japan in return for such a guarantee. All Japan is required to do is to observe the nonnuclear principles it had worked out itself. That the Soviet proposal, repeated in Leonid Brezhnev's reply to Japanese writers opposing nuclear war, fully takes into account the interests of the Japanese people, is evidenced by the numerous public campaigns in Japan against the nuclear threat and for the conversion of the country into a nuclear-free zone.

Understandings on the realisation of confidence-building measures could dispel once and for all the anti-Sovieteers' shopworn myth about "the Soviet military threat to Japan", and this would greatly contribute to the relaxation of tension in the Far East. It could be a point of departure in the process of improvement of relations between our countries. The many meetings and talks at the Third Round-Table Conference showed that this point of view was shared not only by the Soviet participants, but by many Japanese too.

When I was asked whether I saw any way out of the impasse in which Soviet-Japanese relations now found themselves, I replied that it was necessary immediately to start negotiations and, leaving alone the questions already settled by history, discuss sore subjects soberly and without prejudice. We understand that today the Japanese side is not ready for radical changes in relations with the USSR. Well, the Soviet Union is prepared to take part in a longer and more arduous process: to move slowly but surely towards the goal—genuine goodneighbourliness and peace in the Far East, discarding all that alienates us and securing all that is good and useful for both countries. This being the case, it would be well to return to the Soviet proposal that our countries conclude a treaty of goodneighbourliness and cooperation, of which Prime Minister Tikhonov spoke in his interview to the *Asahi* in February. Without taking off the agenda the question of concluding a peace treaty in the future, the proposed treaty could secure all that is positive in the postwar Soviet-Japanese contacts and protect them from the attempts made by the enemies of our friendship to sow distrust and strife between our peoples.

The examples cited above show that the Soviet Union firmly retains the initiative in peaceful negotiations with Japan. But we by no means seek a monopoly in that. The Soviet Union would welcome any constructive proposals from Japan. We are for a dialogue, for a realistic and effective approach to bilateral and international problems. Therein we see the way out of the impasse, a bright perspective for Soviet-Japanese relations.

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JAPAN'S ABILITY TO SOLVE GROWING LABOR-RELATIONS PROBLEMS DOUBTED

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[Article by T. V. Karyagina: "Japan's Acute Social Problems"]

[Text] The crisis of 1974-1975, which dramatically slowed the rate of economic growth, ushered in a new period in the development of the Japanese economy which came to be known as reindustrialisation. It was characterised by the adoption of basically new technology and by the modernisation of economic patterns with an emphasis on the extension of capital-, energy- and labour-saving industries. This trend has, as a matter of necessity, induced serious changes in every field of the socio-economic development of present-day Japanese society, including relations between labour and capital.

The regulation of the wage-labour market, i.e., the employment policy of the state and monopolies, plays an important role in the general system of relations between labour and capital. Today, under the altered conditions of economic growth in Japan, the importance of this policy is constantly increasing for a number of reasons, including the slowdown of the rate of economic growth, the swelling army of unemployed, the progressing aging of labour, considerable changes in the structure, technical equipment and production processes of industry, the growing use of industrial robots (100,000 in early 1982) and the growing involvement of female labour in production.

The system of wage labour practiced by most Japanese enterprises particularly large and superlarge ones, has a substantial effect on the policy of the state and monopolies in this field. The system of employment which is specific to Japan relies on three major principles: employment "for life" (shushin koyo), a specific pay system (nenko chingin) and the organisation of trade unions by company rather than trade (kigyo-betsu kumiai).

These three components which operated particularly effectively during the period of high economic growth rates, from the mid-1950s to the early 1970s, are characterised by proprietors as "the three pillars" of the Japanese economy and the three "sacred gifts" of Japanese production relations, because they ensure the worker's loyalty to "his" factory, something which has no parallel in other industrialised capitalist countries, resulting in a comparatively peaceful relationship between labour and capital and, what is particularly important, high labour productivity. That is why the state and monopolies are trying to retain all these principles to further enhance the exploitation of wage labour. However, these factors are beginning to flounder ever more noticeably in the new economic situation, particularly against the background of the drastic slowdown of economic growth rates.

According to the Japanese system of employment "for life", for instance, the proprietor, posing as "father to his children-workers", should keep them on the job until they wish to retire, that is, throughout their working life.

An analysis of the dynamics of Japanese employment practice shows that this principle operated without fail only during the period of high economic growth rates, when proprietors annually raised workers' wages in accordance with seniority, so workers would stay put. Proprietors were willing to do so although they did not benefit from the work of such employees as much as they could have benefited from exploiting better educated and trained young workers. But the unprecedentedly high profits of Japanese companies enabled them to pursue this policy.

Today, with the considerably slowed-down economic growth rates, even the most privileged employees, namely, permanent workers at large and superlarge enterprises, are forced to leave because many enterprises have introduced limits on the employment age (*teinen seido*). This limit is roughly ten years below the age at which workers usually wish to retire.

A specific pay system (*nenko chingin seido*) is an integral component of the system of employment "for life". According to this system, the main factors in calculating the pay rate are age and seniority, with pay growing automatically from one year to the next. However, the rapidly growing scientific and technological achievements make technology more sophisticated and call not so much for experienced veterans as for technically trained younger workers, and this system is becoming more and more unprofitable for proprietors. It forces them to raise the wage fund annually for aging workers, who are producing less and less. At the same time, the social and political aspects of the "*nenko*" system continue to attract the state and monopolies because it ties workers to "their" factories and thus reduces the possibility of conflicts between labour and capital. That is why both the state and monopolies are trying hard to modify this system. In practice, this "modification" boils down to attempts to preserve the socio-political aspects of the system while abrogating its basic economic principles, that is, the automatic annual pay rise. Such "modification" is graphically exemplified by the practice of the company Shin Nippon Seitetsu and other major steel producers, which decided that beginning with April 1981 the basic pay rate of workers over 50 years of age would increase as before, but the growth rate of the part of the wage depending on seniority would be reduced by 30 per cent. The ratio between such components of basic pay rates as seniority pay and regular pay (taking account of quotas, quality of the work done, etc.) which at present stands at 6 to 4, will gradually change over the next few years until it reaches 5 to 5. As for flow-line production, shop superintendents and foremen will be asked to leave upon reaching 55 years of age, surrendering their jobs to younger workers. In principle, they can retain their jobs on the condition that their pay is reduced. Similar retirement proposals to make room for younger personnel can be made to lower and medium level managers (employee and production engineers). Seniority will play a smaller role in fixing retirement pay, and certain privileges will be extended to aged workers to encourage them to leave the company before reaching the age limit (over 50 years).¹

The state and monopolies both continue to pin great hopes on the specific principle of the organisation of Japanese trade unions: "a union for every enterprise". They believe that the existence of such in-company trade unions which unite all the permanent workers of a given company regardless of their occupation makes for the agreement of union members

¹ *Japan Labour Bulletin*, December 1, 1980, p. 9.

with the proprietor's policy and is part of the attempt to prove that there is peace between classes and that class contradictions are dying away in present-day Japanese society.

These claims, however, are far removed from reality. Although the organisation by companies, as distinct from the organisation within an industry in the United States and West European countries, considerably hinders large-scale joint action by union members, the post-war trade union movement in Japan, particularly its left wing, strongly denounces cooperation with capital and protects the class interests of the working people. This fact is illustrated by statistics on the strike action of the Japanese working people spearheaded by their trade unions. According to official figures, for instance, during the 1970s, the total number of strikes grew by more than 160 per cent as compared with the previous ten years, and the number of participants in them by almost 60 per cent. The number of major strikes (lasting more than 12 hours) nearly doubled and the number of participants in them rose by 30 per cent. All told, 61,853 strikes were registered in Japan between 1970 and 1979, including 26,315 strikes lasting more than 12 hours each. The number of participants in them was 33,877,000 and 16,906,000, respectively.²

This shows that under the altered conditions of economic growth, the above three principles of the Japanese system of relations between labour and capital are going through a grave crisis. The situation is compounded by the fact that the existing system of employment has lately been generating serious problems, the most important of them being the rapid aging of labour.

A comparative analysis of international statistics indicates that Japan is one of the leading world countries in the rate of aging of the population. By 1985, people over 40 years of age will constitute 40.5 per cent of the total employable population and those over 55 years, 19.8 per cent. By 1995, these figures will reach 46 and 24.3 per cent, respectively.³ As a consequence, the workforce will become markedly older within the next few years. This process, naturally, requires that certain measures be taken both by the state and the monopolies.

In this situation, ever more Japanese companies practice first and foremost forced extension of the employable age. During the 12 years between 1968 and 1980, the number of companies which extended the retirement age of their workforce from 55 to 60 years grew substantially. In early 1980, for instance, the share of companies which had established a mandatory retirement age of 60 years or more was 39.7 per cent of the total, i. e., more than the share of those companies which had fixed it at 55 years (39.5 per cent). In early 1968, the figures were 22.1 and 63.2 per cent, respectively.⁴

At the same time many companies have evolved special programmes for extending the term of employment (*kimmu encho*) and reemployment programmes (*saikoyo*), the latter meaning that the proprietor can reemploy workers who have just retired from his company upon reaching the retirement age. Extended employment programmes enable workers, particularly those employed in crucial jobs, to continue working for the company after reaching retirement age.

² Calculated from *Labour Statistics for Practical Use*, Tokyo, 1981, p. 151 (in Japanese).

³ *Ibid.*, p. 122.

⁴ In *Japan Labour Bulletin*, December 1, 1980, p. 7.

The above programmes are used primarily by those companies which fix the age limit at 59 years or less and generally act to stabilise the employment of aged workers. In 1978, as many as 79 per cent of the companies with mandatory retirement programmes (77.3 per cent of all Japanese companies) used one type of programmes or the other. Altogether, 58.6 per cent of them practised only reemployment programmes, 26.4 per cent only extended employment programmes, and 15 per cent both.⁵ The meaning of these programmes is rather different. The reemployment system envisions, for instance, that reemployed workers agree to worse terms than those they had before reaching the retirement age, whereas if the term of employment is extended, the conditions remain virtually unchanged. It is symptomatic that nearly 80 per cent of the workers reaching the retirement age continue to work, although most companies (almost 80 per cent) gradually cease to raise their wages annually, while 10 per cent of all companies even cut down the pay rates of workers under the extended employment system.⁶

Attempts to resolve the problem of the aging workforce as well as the entire employment problem are coming up against serious difficulties. The state and monopolies are trying hard to find a way out of the existing situation, which is constantly growing worse. In 1974, at the height of the economic crisis, the economic policy of the state and the monopolies was put on the basis of the so-called principle of management by restriction, which presupposes a special system of saving raw materials, energy, and labour resources. One result of this principle was the adoption of a policy of regulating employment (*koyo chosei*), which became a new stage in regulation of the labour market and gave rise to new methods of cutting expenses on the reproduction of labour. These methods markedly differ from those used previously, namely, the basic methods of capitalist "rationalisation", such as layoffs or shorter working hours.

The companies practising "regulation of employment" try to minimise layoffs and the adverse consequences of growing unemployment and resort to various alternative ways of cutting back their expenses on wage labour, among them reduction of overtime; reduction or termination of the employment of new permanent workers; transfer of labour to other, lower-paid jobs requiring entirely new skills but still within the same company; the redistribution of the same amount of work between larger number of workers; reorganisation schemes, including closing down outmoded production lines or opening new ones; sending workers to subsidiaries with worse working conditions; nonresumption of contracts with temporary or seasonal workers; compulsory leaves for permanent workers; mandatory retirement; indirect dismissals, etc.

During the 1974-1975 crisis, the share of the companies using various employment regulation methods tended to grow and peaked in the spring of 1975, after which it began to decline. In the first quarter of 1975, for instance, the share of companies in the manufacturing industry which used "employment regulation" stood at roughly 75 per cent of the total. When the economic situation began to improve in 1977-1978, this share gradually decreased to 30 per cent. It had shrunk even further by the spring of 1979, and dropped to 14 per cent in the third quarter of 1980.⁷

⁵ See *Review of Labour Statistics*, Tokyo, 1980, p. 64 (in Japanese).

⁶ *Japan Labour Bulletin*, October 1, 1980, p. 6.

⁷ Hideo Seki, *Employment Policy in the Period of Stable Economic Growth Rates*, Tokyo, 1981, p. 74 (in Japanese).

As for wholesale and retail trade, the scope of "employment regulation" there was considerably smaller. In the first quarter of 1975, for instance, the figure for that industry was a mere 37 per cent.⁸

Large companies used various "employment regulation" methods on a greater scale. For instance, in the first quarter of 1975, only 53 per cent of all businesses employing 30 to 99 workers practised "employment regulation", while the figure for businesses with 100 or more employees was 85 per cent.⁹ Large companies mostly used cut-backs in overtime and employment of new labour, transferred employees to other jobs in the company or its subsidiaries, left vacancies open, etc., trying to avoid laying-off workers and using its subsidiaries and contacts with other companies for the purpose. But most of the small- and medium-size businesses could not afford such a practice. The latter, in addition to the abovementioned "employment regulation" methods, laid emphasis on selective dismissals, "voluntary" early retirement, lay-offs of temporary workers, etc., which is explained either by the lack of trade unions in small businesses or by their weakness and isolation. This policy indicated that the transfer of workers to subsidiaries as a method of "regulation" is particularly widespread and enduring as compared with other methods of cutting back labour expenses.

Prior to 1973, that is, the first oil crisis, Japan actually did not have any formal rules for cutting back labour because of production recession by agreement between proprietors and trade unions. At the same time, Japanese proprietors had to reduce employment. Between March 1974 and March 1978, the 1053 largest companies in the manufacturing industries reduced employment by 10.4 per cent, laying off 323,000 workers. Hitachi, Kanebo, Matsushita and Toshiba, for instance, cut back their workforce by 15,400, 13,400, 12,200 and 11,600, respectively.¹⁰ In the course of "employment regulation" the state and proprietors, particularly larger companies, managed to work out ways and means of reducing employment that were more or less practical and acceptable to companies and trade unions alike. This demonstrates the ability of Japanese capital to make social manoeuvres and to create the illusion of "common interests" between proprietors and workers and the possibility of "resolving" class contradictions by the "concerted actions" of labour and capital.

Many Japanese and foreign economists agree that the Japanese employment system, despite a considerable drop in the demand for labour during the period of economic recession, responded rather flexibly to the "austerity regime", at least far more flexibly than West European countries and the United States did. While the employment level in those countries fell sharply owing to the recession of production, the decrease of employment in Japan was gradual and relatively moderate.

The progressive aging of labour and the policy of "employment regulation", with older workers being the first victims, have made the ensuring and stabilisation of employment for middle-aged and elderly people one of the pressing tasks of the state and monopolies. As has been said above, one direct consequence of this process was the rise in the mandatory retirement age and reemployment and extended employment programmes. At the same time the state and monopolies had to improve the system of vocational training and retraining for older workers.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 76.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 75.

¹⁰ ILO. Japan Seminar on Labour Market Information, September 24, 1980, p. 31.

In 1971, a bill was passed on special measures to ensure employment for middle-aged and older people. The bill fixed a minimum employment level for older workers which was compulsory for all the private businesses in the country. When the bill was revised in 1976, the quota of older workers (55 years or more) which private businesses were required to have on the payroll was increased to at least 6 per cent of the total workforce. In passing this bill, the government pursued a number of objectives, including ensuring and maintaining the demand of middle-aged and older labour, the stabilisation of employment of workers in that age group, assistance to their independent efforts to find jobs, evening out the obvious discrepancies in the distribution of middle-aged and older labour among companies, etc.

On June 1 of every year, all businesses employing 100 workers or more are obliged to submit to the Ministry of Labour reports on the level of employment of people aged 55 years or more. As a consequence, certain progress has been made during the past few years toward resolving the problem of employment for middle-aged and elderly people. For instance, the average indicator of the actual employment of older labour for the country grew from 5.8 per cent in 1979 to 6.2 per cent in 1980. However, the share of businesses which fail to meet the quota fixed by the bill is still considerable: 53.9 per cent in 1979 and 51.8 per cent in 1980.¹¹

The larger the company, the less willing the management is to comply with the 6 per cent quota for older labour fixed by the bill. In 1980, for instance, more than one half (54.3 per cent) of all businesses employing 100 to 299 workers abided by the fixed quota, while the figure for businesses employing 1,000 or more workers was less than one third (22.5).¹² By industry, the leading sectors are the services and the construction industry, where the employment figures for middle-aged and older labour are 13.2 and 10.4 per cent, respectively. The figures for wholesale and retail trade and the manufacturing industries, however, are below the level demanded by the bill.

These statistics show that the bill on special measures to ensure employment for middle-aged and older workers has not completely resolved the problem. That is why the government takes other measures, in addition to increasing the number of large companies complying with the 6 per cent employment level for older workers, and raising the employment figures for wholesale and retail trade and the manufacturing industries. For instance, measures are taken to help elderly people choose jobs corresponding to their abilities, to help them find employment, to encourage companies fixing the retirement age at 60 years or less to reemploy workers who are due to retire, to raise the mandatory retirement age, etc.

In view of the fact that most companies still set the age limit at 60 years or less, in 1978 the Japanese Ministry of Labour issued a special circular laying down rules both for proprietors and for wage labour. For instance, proprietors must raise the retirement age first from 55 to 60 years and then to 65.

The government pays subsidies to companies which raise the retirement age to 56 years or more and keep workers beyond this age. Initially, beginning in April 1976, the subsidies were granted only to small and medium-sized businesses, while in 1977, large businesses also became eligible for subsidies. In June 1979, a system of subsidies for com-

¹¹ Hideo Seki, *Op. cit.*, p. 240.

¹² *Ibidem.*

panies creating new jobs for middle-aged and older workers became effective.

Attempts to resolve the problem of shorter working hours are no less important in the employment policy of the government and monopolies. The purpose of these attempts is to bring the Japanese work time closer to the world average, to increase the number of jobs by reducing working hours in this way, to eliminate the large gap between actual working hours at companies of different sizes, to cut back on overtime, etc. The government hopes in this way to reduce unemployment, which has reached a relatively high level.

Overtime remains considerable in Japan, an average of 13-15 hours a month, and Japanese workers put in 3-4 hours a week more than workers in other industrialised capitalist countries. On average they work 150-200 hours more a year than their counterparts in the United States and West European countries. The reduction of overtime, a far from easy task, has an important role to play in sustaining and expanding employment.

Overtime for proprietors is a means of generating absolute surplus value and enhancing the degree of exploitation of labour. As a rule, they find it more profitable to pay for overtime than to employ additional labour. Forced to reduce overtime, they hope to make good their losses by raising intensiveness and productivity of labour. Besides, overtime is a sort of "buffer" during a depression, when companies cut it back or do away with it completely to avoid layoffs.

As for workers, the reduction of overtime, on the one hand, could help them better meet their intellectual and social needs and give them more time to raise their educational standards and engage in vocational training and retraining. However, this burrows considerably into their earnings and therefore affects their interests under conditions of growing prices and the rising cost of living. Overtime pay is a substantial component of the workers' total earnings, although it is far below the overtime pay in other industrialised capitalist countries.

Large differences between actual working hours depending on the size of business constitute a serious obstacle to the solution of the problem of cut-backs in working time. For instance, in 1979, the average work-week in companies with less than 100 employees was 44 hours 59 minutes (excluding overtime), or 5 hours 23 minutes more than in companies employing 100-999 workers.¹³ Such great differences are not found in any other industrialised capitalist countries.

In this way, despite reductions in average working hours and the growing practice of a five-day work-week in one form or another, Japan has not yet reached the level of the United States or West European countries in this field.

The special importance of further reduction in working hours and the general introduction of a five-day work-week for the solution of the problem of employment as a whole prompts the need to reckon with these factors in compiling national programmes of social and economic development.

For instance, the new seven-year plan of economic and social development for the 1979/80-1985/86 fiscal years (approved in August 1979) formulates the goal of achieving "total employment" during that period as one of the priority objectives. And although the achievement of this goal, according to the plan, is not simple, full employment is considered

¹³ *Japan Labour Bulletin*, August 1, 1980, p. 5.

to be "a state where aggregate supply and demand for labour are in complete equilibrium, and where unemployment owing to labour demand shortfalls is almost negligible".¹⁴ The maintenance of optimal economic growth rates is considered the principal means of achieving "full employment". At the same time, the Japanese expect to ensure stable prices in the country. However, resolving both problems simultaneously is complicated by the fact that these goals are incompatible in a way (while the achievement of full employment calls for the growth of aggregate demand, restrictions on price rises, conversely, require constraints on the latter), and also by the problem of far-reaching structural changes facing the Japanese economy. For this reason, employment and price policy is being based on the maintenance of the optimal economic growth rates (called upon to balance out the goals of full employment and stable prices) and on structural changes.

The plan also provides for the introduction of the 60 year mandatory retirement age at both state-owned and private enterprises. In addition, measures are planned to increase the actual employment age to 60-64 years by means of reemployment and extended employment programmes. Emphasis is also placed on the need to reduce working hours with a view to maintaining and increasing the employment of the able-bodied population.

In accordance with the plan, the state should encourage the introduction of the five-day work-week to all wage workers in those businesses which are already practising this system partially, encourage those companies which have not yet adopted it to do so, and also apply it to all government employees and employees of banks and other financial establishments. According to 1978 statistics, only 46 per cent of the 6,000 private companies examined by the Ministry of Labour had a five-day work-week. Moreover, a mere 6 per cent of the companies examined were consistent with this policy, that is had a five-day work-week every week, while the rest practised it only partially: 15 per cent once a month, 13 per cent twice a month, 9 per cent every other week and 3 per cent thrice a month.¹⁵

In August 1979, a new, fourth basic plan of employment measures, also intended for 7 years, was adopted in accordance with the main national programme of social and economic development.

Practice will show how realistic all these plans are and to what extent the state and monopolies will be able to resolve the problems of employment which are facing Japan and which are growing more acute from one year to the next. However, it is perfectly obvious even now that these acute social and economic problems will be tackled, as usual, from the point of view of the monopolies' interests. This stems from the very nature of state-monopoly policy in general and employment policy in particular.

State-monopoly policy in employment as a component of the state regulation of the economy has been developing in close contact with the need to resolve the general economic problems of Japanese capitalism. In the mid-1950s, this policy began to acquire the character of a major national task. Enhanced attention to employment problems is explained by the fact that the labour market has always been the fulcrum of basic contradictions of the capitalist economy, and the state must adjust its

¹⁴ *New Economic and Social Seven-Year Plan (Summary)*. Foreign Press Center, Japan, 1979, p. 13.

¹⁵ In *Japan Labour Bulletin*, August 1, 1980, p. 6.

economic and social policies to the regulation of the labour market to one extent or another to alleviate social discontent. However, employment policy when antagonistic classes exist inevitably has a class character and is used as a means of social manoeuvring to smother acute class contradictions.

The economic crisis of the mid-1970s, which inflated the army of the unemployed, prompted increased state-monopoly regulation of the labour market. However, it was during this period that the narrowness of the traditional mechanism of state-monopoly employment policy made themselves felt particularly graphically. A search for new ways and means of controlling the labour market and "employment regulation" during the switch-over to the saving of raw materials, energy and labour resources against a background of discrepancies between the high rate of labour aging and the slow pace of the solution of social and economic problems generated by this process could neither produce a final solution to the problem of employment nor substantially decrease the unemployment level. This is explained by the fact that a search for new methods of regulating the labour market ignores the basic reasons for the low efficiency of the measures taken by the state and monopolies in this field. Under conditions of private property, state regulation can be carried out only within certain limits because it often comes into conflict with monopolies' interests. As a result, it is aimed primarily at alleviating economic problems, including the problem of employment, rather than at resolving them. The aggravation of the latter problem, particularly since the mid-1970s, explains the more active efforts of the state and monopolies to cope with it in one way or another.

At present the "three pillars" of the Japanese system of labour relations, i.e., the system of employment "for life", the pay system and the organisation of trade unions by companies, are going through a grave crisis, in particular, as a result of the 1974-1975 economic crisis, protracted economic stagnation, and the transition of the Japanese economy to "stable" growth rates. This cannot help aggravating the problem of employment.

The situation in this key field of relations between labour and capital is constantly worsened by new serious problems, the rapid aging of the labour force being the most acute of them. The slow pace of accomplishing the social and economic tasks generated by this process throws fresh serious difficulties in the path of Japanese economic growth.

After Japan went over to "economic management on the basis of restrictions" (genryo keiei) in the mid-1970s, in particular, to "employment regulation", Japanese companies, to minimize direct layoffs, began increasingly resorting to disguised methods of cutting back expenses on labour. Recourse to such alternative methods as cutbacks in overtime, termination or dramatic reduction of new employment, sending employees to subsidiaries, compulsory leaves, etc., are aimed against the working class because they mean nothing short of the indirect dismissal of "surplus" labour. Due to the class-based character of the government's policy, its efforts to ensure employment and to solve the problems of the regulation of relations between labour and capital cannot help cope with fundamental problems in the interests of the working people. Practical efforts to accomplish these tasks are coming up against serious difficulties rooted in the narrow, class-motivated interests of the Japanese mo

monopolies which are trying to carry out "regulation" at the expense of the working people to avoid reducing the degree of the exploitation of labour.

Government plans and the monopolies' programmes to "regulate" relations between labour and capital and to achieve "full employment", thus drastically resolving this acute social and economic problem are primarily propaganda aimed at distracting Japanese workers from class struggle. At best, they can only alleviate the existing problems and bring temporary relief to the sharp antagonisms between labour and capital due to the class character of present-day Japanese society and the class motivation of the state-monopoly policy of regulating the labour market. The full solution of the problem of employment in the interests of the working people is only possible under conditions of public ownership of the means of production, that is, under a socialist economic system. This, naturally, does not deny the need for struggle by the working class in capitalist countries, including Japan, to achieve a solution to the employment problem that will meet as far as possible interests of the working people under conditions of capitalism. The Japanese proletariat has never ceased its action for such a solution, and its success depends primarily on its cohesion as the most advanced and revolutionary class in present-day Japanese society.

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VIETNAMESE CP CONGRESS STATEMENTS ON FOREIGN POLICY PRAISED

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[Article by M. P. Isayev: "Pursuing the Line of Peace and Friendship"]

[Text] **T**he Fifth Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) held last March was a milestone for the fraternal Vietnamese people, and an important event in the international communist and workers' movement. The Congress urged the Communists and people of Vietnam to tackle two strategic tasks. One of them is to build the material and technical basis of socialism in Vietnam, and the other, to consolidate the national defences of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) to protect the revolutionary gains of the working people there. The Congress mapped out concrete targets for the development of the national economy during the Third Five-Year-Plan period (1981-1985).

The Fifth Congress of the CPV demonstrated that the Communist Party of Vietnam, making use of the general regularities of scientific socialism and the experience of the fraternal states, and taking due account of the specific features of the country, has been consistently working to build a new life. The Congress showed that the CPV is striving thoughtfully and creatively to actualise the immense potential of the country and, at the same time, critically to analyse what has already been done. It has armed the Vietnamese people with a clear-cut programme for building socialism and demonstrated that the working people of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam give full support to the programme directed at building the material and technical basis of socialism, raising the standard of living of the working people and strengthening the country's defence capability.

The Fifth Congress formulated the foreign policy of Vietnam for the period to come. Its decisions confirmed that Vietnam, along with the USSR and other socialist countries, will continue to make an active contribution to the improvement of the international situation, to counteract effectively the forces of imperialism and hegemonism which are hostile to the cause of peace and security.

The entire foreign policy of the CPV today is aimed, first and foremost, at ensuring peace for the rapid restoration and development of the economy and for fulfilling the Third Five-Year Plan. This mirrors the organic unity of the foreign and domestic policies pursued by the SRV. The main directions of Vietnam's foreign policy were formalised in the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam adopted on December 18, 1980. Article 14, in particular, deals with the strengthening of relations of friendship and allround cooperation on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism with the Soviet Union, Laos and Kampuchea.

Today 110 states maintain diplomatic relations with Vietnam, and over sixty countries have trade and economic ties with it. This attests to the growing recognition of Vietnam's foreign policy by the world community. The SRV is part of the world socialist community, an active participant in the nonaligned movement, and respected member of the United Nations. Along with the peoples of the neighbouring countries—Laos and Kampuchea—Vietnam has become a reliable stronghold of peace and socialism in Southeast Asia.

Steering towards the further strengthening and overall development of friendship and cooperation between the SRV and the USSR and other countries of the socialist community remains the strategic line of the CPV and the Vietnamese state. As a result of joining the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance in June 1978 and the signing of the Treaties of Friendship and Cooperation with the USSR, the GDR, Czechoslovakia, Mongolia and Bulgaria (1977-1980), Vietnam's relations with the Soviet Union and the fraternal socialist countries entered a qualitatively new stage and are presently a multifaceted complex of diverse ties along party, state, trade, economic, scientific, technological, cultural and other lines.

The years of the Second Five-Year-Plan period (1976-1980) and the beginning of the Third Five-Year-Plan period were marked by the active development of Vietnam's trade and economic ties with the fraternal countries and the placing of that cooperation on a long-term basis. Commercial ties with the socialist countries account for more than two-thirds of Vietnam's trade. The fraternal countries render assistance to all branches of the SRV's national economy today, thus helping Vietnam overcome the difficulties it encounters in solving socio-economic problems. Vietnam's cooperation with CMEA countries promotes the international socialist division of labour and the entire system of trade and economic ties between Vietnam and other CMEA countries. Comrade Le Duan pointed out at the Fifth CPV Congress, that like the fraternal socialist countries, Vietnam will continue to make every effort to ensure the successful development of cooperation within the framework of bilateral treaties and agreements.

The nature of the fraternal relations between the SRV and countries of the socialist community stands out in especially bold relief if one takes as an example the relationships between Vietnam and the Soviet Union. It was stressed at the Fifth CPV Congress that cooperation with the Soviet Union continues to be the cornerstone of the foreign policy pursued by the CPV and the Vietnamese state. The Communist Party of Vietnam regards this cooperation as a guarantee that the Vietnamese people will be able to defend their country, build socialism, and consolidate their national independence and socialism in Indochina. This cooperation contributes greatly to the strengthening of the socialist community and aids in intensifying the struggle for peace and socialism the world over.

In his report to the Fifth CPV Congress, Le Duan emphasised that, as the most powerful and reliable ally of Vietnam, the Soviet Union has always resolutely sided with the Vietnamese people and has promptly and generously helped them strengthen Vietnam's defences and defend their motherland. The Soviet Union has supplied Vietnam with the most necessary materials, machinery and commodities and helped it lay the foundations for the material and technological basis of socialism. Cooperation with the Soviet Union is expanding, and Soviet assistance to Vietnam in the cultural, scientific and technological fields, as well as in

training skilled specialists, is growing, while trade between the two countries is developing successfully.¹

Today the USSR is assisting Vietnam in the development of practically all major spheres of its national economy. At the end of the Second Five-Year-Plan period, the Soviet Union was rendering technical assistance to the SRV in restoring, building and reconstructing almost 270 economic projects. During the current Third Five-Year-Plan period the USSR is continuing to provide assistance to sixty projects. And in addition, the Soviet Union has begun aiding Vietnam in another forty projects.

A number of important Soviet-Vietnamese documents were signed in 1981-1982 which gave a fresh powerful impetus to cooperation between the USSR and the SRV in trade, the economy and other fields. For example, in July 1981 a protocol on the results of coordinating state plans of the two countries for 1981-1985, an agreement on economic and technological cooperation in the current five-year-plan period, and also an agreement on trade and payments for 1981-1985 were signed.

The Soviet Union remains Vietnam's leading trade partner, and in 1981 it accounted for more than fifty per cent of the SRV's foreign trade.

The fulfilment of the commitments envisaged by the Soviet-Vietnamese documents promotes a balanced development of the economy and ensures the enhancement of production efficiency in the SRV. It helps a more effective satisfaction of the needs of population of the two countries and creates a good foundation for a further development and improvement of trade, economic and other types of cooperation in the current five-year-plan period.

Of paramount significance to the relationships between the two fraternal countries was the meeting in the Kremlin between Leonid Brezhnev and Le Duan on May 31, 1982. The two leaders expressed satisfaction with the successful implementation of the agreement on Soviet-Vietnamese cooperation. They stressed the expediency of closer coordination of the two countries' economic plans, greater efficiency in economic cooperation, and a fuller use of available resources in this important sphere.

While dealing with international issues, Leonid Brezhnev and Le Duan expressed the dedication of their peoples to the cause of peace, independence and social progress, and stressed the desire of the USSR and the SRV to live in peace, maintain goodneighbourly relations with all countries and to develop mutually beneficial international cooperation. The two countries resolutely condemned the policy of imperialism and reaction, the arms race, the exacerbation of conflict situations, and the poisoning of the political atmosphere in the world. The Soviet side expressed its full support of the efforts of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea aimed at settling disputes in Southeast Asia through negotiations. Leonid Brezhnev stressed that the Soviet Union would welcome the early conversion of Southeast Asia into a zone of peace and stability, as this meets the interests not only of the peoples of that region, but also of the whole world.²

Vietnam declared its resolve to step up its cooperation with the USSR and other countries of the socialist community. In his report to the Fifth Congress of the CPV, Le Duan stated that strengthening ties of friendship and expanding cooperation with the fraternal socialist countries along the lines of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism is

¹ *Nhan Dan*, March 28, 1982.

² *Pravda*, June 1, 1982.

a task of primary significance in the foreign policy of the Communist Party of Vietnam and the Vietnamese state.

While marching shoulder-to-shoulder with the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community, Vietnam has waged a consistent struggle for peace and international detente. The materials of the Fifth Congress of the CPV contain the thesis that in the 1970s, the international revolutionary movement has entered a new stage of development. Despite unavoidable difficulties, the forces of socialism are overcoming the forces of imperialism and reaction. Relying on the USSR and accelerating its development, the socialist community serves as a decisive factor in the development of society. It is a firm bulwark of peace, and a powerful support in the on-going revolutionary struggle.

In his report to the Fifth Congress of the CPV, Le Duan pointed out that the forces of imperialism and world reaction have encountered the powerful onslaught of the three revolutionary streams of our day and age, the striving and will of the peoples inspired by the peaceloving Leninist foreign policy of the USSR and countries of the socialist community. Peace, the common goal of all peoples, must be preserved. The joint efforts of socialist and nonaligned countries, democratic and peaceloving forces, and all peoples, as was stressed at the Congress of the Vietnamese Communists, contain tremendous possibilities for averting the threat of nuclear war and checking the aggressive militaristic policy pursued by the forces of imperialism and world reaction.

The Communist Party and the government of Vietnam, along with the CPSU, the Soviet government, the parties and governments of other countries of the socialist community, hold identical views on the key world issues, confirming, not in word but in deed, their adherence to the struggle against the aggressive policy of imperialism and for international detente. The constructive Soviet initiatives to curb the arms race are supported by the SRV. In his report to the Fifth CPV Congress, Le Duan again praised the Peace Programme advanced at the 24th Congress of the CPSU. The Fifth Congress of the CPV voiced its full support of the consistent, peaceloving policy of the USSR, welcomed Leonid Brezhnev's indefatigable activities, the constructive new proposals of the USSR, permeated with a spirit of goodwill and aimed at avoiding cold war and strengthening detente, security and international cooperation.³

The Socialist Republic of Vietnam resolutely condemns the policy of boosting the arms race pursued by US ruling quarters and some other NATO countries, above all NATO's decision to deploy new US medium range nuclear missiles on the territory of some West European countries.

Vietnam emphasises the exceptional importance of the struggle to strengthen peace and stability in Asia. During a meeting in the Kremlin on September 7, 1981, Leonid Brezhnev and Le Duan expressed their conviction that the consolidation of security in Asia should become a common goal of all Asian states. The Soviet leader welcomed the growth of the international influence of the countries of Indochina, India, and other Asian states, and their active participation in world politics. Vietnam holds that the Soviet proposals on confidence-building measures in the Far East, the unswerving efforts by three countries of Indochina and of India directed at strengthening peace and stability in Asia, as well as the activities by other peaceloving nations, enjoy broad support among

³ *Nhan Dan*, March 28, 1982.

Asian peoples and the world public. This shows that the desire for peace is very strong in Asia.

The Socialist Republic of Vietnam gave a high assessment of Mongolia's proposal to sign a convention of non-aggression and non-use of force in relations between the countries of Asia and the Pacific. In his message to Y. Tsedenbal, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, Chairman of the Presidium of the Great People's Khural, Truong Chinh, Member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam, Chairman of the National Assembly, stated that Vietnam is ready to cooperate with Mongolia and other socialist countries in Asia and to make every possible contribution to the joint struggle for peace and security in Asia and elsewhere.

Vietnam maintains that the road toward a genuine settlement of the problems around Afghanistan lies through the discontinuation of outside intervention and the achievement of agreements between the governments of Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and its neighbours on the basis of the well-known proposals made by the government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan on May 14, 1980 and August 24, 1981. It was stated in the documents of the Fifth CPV Congress that Vietnam resolutely supported the government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and the fraternal Afghan people who, with the help of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, have been battling against the undeclared war of the imperialists and international reaction and defending the gains of the April Revolution.

Vietnam favours the proposal to declare the Indian Ocean a zone of peace in line with the desires of the peoples of that region, and condemns the escalation of the US military presence in that area. The SRV backs immediate practical measures for turning the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace, including the holding of an international conference in Colombo no later than the first half of 1983.

The Vietnamese side states that to solve the Middle East problem and achieve a just and lasting peace in that region it is necessary to withdraw all Israeli forces from the Arab lands seized by Israel, and to translate into reality the inalienable national rights of the Arab people of Palestine, including their right to establish an independent state of their own. The Socialist Republic of Vietnam supports the idea of convening an international conference on the Middle East with the participation of the PLO. The people of Vietnam have declared their resolute support for the Lebanese people and the patriots of Palestine who became victim of fresh Israeli aggression in June 1982. In setting forth the demand for a complete and unconditional withdrawal of the Israeli troops from Lebanon, the SRV mass media emphasised that the aggressive actions of the Israeli Zionists in Lebanon were carried out with the agreement, aid and support of the US imperialists.

A Vietnamese delegation took an active part in the Second Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament, where it closely coordinated its actions with the delegation of the Soviet Union and other peaceloving states to secure concrete changes to curb the arms race, and to achieve constructive agreements on the basis of equal security. The SRV praised the new peace initiatives on disarmament set forth by the Soviet Union at the Special Session of the UN General Assembly.

The relations of Vietnam with the Lao People's Democratic Republic and the People's Republic of Kampuchea are developing successfully. The close friendship of the countries of Indochina has become an influen-

tial factor in improving the international atmosphere not only in South-east Asia but also in the whole of Asia.

The documents of the Fifth CPV Congress stated that the Vietnamese people, the Communist Party of Vietnam and the Vietnamese state, in translating into reality the Treaties of Friendship and Cooperation with Laos and Kampuchea, spare no effort in rendering sincere support and assistance to these fraternal countries in the spirit of proletarian internationalism. In recent years, the coalition of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea has entered a new stage. Le Duan noted at the Congress that the relations which had taken shape between Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea are a regular and essential feature of the revolutionary development of the three countries.

In conformity with the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation of July 18, 1977, relations between Vietnam and Laos are developing successfully. Despite the tangible difficulties experienced by the Vietnamese people, the SRV has rendered Laos assistance in most diverse fields. The two fraternal countries are forced to pay special attention to giving a joint fitting rebuff to subversive activities with respect to the states of Indochina. Due to the comprehensive support given by Vietnam and the Soviet Union since the triumph of the revolution in Laos in December 1975, considerable achievements have been attained in laying down the foundations of socialism, as well as in developing economy and culture. The attempts to undermine these revolutionary gains have been checked. The three-year plan (1978-1980) which served as the basis for the implementation of the first five-year plan for the development of the national economy of Laos has been fulfilled successfully on the whole.

In his report to the Third Congress of the People's Revolutionary Party last April, General Secretary of its Central Committee Phommvihane dealt at length with the achievements of the Lao people during the six years since the formation of the Lao People's Democratic Republic. He stressed: "We state with satisfaction that after the victory of the new social system, our country became a member of the socialist community, with the Soviet Union as its mainstay... Along with Vietnam and Kampuchea, Laos has become an outpost of the socialist system in Southeast Asia."⁴

With the collapse, on January 7, 1979, of the bloody Pol Pot regime and the formation of the People's Republic of Kampuchea, a new chapter was opened in the relations of friendship and cooperation between the peoples of Vietnam and Kampuchea. In accordance with the Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation between Vietnam and Kampuchea of February 18, 1979, Vietnam rendered Kampuchea substantial aid in boosting its economy, culture, education and science, in training skilled workers, and so on. This fraternal support was of immense importance to the People's Revolutionary Party of Kampuchea and its government in overcoming the terrible legacy of the Pol Pot regime, stabilising the economy, and improving the living standard of the Kampuchean people.

In a bid to undermine the unity of the three countries of Indochina, reaction in the Western states is accusing Vietnam of "aggression" against Laos and Kampuchea and demanding that the limited contingent of Vietnamese troops, deployed there at the request of the governments of those countries, be withdrawn. Rejecting the brazen interference in

⁴ *Pravda*, April 28, 1982.

their domestic affairs, the countries of Indochina stress that the units of the Vietnamese People's Army will be withdrawn immediately as soon as an end is put to the threat to the sovereignty and independence of Laos and Kampuchea.

The consolidation of an alliance between the three fraternal states—the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, the Lao People's Democratic Republic and the People's Republic of Kampuchea—which have embarked on the road of socialist construction under the guidance of their Marxist-Leninist parties has brought about a qualitatively new political situation in Southeast Asia. Of tremendous significance here is the consistent struggle waged by Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea to turn Southeast Asia into a zone of lasting peace. A number of important initiatives aimed at ensuring a dialogue with the ASEAN countries was set forth at the conferences of Foreign Ministers of the three countries held in Phnom Penh (January 1980), in Vientiane (July 1980) and in Hochiminh (January 1981). The message of the Soviet leadership to the governments of the ASEAN countries and a number of other Asian states of February 22, 1981 had a positive influence on that process. A proposal on the convocation of a regional conference of the two groups of countries—Indochina and ASEAN—was formulated at the Fourth Conference of Foreign Ministers of the three states of Indochina (Vientiane, July 1981). Finally, at the Fifth Conference held in Vientiane in February 1982, the Ministers of the three countries reaffirmed the resolve of the peoples of Indochina to uphold the cause of peace and settle all disputes with the aid of constructive dialogue between all countries concerned. Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea expressed their readiness to hold negotiations with Thailand on all issues of mutual interest.

In spite of the indefatigable efforts by Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea, the situation in Southeast Asia remains tense. US ruling circles opposing normalisation in Southeast Asia, do their utmost to block constructive dialogue between the ASEAN countries and the countries of Indochina, making every effort to force ASEAN to set up a military bloc spearheaded against Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea. These dangerous tendencies are a source of legitimate alarm for the peoples of Southeast Asia. The Indonesian paper *Merdeka* wrote on February 25, 1982, that in their approach to the states of Indochina, the ASEAN countries should take a more realistic stand. Time has shown that the quest for political solutions to existing problems in conformity with the formulas set forth by ASEAN have not brought the prospects for the establishment of peace and security in the region any closer. It is imperative to find an independent way of settling disputes, avoiding the pressure brought to bear from the outside.

The Fifth Congress of the CPV stressed that, following the principles of respect for each other's independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and legitimate interests, as well as the principle of equality and mutual trust, Vietnam will continue to discharge its internationalist duty as regards Laos and Kampuchea and will develop relations of close cooperation and mutual assistance in all spheres. This will strengthen their defences more efficiently and ensure security and economic and cultural advances in each of the three countries of Indochina.⁵

The Vietnamese-Chinese relations remain complicated.

More than once, the government of the SRV has stressed its desire to restore normal relations with the PRC to be based on principles of

⁵ *Nhan Dan*, March 28, 1982.

peaceful coexistence, respect for independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity and of settling disputes through negotiations. It was noted at the Fifth Congress of the CPV that Vietnam repeatedly proposed that negotiations, disrupted unilaterally by China, be resumed, but the Chinese side invariably rejected those proposals.

The people of Vietnam, who fought for many years for its liberation, has always been a reliable ally of the national liberation movement, and has struggled staunchly for the elimination of all forms of colonial domination. The Socialist Republic of Vietnam is an active participant in the nonaligned movement. Vietnam makes its contribution to greater cohesion among the participants in the nonaligned movement on an anti-imperialist basis, and champions stronger ties between them and their allies, i. e., countries of the socialist community and other forces of social progress in the world.

The Socialist Republic of Vietnam took part in the South-South Conference of developing countries held in Delhi in February 1982. In his speech at the Conference, the Vietnamese delegate accused the industrialised capitalist states, the USA above all, of frustrating the North-South dialogue, and of seeking to place the burden of the economic depression on the shoulders of the developing countries.⁶

Vietnamese-Indian relations, which are an important factor in strengthening stability and peace in Asia and a fitting response to those who attempt to undermine the unity of the nonaligned movement, serve as an example of truly equal friendly relations between states with different social systems.⁷

The Socialist Republic of Vietnam, which became a member of the United Nations on September 20, 1977, takes an active part in its activities. Vietnam praises the efforts of the UN to maintain universal peace. Vietnamese delegates to UN make a positive contribution to the struggle for peace and detente, to curbing the arms race, and support the constructive and peaceful initiatives of the USSR and other socialist countries.

Due to its peaceloving policies backed by the Fifth Congress of the CPV, Socialist Vietnam has won high prestige in the world community. Vietnam's initiatives to strengthen peace and stability in Southeast Asia, and its realism and readiness to develop mutually advantageous relations with other countries are winning increasing recognition throughout the world. Vietnam's international policy has exerted a favourable influence on the situation in Asia and the world.

⁶ See *Patriot*, Feb. 24, 1982.

⁷ See *Quan Doi Nhan Dan*, Jan. 7, 1982.

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SOVIET BACKING FOR PRC ON TAIWAN ISSUE STRESSED

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 4, Oct-Dec 82 pp 45-54

[Article by V. N. Baryshnikov, candidate of historical sciences: "The Principled Stand of the USSR on the 'Taiwan Issue'"]

[Text] The so-called Taiwan issue came into being as a result of US imperialism's interference in the civil war in China which ended in the defeat and collapse of the Chiang Kaishek regime and the formation of the People's Republic of China in 1949.

The remnants of the Guomindang grouping fled to Taiwan and some other islands off the Chinese coast. At that period (prior to the Korean war), the US ruling quarters laid their stakes on the nationalist sentiments of some CPC leaders, hoped to reach understanding with them and, for the time being, stated that Taiwan belonged to China and that the United States had no intentions of holding that island in its hands. On December 22, 1949, the US Information Service, on instructions of the Department of State, circulated a memorandum to US diplomatic representatives abroad, which ordered them to explain that the United States allegedly had no interest in possessing Taiwan. The document pointed out that the island was part of China politically, economically, historically and geographically.¹

At a closed meeting held at the Department of State on October 6-8, 1949, which discussed relations with China, most experts favoured recognition of the new regime in China and were opposed to supporting Chiang Kaishek. Having in view the nationalist grouping of Mao Zedong within the CPC leadership, they noted that nationalism had never been so strong in China and that the Chinese communists had succeeded in becoming the leaders of Chinese nationalism. This is why the meeting recommended that US Administration recognise the PRC and refrain from occupying Taiwan.²

A reflection of these sentiments was the publication by US Department of State of the *White Paper on US-Chinese Relations in 1944-1949* which described the Guomindang rule as inadequate, ineffective, corrupt and obviously doomed to collapse. At that time, the US refused to support Chiang Kaishek's proposal to set up a Pacific pact with the aim of continuing the struggle against the Chinese revolution. In January 1950, President Truman promised that Washington would not follow a line which could lead to US involvement in the civil conflict in China. He also claimed that the US would not render military aid to the Guomindang or send military advisers to Taiwan.³ Taiwan was even excluded from the US "defence" perimeter.

¹ See *Congressional Record*, Vol. 96, Washington, 1950-1951, p. 82.

² Institute of Pacific Relations. *Hearings Before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 82 Congress, 2 Session on the Institute of Pacific Relations*, Washington, 1951-1952, pp. 2501, 2527-2528.

³ See *Department of State Bulletin*, Washington, 1950, Vol. 22, No. 550.

So, initially, shortly after the PRC was formed, the Taiwan issue was, as it were, nonexistent. Moreover, the US Administration used Taiwan and the remnants of the Guomindang regime entrenched there as a bargaining instrument while it sought approaches to the new Chinese leadership. At that period, the units of the PLA stationed in Central and South China were preparing intensively to cross the Taiwan Strait and liberate the island. Speaking at the 3rd Plenary Meeting of the CC CPC on June 6, 1950, Mao Zedong claimed that although a portion of the PLA personnel were being discharged, the army should remain in sufficient strength to liberate Taiwan and Tibet.⁴

The situation had changed substantially by mid-1950 after the People's Republic of China joined the community of socialist countries, concluded the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance with the USSR, and embarked on socialist development. After this, the US imperialist policy vis-à-vis the PRC shed its false front, a fact which led to a number of repressive measures ranging from diplomatic non-recognition, a condition imposed on all states dependent on the USA, to economic blockade.

At precisely that point, the Truman Administration produced a series of official declarations concerning Taiwan, which made clear its intention to prevent the return of the island to the People's Republic of China. In his statement of June 27, 1950, in connection with the beginning of the hostilities in Korea, the US President announced his order that any attack on Formosa be repelled. The document also contained the refusal of the US Administration to recognise Taiwan as Chinese territory. Truman said that the decision on the future status of Formosa would be adopted after the restoration of security in the Pacific Ocean, the conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan, or a discussion of that issue in the United Nations.⁵ Simultaneously, the Washington Administration took some measures to strengthen the military, economic and political position of the Chiang Kaishek grouping, notably by coming out in support of its claim that it should represent China in international organisations.

So, the Taiwan "issue" was created by US imperialist policy toward the PRC. Its emergence was accompanied by armed US aggression against the PRC and attempts to use Taiwan in the struggle against China's revolutionary development.

In conditions of the imperialist blockade and blackmail, the People's Republic of China could feel the full measure of efficient support rendered by the USSR and other socialist countries, as well as democratic forces all over the world. The Soviet Union was the first to recognise the PRC and establish diplomatic relations with it. It gave China emergency economic and military aid, and helped neutralise anti-communist attempts to set up a *cordon sanitaire* around it. It is not by chance that Mao Zedong admitted on November 14, 1957 at the International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties held in Moscow: "Were it not for the Soviet Union the imperialists could have swallowed us up."⁶

The Soviet policy vis-à-vis Taiwan was also firm and consistent. The USSR has always respected the PRC's sovereign right to Taiwan and other coastal islands occupied by the Chiang Kaishek grouping. The USSR proceeded from the fact that Taiwan, which was inhabited mainly by the Chinese who had come from Fujian and Guangdong provinces,

⁴ See *Pravda*, June 15, 1950.

⁵ *New York Times*, June 27, 1950.

⁶ *PRC. A Concise History (1949-1979)*, Moscow, 1980, p. 32 (in Russian).

was a province of China for a long historical period, and only in 1895 did Japan seize it by force of arms. This aggressive act was later formalised by the Treaty of Shimonoseki, which was imposed on China. This unjust and illegal act was declared null and void by the governments of the great powers which belonged to the anti-Hitler coalition during World War II. The international documents issued by the summit meetings served as the legal basis for the return of Taiwan to China. Heads of government of the US, Britain and China signed the Cairo Declaration on December 1, 1943. It envisaged that "all territories that Japan captured from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa and the Pescadore Islands should be returned to the Chinese Republic".⁷ The July 1945 Potsdam Conference of heads of government of the US, Great Britain and China confirmed the Cairo Declaration. Article 8 of the Potsdam Declaration read: "The terms of the Cairo Declaration should be observed, and Japan's sovereignty must be limited to Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu and the small islands upon which we shall take a decision."⁸

On August 8, 1945, the Soviet Government officially joined the Potsdam Declaration.⁹ The surrender of Japan was accompanied by it adopting all the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration, including the clause on Taiwan. In the Act on unconditional surrender signed by Japan on September 2, 1945, Japan agreed to the "terms of the Declaration published on July 26 in Potsdam by the heads of government of the United States, China and Great Britain, which was later acceded to by the USSR as well".¹⁰

Basing himself on the directives on the return of Taiwan to China issued by the heads of the great powers, the Commander of the Allied Forces in the Pacific empowered, on February 9, 1945, the Chinese authorities to receive surrender of the Japanese troops on Taiwan. On August 30, 1945, the government of China issued a decree on the formation of a province on Taiwan and appointed a governor there. In October, an official ceremony marking the surrender of the Japanese troops was held on Taiwan. In July 1946, Chinese citizenship was granted to all the inhabitants of the island.

Thus, the international agreements concerning the return of Taiwan to China were implemented, and that territory again became a sovereign part of China.

However, in the early 1950s, the United States and other imperialist powers retracted the commitments set forth in the abovementioned international acts, and began working toward isolating Taiwan from the PRC. The island was turned into a base of the Chinese counterrevolutionaries, wherefrom Chiang Kaishek, enjoying as he did an all-out support from Washington, hoped to launch a new offensive to take revenge and restore his domination over mainland China.

Protected by the US 7th Fleet which patrolled the Taiwan Strait, the Chiang Kaishek military assaulted PRC ships and other countries' traders on their way to Chinese ports. Profiting by the weakness of the PRC's air defences, the Guomindang aviation made unpunished raids on the towns of South, Southeast and Central China, with Shanghai coming under especially intense bombing. Thus, on February 6, 1950, eighteen

⁷ *Izvestia*, Dec. 3, 1943.

⁸ *Ibid.*, Nov. 30, 1950.

⁹ *Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union During the Great Patriotic War*, Vol. 3, Moscow, 1947, p. 263 (in Russian).

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 480.

Guomindang aircraft, including 12 B-24 bombers, dropped 60 bombs on the city, damaging the city power station and killing or wounding more than a thousand civilians. In March 1950, during an air raid on Canton, the Guomindang planes destroyed a number of buildings and sunk several vessels on the Zhujiang river. Chiang Kaishek's squadrons, partially manned by mercenaries from the USA, Japan and West Germany, made similarly devastating raids on Nanking, Nanchang, Hangzhou and other Chinese cities. This air piracy was cut short due to the timely military assistance of the Soviet Union. As early as March 20, 1950, Taipei announced that the Guomindang aircraft were engaged near Shanghai by Soviet jets. Soviet aviation provided air cover for the whole of the PRC's territory, thereby creating conditions for peaceful work in China.

Simultaneously, the USSR came out with an initiative to expel the Guomindang from the United Nations and to grant the People's Republic of China its legitimate place in that organisation. Speaking at the Political Committee of the 4th UN General Assembly on November 25, 1949, the Soviet delegate demanded that representatives of the PRC be invited, inasmuch as Chiang Kaishek's delegates had no right to occupy the place that was rightfully China's. At the sitting of the UN Security Council convened on January 10, 1950, to settle the issue of the powers of the Chiang Kaishek representative, the Soviet delegation resolutely supported the statements made by the PRC government in November 1949 and January 1950 concerning the illegal presence of the Guomindang members in the UN, and demanded that they be expelled as representing neither China nor the Chinese people. The Soviet draft resolution provided for refusal to recognise the powers of the Chiang Kaishek representative and for his expulsion from the Security Council.¹¹ This proposal, however, was turned down on the insistence of Western powers led by the US delegation.

For more than twenty years, the USA and some of its allies adhered to a hostile stand regarding the PRC's rights in the UN, while during this entire period and up to the 26th UN General Assembly when the PRC finally won its legitimate place in this international organisation, the Soviet Union, both in the UN and at all international forums invariably sided with the Chinese people, working to eliminate the abnormal situation that took shape as a result of US attempts to stage a political blockade of the PRC. Under conditions when PRC was artificially denied its place at the United Nations, it was the Soviet diplomacy that shouldered most of the work of upholding the legitimate rights of the Chinese people. These activities were coordinated with the moves of the PRC government in the spirit of the proletarian internationalism.

Addressing the plenary session of the 26th UN General Assembly (November 15, 1971), Soviet Ambassador Yakov Malik said in connection with the restoration of the PRC's rights in the UN: "It is once again, and in a concrete form, that life itself has corroborated the correctness, adherence to principle and foresight inherent in the policies of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet state which have been consistently upholding the principles and objectives of the UN Charter, including the principle of universality. This consistency and the firmness of the policy and stand of the Soviet Union later made it possible to overcome the obstruction and counteraction of imperialism."¹²

¹¹ *Pravda*, Jan. 15, 1950.

¹² *Messages of Greetings to the PRC Delegation*, Peking, 1971, p. 128.

The Soviet Union took a similar stand with respect to attempts by the imperialist quarters, led by the USA, to call into question the status of Taiwan as Chinese territory. Such attempts were prompted by the desire to establish a "legal basis" for using the island as a springboard of aggression.

The order issued by President Truman on the "neutralisation" of Taiwan marked the beginning of it becoming a US military base in the Far East and Southeast Asia. Referring to the place Taiwan occupied in US strategic planning, General McArthur described it as the main axis of the US advanced line in the Pacific and an unsinkable aircraft carrier. He wrote that America should control Taiwan to maintain the air threat to every Asian port from Vladivostok to Singapore.¹³ In conformity with this doctrine, Taiwan was turned into a major US military base. The US 7th Fleet used Taiwan's ports for docking, and the US 13th Air Army was stationed on Taiwan's air fields. The 600,000-strong Chiang Kaishek army was rearmed, reorganised and modernised under the guidance of US military advisers. It was later used for subversion against the PRC, made its bit in the Korean war, and performed operations against some independent countries of Southeast Asia.

Consequently, the United States was interested in sowing doubts about China's legal right to Taiwan. In his message to the UN Secretary-General dated August 25, 1950, the US Ambassador to the UN made a formal statement concerning the need for an appropriate international action to determine the future status of Taiwan and expressed readiness of the US Administration to consider the Taiwan issue in the UN.¹⁴ The message was approved by President Truman. At a press conference on August 31, 1950, he claimed that the Formosa situation should be resolved as part of the peace treaty with Japan.¹⁵ The US delegation came out with a proposal to put the "Formosa issue" on the agenda of the 5th UN General Assembly, thereby seeking to create the impression that the problem of who should own Taiwan was still open, and that the United Nations had the right to decide upon it.

The Soviet Union opposed the plans to have this problem considered in the UN. At the October 5, 1950 sitting of the General Committee, the Soviet Ambassador stated that the inclusion of this question in the agenda "would be a violation of the UN Charter and an insult to the great Chinese people who won their independence after a fierce struggle. The consideration of the Taiwan question would be tantamount to interference in China's internal affairs".¹⁶

Although this question was put on the agenda of the 5th UN General Assembly, the discussion did not follow. The United States met with opposition not only from the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, but also from India, Burma, and other Asian and African states which were preparing to take measures in support of the PRC's right to Taiwan. The Guomindang representative, too, opposed the USA, since the US stand undermined Chiang Kaishek's claim that he could act on behalf of China. Therefore, the discussion of the Taiwan issue was "postponed", and the Soviet delegation demanded that it be removed from the agenda altogether.

When the Soviet complaint about US aggression against China was being examined at the same UN General Assembly, the USSR's Ambas-

¹³ See *US News & World Report*, Sept. 1, 1950, p. 32.

¹⁴ *UN Security Council, Official Records*, 1950, p. 32.

¹⁵ *Washington Post*, Sept. 1, 1950.

¹⁶ *Pravda*, Oct. 7, 1950.

sador reiterated the claim concerning the illegitimate nature of US plans for Taiwan. Proceeding from facts, he demonstrated that Taiwan had always been part of China and that the invasion of that island by US armed forces was tantamount to aggression against the PRC. The Soviet delegate tabled a draft resolution demanding that the Security Council adopt immediate measures to stop the US aggression.¹⁷

This question was discussed by the Security Council on November 28, 1950, with a PRC delegation, invited at the insistence of the Soviet Union, taking part. The speeches of the Soviet and the Chinese representatives laid bare the aggressive nature of the US actions with respect to Taiwan. Discussions in the United Nations showed that many states refused to support such a policy. The US Administration lost all illusions on account of its being able to obtain a UN sanction for the secession of Taiwan from the People's Republic of China. So, soon after (January 21, 1951), the US delegation issued a statement to the effect that the Formosa issue could be solved only within the context of a peace treaty with Japan and that there was no need to discuss it in the United Nations.¹⁸

The next round of struggle over Taiwan began during the preparation of the peace treaty with Japan. In May 1950, the USA unilaterally began drafting the abovementioned treaty, taking no account of the positions of the USSR and China, although the peoples of those countries had made a major contribution to the rout of the Japanese militarists. The clauses of the draft treaty concerning territorial issues were devised by the Americans with a view to revising the clearcut provisions of the Cairo, Potsdam and Yalta Conferences. The US Administration's memorandum on the peace treaty divulged on October 26, 1950, contained a provision on the need for the four great powers to determine the status of Taiwan and Penghuliedao within a year. If they failed, the UN General Assembly was supposed to solve the problem.¹⁹

The Soviet Government's memorandum to the US Administration dated November 20, 1950, asked for clarification of the US proposal on a renewed consideration of Taiwan's status, since it was at odds with the decisions of the Cairo and the Potsdam Conferences whereby Taiwan was returned to China. At the same time, the Soviet memorandum also queried what the US Administration was doing to establish the viewpoint of the People's Republic of China on all aspects of the peace treaty with Japan.²⁰ However, while preparing the draft treaty, Washington was guided exclusively by the interests of the US imperialists. In reply to the Soviet remarks of May 7, 1951, concerning the provisions of the draft treaty dealing with Taiwan, the United States came up with a casuistic note to the effect that since the Cairo Declaration mentioned the transfer of Taiwan and Penghuliedao to the Chinese Republic, the Soviet demand that these territories be returned to the People's Republic of China "were unfounded".²¹

Such an "argument" obviously ran counter to the elementary principles of international law on legal succession of states formed as a result of social revolutions and representing a new type of state as to their class character. In such cases, in conformity with international law such a state, despite any change of its name, is undoubtedly the full legal successor of the state that ceased to exist as regards the whole of its ter-

¹⁷ United Nations. First Committee, New York, 1950, pp. 358-360.

¹⁸ See *New York Times*, Jan. 23, 1951.

¹⁹ See *Department of State Bulletin*, Dec. 4, 1950, p. 881.

²⁰ *Pravda*, Nov. 24, 1950.

²¹ *Department of State Bulletin*, May 28, 1951, p. 853.

ritory as well as all of its property available on this territory and on the territories of other states. The change of a state's name in no way influences its rights as a subject of international law but merely reflects the emergence of a new internal system in the country. Its international nature as a subject of international law is not altered. Any changes in the socio-economic system of a state are the internal affair of the people who inhabit it. The principle of noninterference demands that other states respect this expression of popular will.

All these provisions apply fully to the People's Republic of China as well. Any attempt to restrict the sovereignty of the PRC on any part of Chinese territory contravenes the international law, according to which the return of Taiwan precisely to the PRC, as the successor of the Chinese Republic, is legal.

On this basis, the USSR Foreign Ministry, in its statement of June 10, 1951, rejected the American arguments, and among other important remarks concerning the draft peace treaty with Japan proposed that it stress the need to implement the decisions taken by the Cairo and Potsdam Conferences, and the Yalta Agreement on Territorial Issues.²² However, the final draft of the peace treaty made public by the USA on July 12, 1951, contained no clauses saying that Taiwan and the other islands belonged to China. It only mentioned Japan's renunciation of those territories.

At the San Francisco Peace Conference held on September 4-8, 1951, the Soviet delegation pointed out the major flaws of the US-British draft treaty. In his speech on September 5, Andrei Gromyko, head of the Soviet delegation, dealt, among other things, with the problem of Taiwan. He stressed that the "draft grossly violates China's undisputable right to the return of the inalienable parts of Chinese territory seized from it by the Japanese militarists. The draft," Andrei Gromyko pointed out, "deliberately glosses over in silence the future state of these territories." After demanding the return of Taiwan to the Chinese people, the Soviet delegation proposed that the draft be supplemented with a clause to the effect that "Japan recognises the sovereignty of the People's Republic of China over Taiwan".²³ Under the pressure brought to bear by the USA, the Conference approved the draft treaty as it stood, taking no account of the Soviet amendments. The USSR and other socialist countries declined to sign the treaty.

In a bid to erect new legal barriers on the road to the reunification of Taiwan with China, the United States fostered the conclusion of a peace treaty between Japan and the Guomintang regime as the representative of "China".

The US-Guomintang "Mutual Defence" Treaty was signed on December 2, 1954; according to John Foster Dulles, it was designated once and for all time to put an end to the rumours and reports that the United States would in any way agree to transfer Formosa and the Pescadores to the control of Communists.²⁴ In accordance with Article 5 of the Treaty, the USA undertook to render armed aid to the Chiang Kaishek grouping in the event if the PLA started operations to drive the Guomintang from Taiwan.

In its Statement of December 15, 1954, the USSR Foreign Ministry described the purpose of the treaty as the secession of Taiwan and Peng-

²² *Pravda*, June 11, 1951.

²³ *Ibid.*, Sept. 7, 1951.

²⁴ See *Congressional Record*, Vol. 101, Washington, 1955-1956, p. 1380.

huliedao from China and the establishment of US domination over those Chinese islands. The Statement pointed out that "since Taiwan is a Chinese territory, the task of its liberation is naturally China's internal affair and a sovereign right of the Chinese people".²⁵

Since the mid-1950s, particularly after the beginning of Chinese-US negotiations at the ambassadorial level (first in Geneva and then in Warsaw), Western powers, the United States above all, increasingly openly sought to assume the "two Chinas" tactic to block the return of Taiwan to the PRC. Aware that the "two Chinas" situation was unacceptable to the PRC government, the imperialist powers began stubbornly pushing the "two Chinas" policy in international organisations of which the PRC was a full-fledged member. This situation took shape for the first time during the preparations for the 16th Olympics in Melbourne in November 1956 and at the sitting (June 1957) of the Bureau of the Special Committee on Holding the International Geophysical Year. The leaders of these organisations, succumbing to the pressure from the USA, invited representatives of the "Chinese Republic" on Taiwan to take part in their proceedings, though the PRC was already a member of those bodies. Later, a similar situation was artificially created at the 19th International Conference of the Red Cross, the International Football Federation, the conference on big energy systems in Paris, and so on.²⁶ In each case, the protests lodged by the PRC government against this imperialist conspiracy enjoyed the solidarity and support of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

At that period the USA, Britain, and some other countries boosted propaganda stressing the need to resort to the policy of "two Chinas", of separating Taiwan, and impeding the PRC's struggle for the return of its territories.

The USSR and all other socialist countries worked consistently and resolutely against the separation of Taiwan from the PRC and against the "two Chinas" concept. At the UN General Assemblies and all international conferences they firmly upheld the rights of the Chinese people. For example, in November 1956, at the 11th UN General Assembly, the Soviet delegation stated that there never had been nor were there at that time "two Chinas". There was only one China—the People's Republic of China—whose government enjoyed support of the Chinese people and exercised its power throughout the entire territory of the country.²⁷

In its foreign policy contacts, the Soviet government invariably stressed the need to return Taiwan to China. This provision was written, in particular, into joint statements and declarations of the USSR and Vietnam (December 1954), the USSR and India (June 1955), the USSR and Burma (October 1955), the USSR and Yugoslavia (June 1955 and June 1956), and so on.

During the Soviet-US summit talks in 1959, the Soviet delegation insisted on the need to recognise the right of the People's Republic of China to Taiwan. In its Statement of November 30, 1959, the Soviet government stressed that the "Soviet Union clearly understands the desire of the Chinese people and government of the PRC for the return to the Chinese state of Taiwan and other Chinese islands belonging to it but occupied by foreign troops. On this issue, we shall fully support the government of the

²⁵ *Pravda*, Dec. 16, 1954.

²⁶ *Against US Occupation of Taiwan and American Intrigues Aimed at Creating the "Two Chinas" Situation*, Peking, 1958, pp. 85-113 (in Chinese).

²⁷ *Pravda*, Nov. 16, 1956.

People's Republic of China until it has this problem solved, inasmuch as it has all juridical and moral rights on its side." This same Statement exposed attempts to perpetuate the separation of Taiwan from the PRC with the aid of the "two Chinas" tactic. "In the West," the Statement said, "attempts are still being made to prove that allegedly there is not one but two Chinas. However, any schoolchild knows that there is only one China, and that the capital of the People's Republic of China is in Peking. Today, when the People's Republic of China has entered the second decade of its existence, after large-scale political and social transformations have been carried out there and outstanding achievements in the development of economy and culture have been attained, those who adhere to the absurd concept of the 'two Chinas' look particularly ridiculous."²⁸

The Chinese people felt the efficiency of Soviet assistance during the crisis situations which were created in the Taiwan Strait. Early in 1954, the United States decided to test the PRC's strength with the help of the Guomindang grouping. Washington cancelled Truman's order to "neutralise" Taiwan, and gave the Chiang Kaishek army a free hand in carrying out military operations against the PRC. However, the Chinese people, who had boosted their defences with Soviet assistance, easily repelled the Guomindang sorties. In 1954, the Chiang Kaishek grouping lost, in East China alone, 39 aircraft, 54 warships, and about three thousand officers and men.²⁹ As a result, the USA was compelled to restrain Chiang Kaishek again.

During the September 1958 crisis in the Taiwan Strait³⁰ the United States concentrated its armed forces on the largest scale since World War II, an unprecedented action, and tried to blackmail the PRC. US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles said that the US Administration did not regard the control exercised by the Chinese communists over mainland China as constant nor did it regard this control as one of those inevitable circumstances which the USA would constantly have to reckon with and reconcile itself to.³¹ However, this imperialist blackmail, too, was foiled owing to the resolute interference of the Soviet Union which, basing itself on the principles of proletarian internationalism, issued a serious warning to the United States. The Statement of the Soviet government of September 7, 1958, said: "An attack at the People's Republic of China, which is a great friend, ally and neighbour of our country, is an attack at the Soviet Union. Loyal to its duty, our country will do everything in order to uphold, together with People's China, the security of the two states and the interests of peace throughout the world."³² On September 15, a similar warning was issued for the second time. At the height of an acute international crisis, the USSR took a firm stand of solidarity with and support of its ally.

At that time, the internationalist stand of the USSR was praised in the message of thanks sent to the Soviet government by Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai on October 10.³³ On October 15, 1958, the CC CPC sent a special message to the Central Committee of the CPSU

²⁸ *Pravda*, Dec. 1, 1959.

²⁹ *Renmin ribao*, Jan. 2, 1955.

³⁰ For details see O. B. Borisov, V. T. Koloskov, *Soviet-Chinese Relations, 1945-1980*, Moscow, 1980, pp. 166-169; M. S. Kapitsa, *PRC: Three Decades—Three Policies*, Moscow, 1979, pp. 204-209.

³¹ *New York Times*, Sept. 10, 1958.

³² *Pravda*, Sept. 9, 1958.

³³ *Pravda*, Oct. 16, 1958.

expressing gratitude for the effective assistance in ensuring security of the PRC. The message read in part: "We are deeply touched by your boundless fidelity to the principles of Marxism-Leninism. In our struggle against the Americans, we have already obtained powerful support from the Soviet Union."³⁴

The Soviet stand as regards Taiwan has never changed. In November 1964, Leonid Brezhnev again stated: "We have been and continue to be of the opinion that Taiwan should be reunited with its motherland—the People's Republic of China."³⁵

The Soviet stand on the Taiwan issue remains irreproachable and firm. The USSR has not changed its fundamental approach to the Taiwan problem, and has never tried to make it a subject of bargaining or diplomatic manoeuvring. Of late, this policy was reiterated most authoritatively. In his speech in Tashkent on March 24, 1982, Leonid Brezhnev stated: "We have never supported and do not support in any form the so-called 'two Chinas' concept, and we fully recognise and continue to recognise the PRC's sovereignty over Taiwan."

³⁴ *Pravda*, Sept. 21, 1963.

³⁵ L. I. Brezhnev, *Following Lenin's Course, Speeches and Articles*, Vol. 1, Moscow, 1973, p. 28 (in Russian).

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DEVELOPMENT OF LEFTWING JAPANESE WOMEN'S ORGANIZATIONS CHRONICLED

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 4, Oct-Dec 82 pp 55-66

[Article by I. I. Tamginskiy: "The Women's Movement in Japan"]

[Text] The defeat suffered by Japanese imperialism in the Second World War and the socio-economic transformations carried out in the country on the basis of the Potsdam Declaration brought about a change in the position of women in Japanese society. The mainstays of the semi-feudal arrangement in Japanese families collapsed, and women ceased to be oppressed creatures deprived of political and economic rights. Japanese women quickly began to adapt to the new conditions, to join ever more actively the sphere of material production, especially the services, to be appointed to various public posts, and to take part in political life.

In present-day Japan, one often encounters women MPs, prominent scientists, doctors, teachers at establishments of higher education, journalists, and even businessmen. Women are especially numerous in trade, and they comprise a considerable part of office employees, teachers at elementary schools and medical workers. The number of women working in the sphere of material production has grown considerably. Whereas in 1960 the number of working women in Japan was 6,920,000,¹ the figure for 1978 was already 12,800,000, or 33.7 per cent of all hired labour.²

Big changes have also taken place in the age composition of working women: the share of women workers under 30 was 69 per cent in 1955 and 41 per cent in 1976, while the proportion of married women workers rose from 35.3 per cent in 1955 to 64.9 per cent in 1975.³

More than a half of all women (54.8 per cent) work at small and medium enterprises (labour force not exceeding 100 persons), where wages and working conditions are much worse than at big enterprises.

The country's rapid development due to scientific and technological revolution has also brought about big changes for the peasants. There are noticeable alterations in the ratio of men and women employed in agricultural production. The number of men between 30 and 39 dropped, while the number of women of this age group went up from 58.8 per cent in 1960 to 62.2 per cent in 1976.⁴ 42 per cent of all women between 30 and 59, besides being occupied in agriculture, hold other jobs, 39 per cent of these working on the by-the-day, or part-time basis.⁵

Women engaged in small family businesses comprise a very large group of the country's population. There were 5,070,000 in 1976, including 2,210,000 owners and 2,860,000 employees.

When speaking of the changes in the status of women in society, mention should be made of such an important fact as the rising educational

¹ See *Fujin mondai to nihon kyosanto* (The Women's Question and the CPJ), Tokyo, 1981, p. 29.

² See *Zenei* (special issue), No. 989, p. 451.

³ *Ibidem*.

⁴ *Fujin mondai to nihon kyosanto*, p. 30.

⁵ *Ibidem*.

level of Japanese women in the post-war period. Whereas before the war, only 17 per cent of all girls went to high school, at present the corresponding figure is 99.5 per cent. The share of women entering establishments of higher education has also grown: from 17 per cent in 1950 to 30.8 per cent in 1977.⁶

This was promoted by the new system of education introduced on the basis of the new constitution and also by the ethical and psychological changes in the mentality of Japanese women. The demand for skilled labour increased after Japan had entered a period of rapid industrial development. The scientific and technological revolution has exerted a big influence not only on production processes but also on the minds of millions of Japanese working people.

Serious changes have also taken place in the attitude of women to work. Japanese women are ever more actively drawn into the sphere of material production where they go through the difficult school of class struggle. The following fact bears evidence to the new attitude of Japanese women to productive work: in a poll conducted in October 1979 by the Prime Minister's Office, 20 per cent of the women replied positively to the question "Will you work after you will have children?"; whereas only 12 per cent gave a similar answer seven years prior to that.⁷

But the position of Japanese women, especially working women, remains difficult. They are still subjected to various types of discrimination. For their work they are paid much less than men; women remain in an inferior position in the family, and their participation in socio-political life is restricted by the vestiges of feudalism and the insufficient development of democracy. Japan still does not have a law ensuring equality of men and women in all spheres of material and spiritual life.

Among Japan's political parties, only the Communist Party consistently works for the rights and interests of women and for improving their position in the family and society.

The Communist Party of Japan has always regarded the emancipation of women as a component part of the work for the emancipation of the people as a whole. In 1922, in the draft party programme, the CPJ set forth the demand "to grant electoral rights to all men and women who have reached the age of 18". The Theses of 1932, adopted by the CPJ CC as a programmatic document, protested against "dual exploitation of women" and contained the demand of "equal pay for equal work".⁸

The Communist Party launched a particularly persistent struggle for the rights and interests of women, and for enhancing their role in Japanese society in the post-war period, when for the first time in its history, it was given the right to function legally. At its 4th Congress in December 1945 (the first legal one) the CPJ adopted a special Programme of Action in Defence of Women which set forth demands for the granting of suffrage to women, equal pay for equal work, introduction of maternity leaves, expansion of the network of children's institutions, coeducation, and the liquidation of the humiliating status of women in the family.⁹

Proceeding from this programme, the CPJ began vigorously to draw women into active socio-political work, into mass organisations of working people, into strike action, and called on them to join the struggle for a new, democratic Japan.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 29.

⁷ *Zenei* (special issue), 1980, No. 452, p. 450.

⁸ *Fujin mondai to nihon kyosanto*, p. 10.

⁹ I. I. Kovalenko, *Essays on the History of the Communist Movement in Japan Before the Second World War*, Moscow, 1979, pp. 238-253 (in Russian).

Japanese women actively responded to the call of the CPJ and together with their husbands, fathers, and brothers rose to the struggle against the Japanese-American reaction, for democratic transformations, for peace and social progress.

The Party's policy on the women's question was further developed in the decisions of the 6th CPJ Congress in 1947. In its appeal to the people "In the Name of National Independence" the Party proposed that all patriots, all men and women, should struggle for the implementation of the Potsdam Declaration, for the country's democratisation and demilitarisation, for the improvement of the people's life, for the restoration of the country's full sovereignty, against the plans of the imperialist enslavement of peoples, and for peace throughout the world.

The 6th CPJ Congress also studied organisational questions connected with the women's movement. The Congress proposed the formation of a united women's front based on the existing Council of Women's Organisations of Struggle for National Independence and Peace (Nihon minzoku-no dokuritsu to heiwa-o meizasu toso-no tame fujin dantai kyogikai). The Party set the task of creating such a united women's front that could become a reliable component of a broader national democratic front.

Responding to the Party's call, the women's departments of trade unions belonging to the All-Japan Congress of Production Trade Unions, that held militant revolutionary positions, began to join the women's movement actively. Women joined the trade unions to conduct a struggle within the ranks of the organised labour against hunger and economic dislocation, for improving the standard of living, for democratic rights, against discrimination, and for the protection of motherhood. Many women's departments of trade unions succeeded in including these demands in collective bargains.

Some prewar women's organisations resumed their activities on a new basis in the first post-war years (for instance, the Union of Peasant Women for the Purity of Morals) and new ones were set up: the Union of Women of New Japan (Sinnihon fujin domei), later reorganised into the Union of Struggle for the Rights of Women (Fujin yukensha domei), the League for Upbringing in the Spirit of Democracy (Minshu kyoiku temmei), and the Women's Democratic Club (Fujin minshu kurabu) which under the guidance of Yuriko Miyamoto and Toshiko Hani played an important role in the democratic women's movement.

A congress of Japanese women was held in 1948 on the initiative of the CPJ. The Council of Democratic Women of Japan (Nihon minshu fujin kyogikai, or abbreviated Minfukyo), the first women's democratic organisation to include not only working women but also housewives, was formed. The Council united more than 600,000 women from 44 women's organisations which prior to that belonged to various democratic associations. It had not only a central board but also a ramified network of local organisations. Minfukyo belonged to the Women's International Democratic Federation.

The Council worked actively on a national scale. It became the focal point of the entire women's movement and the initiator of many major countrywide activities. Minfukyo was the first to celebrate March 8, International Women's Day, in an organised manner in Japan. It sponsored a women's congress for peace, gave much support to striking workers of the Toho film company, actively supported the struggle of workers of state-owned railways, and conducted a campaign for increasing allocations for the expansion of the network of children's day-care centres.

Still the activities of Minfukyo were of a limited nature, because its membership did not include the women's departments of political parties. To impart a broader nature to the Council of Democratic Women, an agreement was reached by political parties to set up a supra-party national women's organisation. Such an organisation was formed in 1949 at a congress devoted to Women's Day and was named the Council of Women's Organisations of Japan (Fudankyo). It was formed on the basis of 44 women's organisations that previously belonged to the Council of Democratic Women.

When the Japanese reaction and American occupation authorities launched an offensive against the democratic circles, which forced the CPJ underground, attacks were also made against the women's democratic movement. The government and American General McArthur succeeded in striking serious blows not only at left-wing trade unions but also at women's departments, while the Council of Democratic Women (Minfukyo) actually ceased its activities. After the commencement of the American aggression in Korea, serious differences developed in the Fudankyo leadership, and as a result, this organisation ceased its activities.

The democratic movement of Japanese women marched in the same ranks as other militant detachments of the Japanese democratic forces and made a weighty contribution to the struggle against Japanese-American reaction. The democratic organisations of Japanese women took an active part in preparing the national strike of February 1, 1947, took part in countrywide actions against the reactionary activities of the Japanese authorities and McArthur's headquarters that manifested themselves especially clearly in such provocative incidents as the "Matsukawa case" and the "Mitaka case".

They worked actively against the divisive activities of right-wing reformist leaders who began the movement for the "democratisation of trade unions" which brought about the collapse of the All-Japan Congress of Production Trade Unions that held militant class positions. The women's front played a positive role in the struggle against the San Francisco treaty system and against the use of Japan as a military base in the war against the Korean people.

After the signing of the peace treaty, the Japanese government, using the policy of "rationalising" industry as cover, continued the offensive against the rights and freedoms of Japanese working people that were won in the first years of the post-war period. The ruling circles worked out a broad system of measures to suppress the democratic movement, increase the exploitation of the working class, and the working people of town and countryside. Japanese women, comprising more than a third of the working class, did not remain outside of the government's field of vision either. Along with the cruel exploitation of female labour (in Japan women received fifty per cent of the pay of men for equal work) monopoly capital increased pressure on the spiritual life of Japanese women. The restoration of the old system of family relations and the introduction of purely "women's" subjects at schools took hold rapidly.

In these conditions, the centre of the women's movement was temporarily shifted to the periphery of the country, to the rural areas. There the Liaison Council of Local Women's Organisations (Tifuren), the Liaison Council of Rural Women (Nofukyo), and several other organisations and groups were formed. Women's strikes took place at various enterprises hiring mostly female labour. The Japanese public's attention was drawn to the strikes at the Mitsukoshi department store, at Fuji koronban, the largest candy store, the Omi kenshi textile mill, etc. Hus-

bands were increasingly joined by their wives in strikes. Thus, wives helped their husbands win a strike at the Mitsui coal mine. Such organisations as the Associations of Miners' Wives (Kofukyo) were set up, as were the Society of Families of Railway Workers (Kokutetsu kazokukai) and organisations of housewives who ever more frequently joined their efforts in the struggle against the growing cost of living and for the improvement of living conditions.

The upsurge of the nationwide struggle for the conclusion of a comprehensive peace treaty, for the liquidation of American bases, and for the prohibition of nuclear weapons created the necessary conditions for the rallying of the women's front. In 1951, prominent members of the women's movement Raicho Hiratsuka, Fusae Ichikawa and Tonari Kamidai organised a movement to collect signatures under a call to the US Senate demanding an end to the arms race. Much success attended the speeches of Tomi Kora, the first Japanese MP to visit the Soviet Union after the war. Her emotional and truthful words about the Soviet Union evoked a broad response in Japan.

The establishment, in 1953, of the Federation of Japanese Women (Fudanren) was an important event in the women's movement. It became the successor to the democratic traditions of Minfukyo. In 1954, a number of women's organisations—the Association of Democratic Women Lawyers (Fujin horitsuka kyokai), the Union in Defence of Women's Rights (Fujin jinken yogo domei), the Union of Women for Suffrage (Fujin yukensha domei), the Association of Housewives (Shufuren), the Federation of Local Women's Organisations (Tifuren), and the Council of Youth Organisations (Seinen dantai kyogikai)—with the support of the Federation of Japanese Women (Fudanren) and the Sohyo Women's Association started a campaign of struggle against the revival of old family relations. This campaign took the form of large-scale concerted actions by Japan's democratic forces. The unification of the efforts of women's and youth organisations had a positive effect on the mass actions by working people against the plans to introduce the certification of teachers, against the new draft police law impinging on the rights of the people, and against the draft law on the prevention of political violence. The militant spirit of Japanese women manifested itself with particular force in the course of struggle against the Japanese-American "security treaty".

The annual holding of Mothers' Congresses (Hahaoya taikai), attended by huge numbers of Japanese mothers who want happiness for their children, became a significant event in Japan's women's movement. The first such congress assembled in 1955. Since then, for more than 27 years, it has functioned as a permanent organisation of joint struggle uniting 36 women's organisations.

The Mothers' Congress became an important form of participation of Japanese women in the country's political life. Thus, a declaration of protest against the Japanese-American "security treaty" was adopted at the 5th Mothers' Congress. 16,000 participants attended the 25th Congress in July 1979. Japanese mothers responded with great gratitude to the appeal adopted by the Congress which contained the following words: "By the love and actions of mothers, let us make the year of the child a propitious one; let us ensure a peaceful and secure future for all children."¹⁰

¹⁰ *Zenei* (special issue), 1980, No. 452, p. 454.

Along with Mothers' Congresses, congresses of working mothers in defence of children are also held annually in Japan. More than 3,000 delegates attended the 24th Central Conference of the Congress of Working Mothers (Hataraku fujin-no chuo taikai) which was keynoted by the slogans "Let us raise the status of working women who are playing an important role in production and the household!" and "Let us make the 1980s the years of progress and renewal on the basis of the formation of a united front of renewal!"¹¹ The congress called for a development of the movement for the rights of women and for raising their place in society.

The first seminar of children's educational organisations was held in August 1969. The 10th seminar of these organisations in 1978 adopted a decision to set up a standing body for liaison with children's educational organisations. A liaison research council of children's educational organisations which is doing much work in the field of the democratic upbringing of the rising generation came into being.

Whereas the first Japanese mothers' congress was convened in response to a call put out by the International Mothers' Congress to launch the struggle for the prohibition of nuclear weapons, the first meeting of working women was convened in the course of preparation for the Japanese delegation's participation in the work of the first world congress of working women. This shows that the development of the women's movement in Japan is closely connected with the activities of WIDF which unites the democratic forces of the international women's movement.

Much assistance was given to the democratic women's movement by the 6th National Conference of the CPJ in 1955. It condemned attempts by some leaders to impose the political line of the CPJ on the women's movement and noted the need for rallying the women's front on the basis of demands made by the women themselves. The 4th Plenary Meeting of the CPJ CC (1956) described the women's democratic movement as one of the major forces of the democratic national liberation revolution and demanded that communists maintain a most attentive attitude to all contingents of the women's movement regardless of their political views or party affiliation.

The women's movement encountered major difficulties in the period of intensive development of the Japanese economy and its structural reorganisation. Monopoly capital tried to make the working people, including women, shoulder all the hardships of the "rationalisation of production". This set before the CPJ and other left-wing forces the question of the need to formulate a new approach to the mass movement, including the women's movement.

The directions of the Party's work, including contacts with the women's movement, were defined in the new CPJ programme adopted at the 8th Congress in 1961. "The Party," the Programme stressed, "works against all inequality of women in employment and social life, for the expansion of democratic rights and increasing the role of women in social life, for ensuring state assistance to mothers and for the undeviating observance of the 'Charter in Defence of Children', for the creation of public institutions, and the implementation of measures to protect the health and well-being of children".¹²

The CPJ realised that the fulfilment of its programmatic demands concerning the women's question could be successfully advanced only in

¹¹ *Ibidem*.

¹² Quoted from I. I. Kovalenko, *Essays on the History of the Communist Party of Japan after the Second World War, 1945-1961*, Moscow, 1981, pp. 279-280 (in Russian).

the event of the creation of a ramified national organisation capable of uniting and raising millions of women to the struggle. The Party initiated the creation of such an organisation. The Society of Women of New Japan (Sinnihon fujin-no kai) was formed in 1962 and became the leading nationwide women's organisation uniting women of various political orientations. The Society based its activities on the struggle to meet the pressing needs of women, working women first of all, against the soaring cost of living, the growth of prices of rice and other staple foodstuffs, for improving housing conditions, for the abolition of tuition fees in schools, for the free vaccination of children, for improving the system of maternity protection, etc.

The CPJ instructed its members that the struggle for the attainment of these aims should be conducted in connection with the struggle against capitalist rationalisation and its grave consequences for working women. Based on concrete facts, the Party mobilised the masses to the struggle against ugly forms of capitalist exploitation and the arbitrariness of employers. In 1964, a woman worker of the Sumitomo Semento plant filed suit against the firm for her unlawful dismissal on the grounds that she had married. The trade union defended her and the court was forced to adopt a ruling in her favour. Such struggle influences the consciousness of working women and encourages vigorous action.

Experience has taught Japanese women that economic struggle does not produce the desired effect if it is not supplemented by political struggle. For this reason, the Society of New Japan and other women's organisations set forth, not only economic but also political demands. The most important of them are the struggle for peace, against the militarisation of the country, for the liquidation of the Japanese-American "security treaty" and the abolition of American military bases on Japanese territory. The women's campaign against the American aggression in Vietnam acquired a particularly large scope. Women, members of the Society of New Japan, Fudanren, the Association in Defence of Children and other organisations held meetings under the slogan "No to the dirty war!", collected signatures and money for the heroic Vietnamese people and sent gifts to Vietnamese women and children, first of all to the children left orphans by the war.

In connection with International Women's Year, organisations of joint struggle were formed in Japan with the participation of 17 various women's organisations which supported peace and the total prohibition of nuclear weapons. They sent a message to the Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly on Disarmament demanding the prohibition of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. Democratic women's organisations jointly with other organisations of Japanese women such as the Japanese Christian Society (Kuristokyo dantai), the Japanese Association of Nurses (Nihon kangofukai), etc., sent a letter to the government protesting the introduction of emergency legislation in Japan.

The women's democratic movement devotes much attention to protecting the lives of children. A broad movement against the decline of culture and morals was organised on the initiative of the Society of Women of New Japan. The members of this movement demanded the removal of vending machines selling pornographic pictures, an end to the showing of pornography on television, etc.

In their attempts to bar women from political and public activities, the ruling circles use right-wing Social Democrats to split the progressive women's organisations. The Society of Working Women was split in 1964,

and the turn of the Women's Democratic Club came in 1970. A number of large trade union associations began to refuse to take part in the Mothers' Congresses.

In addition to the women's organisations functioning under the guidance of the CPJ, there are powerful women's organisations that are under the influence of reformist parties. The Congress of Japanese Women (Nihon fujin kaigi, 45,000 members) is under the control of the Socialist Party of Japan. Also under the SPJ's influence is the SOHYO Women's Council (450,000 members). The Society of Democratic Women of Japan (Nihon minshyu fujinkai, 20,000 members) is directed by the Party of Democratic Socialism. The Union of Housewives (Shufu domei, 200,000 members) is close to the Komeito party. These organisations also conduct extensive work among women. But their sectarianist stand often impedes concerted actions by all women's organisations. This is also facilitated by the Council of Japanese Women (Nihon fujin kyogikai, one million members) set up by the Liberal Democratic Party in 1975 and through which the ruling circles are trying to influence the women's movement.

Early in the 1970s when Japan entered a period of crisis, the ruling circles and monopolies tried to find a way out at the expense of the working people. Special hardships fell to the lot of women. As before, they were the last to be hired and the first to be fired. Their families suffered from inflation, high prices and the housing shortage. Left-wing forces achieved a major success when they set up the Popular Liaison Committee for Struggle Against Inflation, Growing Prices and the Preservation of the Standard of Living (Infre boshi, bukka neage hantai, seikatsu kiki toppa). This Committee was joined by a total of 69 mass organisations, among them the CPJ, the SPJ and the SOHYO.

Women participated actively in all political actions carried out by the democratic forces during this difficult period for the Japanese economy. Women's organisations were invariable participants in actions directed against the automatic renewal of the "security treaty", against calls at Japanese ports by American ships with nuclear weapons on board, and were in the first ranks of the movement to prohibit nuclear weapons and strengthen peace.

The question of conducting election campaigns acquired even greater importance after the CPJ adopted a policy of coming to power by peaceful means. The election of a large number of Communists to parliament and local municipal councils has opened up new possibilities for improving people's lives and the position of Japanese women.

Japanese women are exerting a major influence on the course and results of national and local elections. According to a 1975 census, there were 39,700,000 women voters or 2,600,000 more than men voters. By taking part in elections, women exert an influence on the social composition of parliament and the local bodies of self-government. However, a relatively small percentage of women vote for the CPJ. Studies conducted by the Committee for Fair and Honest Elections to the House of Councillors in 1977 showed that 39.8 per cent of all women voters cast their ballots for LDP candidates. This percentage was even higher in the countryside, where 69 per cent of women voted for the LDP. 21.2 per cent of all women voted for the Socialist Party, 7 per cent for Komeito and 5 per cent for the CPJ, or 2.4 per cent less than in 1974. Young women and middle-aged women (from 20 to 40) withdrew their support of the Party. Studies showed that the percentage of women not voting for any par-

ticular party increased from 23.1 per cent in 1974 to 32.3 per cent in 1977.¹³

These statistics on the political sympathies of women confirm the correctness and timeliness of the decisions of the 14th CPJ Congress on the need to step up work among women of various social and age groups. "A big charge of democratic energy has accumulated in the masses of women and is capable of directly influencing public life, but in the political respect, this democratic energy remains untapped."¹⁴

The struggle for improving the material and political position of Japanese women in society is the most important field of the CPJ's activity. The programme of a coalition democratic government set forth by the CPJ provides for efforts by that government to improve the social and economic position of women. Even now communist deputies are trying to improve women's lot. They have submitted to parliament a number of important proposals concerning the women's question: draft laws On Increasing the Protection of Motherhood, On New Rates for Nursery Child Care, on the New Rules of Employment for Single Mothers, and On Raising the Legal Status of Wives. Japanese women have become convinced that the CPJ upholds their interests and shows concern for their pressing needs.

The CPJ did much work in the course of the preparations for and holding of International Women's Year marked in 1975. It made a number of important amendments to the government's Plan of Action for Women's Year and set forth its own comprehensive programme For Improving the Position of Women in Society, in Defence of Their Rights. This broad programme of action to improve the life of Japanese women presented by the CPJ prompted the other parties and organisations to come out with plans of their own. SOHYO and Domei were compelled to submit their considerations and set forth demands for the equality of women and protection of motherhood.

In connection with International Women's Year, interest in the women's question increased in all sections of society. A certain tendency developed toward elevating the status of women in society. A committee of 41 public organisations was set up in Japan to convene a congress of Japanese women in connection with the holding of International Women's Year. The most important decisions adopted by the Congress were the demands for raising the role of women in society, for ensuring equal wages for equal work, for adopting a law on labour standards, pensions for women, etc. A supra-party League of Deputies was formed by the women MPs, and it submitted concrete proposals to the government on ways to improve the condition of Japanese women. At the same time, protest demonstrations were held throughout the country against attempts by the LDP government to worsen the law on labour standards, encroaching on the rights of working women. Also mounting in Japan is a movement for the adoption of a law on the equality of women and men.

In 1978, the CPJ worked out a comprehensive plan of intensifying work among women. It provided for measures to increase the number of organisations affiliated with Fudanren, to increase the influence of the Society of New Japan and the Liaison Committee for the Reorganisation of the Women's Democratic Club, to increase the membership of left-wing women's organisations, to draw more actively into concerted actions on the basis of common interests and demands such major organisations

¹³ *Fujin mondai to nihon kyosanto*, p. 38.

¹⁴ *Akahata*, April 24, 1978.

of women as Tifuren (6.5 million members), the Council of Women Members of Agricultural Cooperatives (Nokyo fujin kyogikai, 2,600,000 members), the National Council of the Organisations of Widows (Zenkoku mibozin dantai kyogikai, 1 million members) and the Japan Youth Council (Nihon seinen kyogikai, 400,000 members).

The CPJ attaches special importance to the democratic strengthening of the women's departments of trade unions, uniting 340,000 women, and also to drawing women workers into trade unions. At present, only 28.3 per cent of all working women are union members. The Party must also pay more attention to work among temporarily employed women who number almost two million.

Despite the important role they play in the sphere of production, the working women of Japan remain in an unequal position. Discrimination against women expresses itself in many ways: wages, employment, promotion and "priority" in dismissals. For equal work, a woman is paid only 55.8 per cent of what a man is paid. In production and offices, women are given only minor jobs that do not require high skills. To this day, women are dismissed when they marry or become pregnant. In Japan, women usually retire at the age of 40. Nothing of the sort exists in other industrially developed capitalist countries. In Japan, only 3 per cent of responsible posts are held by women as compared with about 33 per cent in the FRG and 25 per cent in the United States.

A poll conducted by the People's Life Centre (Kokumin seikatsu senta) in 1977 showed that 93 per cent of all housewives were displeased with or alarmed by the high cost of living, inadequate security in old age, costly housing, and the high level of environmental pollution.

In provisions for working mothers Japan holds last place among industrial countries. In 1973, 54.9 per cent of all women had abnormal childbirths. The same can be said about maternity leaves. Whereas in Italy, for instance, pregnancy and childbirth leave is 8 weeks before birth and 12 weeks after birth, the respective period in Japan is 6 weeks before birth and 6 weeks after. But not all Japanese women utilise even this right, because such leaves are granted at less than 40 per cent of all enterprises and offices.

The unequal position of women in society creates objective conditions for drawing them into the struggle for extensive democratic transformations, for peace and social progress. The CPJ has set itself the task of expanding the party's influence among the 40 million employed women by way of strengthening the ties of Party organisations with the masses of women and stepping up the struggle for their pressing demands. In November 1978, the CPJ held a national conference of women activists. The Conference adopted slogans for the 1979 parliamentary elections. It was decided that "the problem of the place of woman and the education of children" should become one of the main issues in the struggle to gain control of parliament.

In July 1979, the CPJ proposed the adoption of a law on the equality of men and women in production and on ensuring the rights of women. It also suggested the introduction of amendments to the law of labour standards with the aim of improving protection of mothers.

It is noted in the decision of the 14th CPJ Congress: "Our democratic women's movement (Fudanren, Sinfujin, the Liaison Committee for the Reorganisation of the Women's Democratic Club) continues to play a big role on the women's front. But in the light of the historic task of mobilising all the democratic energy of Japanese women, the development of the women's democratic movement has not yet produced the desired re-

sult. With due consideration for this, the party will further facilitate the development of the democratic women's movement".¹⁵

It is stressed in the decision of the Congress that for this, it is necessary to strengthen those women's organisations that support the policy of the CPJ, first of all the Sinfujin which is marching in the front ranks of the women's movement. Sinfujin has sections in all prefectures of the country with a membership of 155,000.

Sinfujin does not oblige its members to support any particular party. Its doors are open to all who accept the following slogans: protection of the life of women and children from the danger of nuclear war; struggle against the revision of the constitution for the worse; struggle against the revival of militarism; struggle to improve the life and for the rights of women and for the happiness of children; attainment of genuine independence for Japan; struggle for democracy and the emancipation of women; struggle for lasting peace together with other women.

Japanese women have experienced the horrors of the atomic bomb and are marching in the front ranks of the fighters for peace and against the nuclear arms race to save mankind from the nuclear holocaust threatening it. They are perhaps the most active force in the national peace movement that is mounting in Japan. Japanese women invariably take part in meetings and gatherings devoted to the struggle against nuclear weapons and with their children comprise the vast majority of the millions of people who march daily in the country demanding peace and protesting the rearmament of Japan. Women are active organisers in the collection of signatures under anti-nuclear appeals. In the course of the struggle for peace and detente, for a peaceful democratic Japan, women are learning much about political struggle, are raising their class consciousness, and are becoming one of the most active contingents among the democratic forces of Japan.

In addition to Sinfujin, the Federation of Japanese Women (Fudanren) also stands on class positions. It pursues a line of cooperation and joint actions in defence of peace and democracy and for raising the role of women in society with such major women's organisations as the Federation of Local Women's Organisations (Tifuren), the Council of Women Members of Agricultural Cooperatives (Nokyo fujin kyogikai), the National Council of the Organisations of Widows (Zenkoku mibozin dantai kyogikai), and the Japan Youth Council (Nihon seinen kyogikai).

Sinfujin and Fudanren maintain close contacts with the CPJ and cooperate with it, but at the same time they grant their members freedom of creed and political views. CPJ members who are also members of Sinfujin do not have the right to force the Party platform on the other members of the organisation. At the same time they must actively explain the policy of the CPJ and raise the ideological and theoretical level of the non-party members of the organisation.

The CPJ leadership pays constant attention to enrolling women in the Party. By the 14th CPJ Congress, women comprised 35 per cent of all Party members. Many women hold responsible posts in the Party—for instance, heads of party cells and directors of departments for the distribution of the newspaper *Akahata*. Eight women have been elected to the Japanese parliament and 380 to local municipal assemblies on the CPJ ticket. Along with independent and progressive deputies, communist women deputies account for 40 per cent of the total number of women in local bodies of self-government.

¹⁵ *Akahata*, Feb. 29, 1978.

To assist the women party activists, the CPJ CC has published, since 1978, a monthly women's magazine *Zyosei-no hiroba*. It deals with the life and struggle of Japanese women and raises questions of the CPJ's guidance of the women's movement.

The Party actively promotes women to leading Party posts. Large numbers of women activists are studying at the Party school under the CPJ CC and at schools under the regional Party committees. The attraction of large numbers of women to the side of the CPJ and the expansion of the Party's influence in the ranks of the women's movement can be considered a major accomplishment in Japan where, prior to the Second World War, women were prohibited to join political parties altogether. This is a result of the extensive work conducted by the CPJ among the masses. At the same time, this is a good indicator of the effectiveness and popularity of the CPJ's policy in various sections of society, including women. But much must still be done before the Japanese woman will hold a worthy place in society and before the women's movement becomes a mighty contingent in the struggle for peace, democracy, and social progress in Japan.

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U.S. EVALUATIONS OF CHINESE WRITER SEEN AS DETERMINED BY POLITICS

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[Article by A. N. Zhelokhovtsev, candidate of philological sciences: "Lu Xin in American Sinology"]

[Text] **T**ranslation and study of Lu Hsün's* works have never been regarded in the West, especially the United States, as something purely scholarly. A political significance has been always attached to them. Lu Hsün was an acknowledged leader of the left-wing literary movement in China and precisely this determined the attitude to him in the United States. At the same time, the approach to Lu Hsün also varied depending on the state of American-Chinese relations.

During Lu Hsün's lifetime his work was ignored by American Sinologists. In general, reactionary circles in the United States showed a dislike for the new Chinese literature that came into being in the course of the movement of May 4, 1919, regarding it as "pro-communist". The only exception was the stand taken by Edgar Snow, but he pursued his own aims in publicising this new Chinese literature.

Lu Hsün's literary success in China resulted in certain changes in the attitude of American Sinologists toward him, especially after the writer's death in 1936. Translations of Lu Hsün were published in the United States and his work was recognised as a part of contemporary Chinese culture. Even the Guomindang authorities lent a hand in popularising Lu Hsün's works in the United States after his death. This is a typical example of political speculation on the creativity of an outstanding writer. In their quest for popularity, the Guomindang reactionaries, who needed American aid, were not above exploiting the heritage of a man whom, during his lifetime, they had subjected to hounding, persecution and harassment. But Sinologists at American universities continued to ignore Lu Hsün and new Chinese literature as a whole, denying that it possessed any aesthetic merit. The recognition of Lu Hsün in the PRC in the 1950s and 1960s only increased the prejudice toward him in the United States. In that period, Lu Hsün was either ignored or referred to in the most hostile manner.

The changes in American-Chinese relations in the 1970s brought about a revision of the attitude to Lu Hsün in the United States. An active study of his works began in Western countries and translations were published. This new attitude was more serious in scholarly terms than before. In the process, the serious lag of American and Western Sinology in general as compared with Soviet studies of the works of Lu Hsün came to light. It became obvious that the accomplishments of Soviet scholars are due first of all to their objective attitude to the great Chinese writer and their systematic study of his heritage.

* In modern orthography the name of the Great Chinese writer is spelled differently (Lu Xin, Lu Xun, Lusin, Lu Xsün).

The first period, the familiarisation of Americans with Lu Hsün's works, is the period of the lifetime publication of translations of his works. A distinction should be made between the translations into English done by the Chinese and published in China and works by Western (including American) Sinologists. They are united only by the fact of translation into the same language. The work of the Chinese translators could not determine or express the position of academic circles in the United States.

The first translations of Lu Hsün were done by the Chinese in China. Liang Sheqian translated *The True Story of Ah Q* into English and published it in Shanghai in 1926.¹ Publications in foreign languages in the writer's home country were not yet evidence of international recognition. This came much later, when Lu Hsün's works were translated and published abroad. A French translation by Qyn Yn Yu was published by Romain Rolland in the magazine *L'Europe* (1926, Nos. 5-6), while in 1929, having added to *The True Story of Ah Q* Lu Hsün's stories "K'ung I-chi" and "Motherland", the translator included them in a collection of stories by modern Chinese writers and published it in Paris. This collection was translated by E. H. F. Mills in Britain from French into English and published in London in 1930 and in the United States in 1931.² So the first acquaintance with the writer in the United States was second-hand and Edgar Snow was quite sceptical about this translation. "Two English translations have already been published, but alas, both of them are full of arbitrary insertions and deletions, as well as crude mistakes", he wrote in 1935 of the translations by Liang Sheqian and Mills.³

It is noteworthy that American bibliographies do not mention the New York publication of the translation by Mills; they pretend that it never existed. Neither is there mention of it in the detailed bibliography by Donald A. Gibbs.⁴ This publication is mentioned only by the Chinese literary scholar Ge Baoquan who studied the spread of *The True Story of Ah Q* outside China in foreign translations.

Among American Sinologists, Edgar Snow was the first to turn to Lu Hsün's work. In 1935, in the New York journal *Asia*, he printed a translation of Lu Hsün's story "Medicine", and in 1936 the story "Kites". Then Edgar Snow managed to publish a book of his translations from Lu Hsün and other modern Chinese writers in the United States under the title *Living China*. It came out in New York in 1935 and in London in 1936. It included Lu Hsün's best known stories "A Little Incident", "Kites", "Medicine", "K'ung I-chi", "Divorce" and "Benediction".⁵

The American *Far East Journal* (New York) printed translations of Lu Hsün about once a year. Translator Wang Chi-chen published "Waves" and "Benediction", while an American translator Kennedy translated "Motherland".⁶ In 1941, Wang Chi-chen put out a collection of Lu

¹ G. K. Leung, *The True Story of Ah Q*, Shanghai, 1926.

² *The Tragedy of Ah Q and other Modern Chinese Stories* (tr. E. H. F. Mills from the French original of Kyn' Yn Yu), London, 1930; New York, 1931.

³ Quoted from Ge Baoquan, *The True Story of Ah Q Abroad*, Peking, 1981, p. 28 (in Chinese).

⁴ D. A. Gibbs, *A Bibliography of Studies and Translations of Modern Chinese Literature, 1918-1942*, Cambridge, Mass., 1975.

⁵ E. Snow, *Living China. Modern Chinese Stories*, London, 1936; London, 1937. In his other book, Snow mentions the existence of a New York edition of 1935. (E. Snow *Red Star Over China*, New York, 1968, p. 245) which I have not seen and which is not recorded either by the American bibliographies of Tian-i Li and Donald A. Gibbs, or the Chinese bibliography "The Yearbook of Lu Xin Studies" (Sian, 1979).

⁶ *Far East Journal*, vol. 2, Nos. 2, 3; vol. 3, Nos. 5, 6.

Hsün's works at Columbia University Press.⁷ In fact, this was the first book by Lu Hsün to be brought out in the United States, even though it was translated by a Chinese who was sent specially by the Guomindang government to work in the field of cultural ties with the United States during the war. Before coming to the United States, Wang Chi-chen worked at the English-language *Tianxia Monthly* which was published in China for foreigners. In 1943, this same Wang Chi-chen published a collection of works by modern Chinese writers in the United States that included Lu Hsün's stories "Summer Festival" and "For the Crowd to See".⁸

In the PRC, Lu Hsün's works were translated into English by Yang Xianyi and Gladis Young. These translations were printed several times in the PRC, for instance, in the four-volume collection of Lu Hsün's selected works, which saw three editions prior to 1980. The one-volume New York edition of Lu Hsün's stories was put out in New York on the basis of these translations in 1972.⁹ In the 1950s, Lu Hsün's stories were published in the United States only once by the progressive Cameron Publishing House.¹⁰

W. J. F. Jenner included Lu Hsün's works in the book *Modern Chinese Stories* published in New York in 1974 (it was published in London in 1970).¹¹ The publication in the United States of the book *Straw Sandals* in 1974 was a joint Sino-American venture.¹² This was a collection of stories by Chinese writers written in 1918-1933 prepared in their time by Lu Hsün and Mao Tun for publication in the United States at the request of Harold R. Isaacs. The book was prepared but not published, and the manuscript collected dust in the United States for forty years before being printed. This belated publication was prompted, of course, not by the sudden realisation of the aesthetic value of modern Chinese literature but by the desire to follow up the restoration of U. S. political ties with China with an appropriate gesture in the cultural field. In the detailed foreword to the book, its compiler H. R. Isaacs writes: "This collection of translated Chinese stories was assembled in 1934. It was put together to present and to illustrate the development of the literary revolution in China, at that time underway for barely more than fifteen years. The stories were chosen with the guidance and counsel of Lu Hsün, one of the makers and the premier creative writer of that revolution, and his younger friend and associate, Mao Tun, thought at that time to be the foremost among the writers after Lu Hsün himself. The intent was to trace, through examples, the passage of the new literary movement in China from the humanistic or romantic concerns of its beginning to the intensely political and ideological cast it took on under the pressure of the great events that swept the country in those years. As Lu Hsün points out in his foreword, another purpose was to introduce to Western readers the work of writers suffering the heavy-handed repressions of Chiang Kaishek's Kuomintang regime."

Isaacs writes further that initially the collection was conceived under the dramatic title "Stifled Voices from China" which he changed to

⁷ *Ah Q and Others: Selected Stories of Lusin*, New York, 1941.

⁸ Wang Chi-chen (tr.), *Contemporary Chinese Studies*, New York, 1943.

⁹ Lu Hsün, *Selected Works*, vol. 1-4, Peking, 1980; Lu Hsün, *Selected Stories*, New York, 1972.

¹⁰ Lu Hsün, *Teacher of Chinese Revolutionary Literature*, New York, 1957 (According to the Yearbook of Lu Hsün Studies).

¹¹ W. J. F. Jenner (ed.), *Modern Chinese Stories*, New York, 1974; London, 1970.

¹² *Straw Sandals. Chinese Short Stories 1918-1933*, Ed. by Harold R. Isaacs. Foreword by Lu Hsün, Cambridge, Mass., 1974.

"Straw Sandals". Now, many years later, the American compiler and initiator of the publication realises how symbolic and just the initial title was: "The events and transformations of the many years that have passed while this manuscript lay unpublished in the files now give a peculiarly heavy weight of irony to that title."¹³

Lu Hsün and Mao Tun selected works by China's progressive writers for the collection which, they hoped, would help the English-speaking reader, first of all the American one, discover Chinese literature. The collection included works by sixteen authors. Many of them are well known in our country because their works have been translated into Russian many times. The books of most of these writers had already been published in the USSR in the 1950s. Nevertheless, the collection itself is a literary landmark of the 1930s. The destiny of the Chinese authors represented in the collection is truly symbolic in the history of Chinese literature. Isaacs is right when he sees in this a reflection of the tragic events of Chinese history: "By the time this collection was put together in the early 1930s, five of them were already dead, three killed by Kuomintang executioners in 1931, one dead of illness that same year, one murdered by Kuomintang plainclothesmen during an attempted kidnapping in 1933. Lu Hsün died of tuberculosis in 1936. Two were killed by the Japanese in the 1940s. Two who became officials under the Communist regime died, presumably of natural causes, in the 1950s or later, but neither had done any writing for many years. Of five others, three became members of the literary apparatus that was dismantled during the Cultural Revolution and nothing has been heard of them since; and two—the most prominent among them as writers—Mao Tun and Ting Ling, were purged and sent into obscurity, Ting Ling in 1957 and Mao Tun when he was dismissed as Minister of Culture in 1965. Of the sixteen, only one, the aging Kuo Mo-jo, the senior literary official of the regime and intimate of Mao Tse-tung, remains."¹⁴ The foreword was written by Isaacs in 1973 and time has made its own alterations. Neither Kuo Mo-jo or Mao Tun are alive now, but Ting Ling has been rehabilitated. She is alive and active in Chinese literature, is putting out new editions of her old works, penning new forewords to them, and writing newspaper articles. Also among the living is Ye Shaojun, whom Isaacs failed to mention, but who was recently feted in the PRC as an outstanding educator and writer.

Isaacs himself called the publication of *Straw Sandals* in the United States a "ressurrection". He also published his correspondence with Lu Hsün and Mao Tun concerning the plans for the book. It was immediately reprinted in the PRC not only in special scholarly publications but also in newspapers.¹⁵ There is no doubt that in the 1930s, Isaacs made a sincere attempt to publish the book compiled by Lu Hsün. But his efforts were to no avail, and the cause of his failure is obvious: the aims proclaimed in the foreword to the collection—to give a voice to the victims of Guomindang repressions and to show the progressive Chinese literature of 1918-1933—did not coincide in any way with the then American policy with respect to China. As Isaacs wrote, a well-known New York publisher, on agreement with whom the collection of stories was compiled, "lost enthusiasm" after the manuscript was ready since "the situation had changed". In the course of two years *Straw Sandals* was rejected by one publisher after another. After the publication of the collection of

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. XI, XII.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. XV.

¹⁵ See *Guangming ribao*, Dec. 5, 1979.

Chinese stories prepared by Edgar Snow, Isaacs ceased his futile efforts.¹⁶

It appears that Isaacs realises the direct dependence between the publication of Chinese literature in the United States and the American political course, because, he writes, "some books, like some ideas, have their time, and the time for this book may, after all, be now".¹⁷ So after the visit to Peking by President Nixon in 1972, the time was "ripe" for the publication of the collection that had been collecting dust for forty years. Everything is crystal clear here, and there would be no need to mention this were it not for the attempt by Isaacs to place the blame for the forty years of disregard for Chinese literature in the United States on... the communists. Fantastic as it may seem, according to Isaacs, the collection of stories by these progressive Chinese writers, many of whom were communists and revolutionaries themselves, victims of reactionary terror and heroes of the Chinese revolution, was not published in the United States because of resistance by the communists who, it transpires, put pressure on the New York publishers! No less self-exposing are the passages in Isaacs' foreword in which he tries to portray Lu Hsün himself as an anti-communist: "The last years of his life were filled with stubborn and exasperated resistance to Communist Party functionaries..."¹⁸ In reality what took place was Lu Hsün's polemic with the dogmatists within the revolutionary movement—something which has more than once attracted the attention of literary scholars, including Soviet ones.¹⁹ Isaacs' attempts to pit Lu Hsün against the Chinese communists as such can be explained by his desire to make easier the publication of the book in the United States with unscrupulous phrases to the liking of anti-communist American publishers.

The animosity to Lu Hsün in the United States is the reason why his works were never properly publicised in that country. They were put out in small editions or in special political publications rather as a symbolic token of cultural ties. The translation made from the French by Mills cannot be taken seriously as representative of Lu Hsün's creativity. Snow's translations are another matter, but even they were not brought out in the form of a single book.

As to Lu Hsün's first book in the United States, it was translated, as has already been stated, by Wang Chi-chen for political purposes and was not circulated widely. For this reason, Lu Hsün's works did not become a part of the literary life of the United States and did not extend beyond the framework of Chinese studies. Their very existence remained unknown to the reader at large. Even the restoration of Sino-American relations after Nixon's visit did not give the broad American reading public access to Lu Hsün.

In practical terms, no research into Lu Hsün's works was conducted in the United States for a lengthy period of time. During Lu Hsün's lifetime, Edgar Snow did make an attempt to popularise his works and published an article "Lu Hsün, Master of Pai-Hua".²⁰ A positive reference to Lu Hsün was also made in an article by Nym Wales, the wife of Edgar Snow. This article was included in the book *Living China* compiled by Snow.²¹

¹⁶ *Straw Sandals*, p. XLIV.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. XLV.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. XIII.

¹⁹ V. I. Semanov, "Lu Hsün and the Dogmatists", *Peoples of Asia and Africa*, 1968, No. 2, pp. 64-73 (in Russian).

²⁰ E. Snow, "Lu Hsün, Master of Pai-Hua", *Asia*, 1935, Vol. 35, No. 1.

²¹ N. Wales, "The Modern Chinese Literary Movement", in E. Snow, *Living China. Modern Chinese Short Stories*, London, 1937.

Subsequently, even in 1968, these articles were ignored by U. S. bibliographers precisely because Lu Hsün was mentioned in them with the respect he deserves. On the other hand, American bibliographers readily included works that presented a distorted picture of Lu Hsün's literary endeavours.²² But even such works were few and far between, because Lu Hsün was deliberately ignored in the United States. The author of the bibliography of Chinese fiction that was published in 1968, Tien-yi Li, managed to name only three articles, those by T. A. Hsia, Chün-jo Liu and J. H. Weakland.²³ Works by T. A. Hsia and Harriet Cornelia Mills, specially noted in the bibliography as being important ones, remain unpublished: the first was mimeographed while the second is still in the files as an unpublished dissertation.²⁴ What is this if not evidence of the slighting attitude to Lu Hsün's work in the United States?

The lack money to finance the publication of dissertations on Lu Hsün's works in the United States cannot be a chance happening. This was yet another symptom of the generally hostile attitude toward the Chinese writer. But after Nixon's visit, money was found promptly, and works devoted to Lu Hsün began to appear. Pearl Hsia Ch'en's dissertation, written in 1953, came off the press in 1976, i. e., 23 years after it was completed.²⁵ The dissertation by William R. Schultz remains unpublished to this day, although it was completed in 1955. Judging by its title, it is devoted to the most intensive period in Lu Hsün's literary career.²⁶ T. A. Hsia printed his work on Lu Hsün in a collection of his own essays published in 1968,²⁷ while H. C. Mills, leaving her dissertation unpublished in 1963, continued her work and printed an article in a 1977 collection of Harvard University.²⁸ T. A. Hsia's work awaited publication 9 years; that of H. C. Mills, 11 years; and the dissertation of P. H. Ch'en, 23 years. As to Schultz's work, it remained unpublished, although references to this work in articles by American Sinologists show that it should be taken into account by researchers.

The restoration of Sino-American relations caught American Sinology totally unprepared for the study of modern Chinese literature, as the situation with the study of Lu Hsün eloquently illustrates. So it became necessary to recognise Lu Hsün quickly, and without polemics, to be the great writer of China. Vigorous studies of modern Chinese literature have begun. In the 1970s, American Sinologists actively began printing works about Lu Hsün, reprinting books of previous years that had been ignored in America or were published abroad. Besides the above-mentioned dissertation by Pearl Hsia Ch'en, the publications included an important article by Patrick Hanan²⁹ and a detailed section on Lu

²² Tien-yi Li, *Chinese Fiction. A Biography of Books and Articles in Chinese and English*. New Haven, Conn. 1968.

²³ T. A. Hsia, "Aspects of the Power of Darkness in Lu Hsün", *Journal of Asian Studies*, 1964, vol. 23, No. 2; Chün-jo Liu, "The Heroes and Heroines of Modern Chinese Fiction: From Ah Q to Wu Tzu-hsü", *Journal of Asian Studies*, vol. 16, No. 2; J. H. Weakland, "Lusin's (Lu Hsün) Ah Q: a Rejected Image of Chinese Character", *Pacific Spectator*, 1956, No. 10.

²⁴ T. A. Hsia, *Lu Hsün and the Dissolution of the League of Leftist Writers* (mimeo), Seattle, 1959; H. C. Mills, *Lu Hsün: 1927-1936—the Years on the Left*, Doctoral Diss., 1963.

²⁵ Pearl Hsia Ch'en, *The Social Thought of Lu Hsün (1881-1936)*, New York, 1976.

²⁶ W. R. Schultz, *Lu Hsün: the Creative Years*, Ph. D. Diss, Univ. of Washington, 1955.

²⁷ T. A. Hsia, *The Gate of Darkness. Studies on the Leftist Literary Movement in China*, Seattle-London, 1968.

²⁸ Merle Goldman (ed.), *Modern Chinese Literature in the May Fourth Era*, Cambridge, Mass. London, 1977.

²⁹ Patrick D. Hanan, "The Technique of Lu Hsün's Fiction", *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, 1974, vol. 34, pp. 53-96.

Hsün in C. T. Hsia's book.³⁰ The monograph by Huang Sung K'ang³¹ published in Amsterdam in 1957 was put out in a new edition, and a new book by W. A. Lyell Jr., *Lu Hsün's Vision of Reality*, was printed.³²

It is not surprising that in the obtaining situation (the intense interest in Lu Hsün that suddenly cropped up because of the altered political situation and the general lag of American Sinology in this field) the eyes of researchers turned to the relevant experience and accomplishments of Soviet Sinology.

The work of the Soviet Sinologist, now a professor at Moscow University, V. I. Semanov *Lu Hsün and His Predecessors* (Moscow, 1976) was translated into English in the United States and published.³³ This is not something that happens often in the field of humanities. On the one hand, this fact by itself is evidence of American Sinology's lag in the study of problems of China's modern literature and culture. Translator Charles J. Alber had to admit this: "It has always astounded me that there has been so little systematic research on Lu Hsün in English, and above all no index to his writings. The problem is that there is none in Chinese either, despite the numerous additions in his collected works... Still, there is much to be done in the study of this great writer, and I am proud to make even a modest contribution."³⁴ Alber's translation of V. I. Semanov's book was, in fact, a contribution to the American Sinology and his effort would have deserved appreciation, but for the following matter.

The translator and the author of the foreword Charles Alber is not only a Sinologist, but a Sovietologist as well. In 1971 in Indiana University he defended his thesis on the Soviet literary critique of Lu Hsün. (Presently Alber is a professor at the North Carolina University.) "Filling" the obvious gap in American Sinology, the translator tried in every way in his introductory article to smear Soviet Sinology in general and works on Lu Hsün in particular. One is unpleasantly surprised by the self-confidence with which Alber passes judgement on Soviet scholarly publications, a self-confidence that is out of place in American Sinology, which has nothing to be proud of in its study of Lu Hsün's heritage.

The slighting attitude to Lu Hsün that lasted for half a century in the West could not have been by chance. So Alber is hardly justified in his expression of surprise. The reason for this situation is clear to any unprejudiced reader: the revolutionary spirit of Lu Hsün, his transition to a Marxist position, his popularisation of Soviet literature and Marxist-Leninist literary theory irritate bourgeois Sinologists. Their political bias has robbed them of the ability to think rationally. An American publication on the history of Chinese literature stated that Lu Hsün's attention had been attracted by numerous communist works in Japanese and German translations. He was also greeted by the left-wingers as an elder of revolutionary literature. Lu Hsün went underground in Shanghai's international settlement and, under numerous pen-names, he kept denouncing the nationalist government. He was constantly receiving instructions and directives from the CPC functionaries.³⁵ This is the reason why Ame-

³⁰ C. T. Hsia, *A History of Modern Chinese Fiction, 1917-1957*, New Haven, 1961.

³¹ Huang Sung K'ang, *Lu Hsün and the New Culture Movement of Modern China*, Westport, Conn., 1975.

³² W. A. Lyell Jr., *Lu Hsün's Vision of Reality*, Berkeley, Calif., 1976.

³³ V. I. Semanov, *Lu Hsün and His Predecessors*, Tr. and ed. by Charles J. Alber, New York, 1980.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. XXVI.

³⁵ Ch'en Shou-yi, *Chinese Literature. A Historical Introduction*, New York, 1961, p. 644.

rican Sinology demonstratively refused to study Lu Hsün's works. But still this did not prevent Mr. Alber from looking down at Soviet studies devoted to Lu Hsün.

In 1929, *The True Story of Ah Q* came out in two editions in Moscow and Leningrad³⁶—and we might remind the reader here that this major work by Lu Hsün had not yet been translated either in Britain or the United States. But the assessment of the writer made in the USSR at that time does not suit Alber. Of course, today the attitude to Lu Hsün has changed in our country and no one regards him as an "ideologist of petty-bourgeois radicalism".³⁷ Truth, as is known, is found by quest, but at the time there was no quest at all either in Britain or the United States. Mr. Alber is forced to admit that by 1938, the name of Lu Hsün was held in high esteem in the USSR, but in the same breath he gloats that in the 1938 anniversary volume,³⁸ the articles and translations were not of the highest quality. But again, it must be recalled that in those days, there were no translations in the United States at all.

Referring to the older generation of Soviet Sinologists, the American author permitted himself the remark that they lacked the training to study Pai-hua literature, while all subsequent books devoted to modern Chinese literature are supposedly superficial, incorrect, and clearly ideologically oversimplified. Such a characteristic could be made only by person who is remote from genuine scholarly research. In 1956, modern Chinese literature was not studied in the United States at all because of political hostility to the PRC.

In the second half of the 1950s, studies of Lu Hsün in the USSR acquired a much broader scope, the standard of work went up sharply, and they gained international recognition. Even Alber had to admit that the work by L. D. Pozdneeva³⁹ left studies made in the West far behind and exerted an influence in China and Japan. Moreover, in making this point, Alber referred to a Japanese reviewer.⁴⁰ He considers books by V. V. Petrov and V. F. Sorokin⁴¹ to be a significant contribution to the study of Lu Hsün but at the same time erodes this praise by contending that their literary importance is diminished by the socio-historical approach of the former and the socio-psychological approach of the latter. This prejudice goes so far that the American translator ironically described as a "Petrov's neologism" the author's description of Lu Hsün as a *narodolyubets* (Russian for a person who admires the common folk). Lu Hsün's genuine love of his people makes sarcasm of this type unworthy. But we must hasten to inform this self-proclaimed American expert on Russian neologisms that the word *narodolyubets* appeared in Russian literature in the beginning of the 19th century; it was first used by P. A. Vyazemsky and later by G. I. Uspensky and G. V. Plekhanov.

Mr. Alber has attempted to present Soviet Sinology to the American reader as primitive and unscholarly, and as distorting objective truth.

³⁶ *The True Story of Ah Q*, Leningrad, Priboi Publishers, 1929, *A Truthful Description of Life. Short Stories*, Moscow, 1929.

³⁷ B. A. Vasilyev, "Foreign Influence in Chinese Literature of Imperialist Epoch", *Proceedings of the Institute of Oriental Studies*, Vol. 1, Moscow, 1932, p. 36.

³⁸ Lu Hsün. 1891-1936. *Collection of Articles and Translations Devoted to the Memory of the Great Writer of Modern China*, Moscow-Leningrad, 1938.

³⁹ L. D. Pozdneeva, *Lu Hsün. Life and work (1881-1936)*, Moscow, 1959.

⁴⁰ Kawakami Kyuju, "Studies of Chinese Literature in Soviet Russia", *Dzinbun kenkyu*, 1964, vol. XXVII, No. 19.

⁴¹ V. V. Petrov, *Lu Hsün. Essay on His Life and Work*, Moscow, 1960; V. F. Sorokin, *Formation of Lu Hsün's World Outlook. Early Articles and the Collection "Call"*, Moscow, 1958.

But he failed to cope with this task and began to contradict himself. Already the books by V. F. Sorokin and V. V. Petrov turned out to be so different that the American Sovietologist failed in his attempt to write them off as overly simplistic. But he faced his most formidable task in writing about V. I. Semanov's book which was chosen for translation both due to its obvious merits and also as the latest work taking into account the accomplishments of all preceding studies. And here, Alber was forced to resort to primitive demagoguery, contending that he was amazed not by the extent of distortion by the author but, on the contrary, by his impartiality which was so great that the book did not appear to be written by a Soviet literary critic. This is a flippant attempt to contrast various Soviet studies on Lu Hsün. The unhistorical approach to Soviet Sinology in combination with obvious political bias have totally deprived Alber of the ability to pass judgement objectively.

Published in 1967, V. I. Semanov's book was received very favourably by the Soviet academic community.⁴² A fair assessment of V. I. Semanov's book is also contained in the review by Hungarian Sinologist E. Galla, who specifically indicated that "Semanov's study draws on earlier outstanding works of the Soviet school of Lu Hsün studies"⁴³ which, for this reason, cannot in any way be opposed to them.

A review of V. I. Semanov's book by Ellen Widmer (Harvard University), a work free of Sovietological speculations,⁴⁴ appeared recently in an American journal of Chinese studies. The author replied to the reviewer in the same journal and polemised with her on the nature of the dependence of Lu Hsün's work on the traditions of the Chinese accusatory novel of the late 19th and early 20th centuries.⁴⁵ So in American Sinology, too, there is room for a serious approach to Soviet scholarship. But such a serious approach, alas, proved to be unattainable for Charles Alber. The work by the Soviet Sinologist revoked broad response of the US academic community. "A product of a revolutionary age, what made Lu Hsün great as a human being and as a literary creator was his grasp of the pathos of revolution. It was ultimately this pathos that shaped his literature. Semanov appreciates this implicitly," wrote Arif Dirlik.⁴⁶

The reviewer of a Sinological journal directly refutes Alber, noting that Semanov's book shatters the formerly prejudiced and dogmatic perception of the nature of the studies by Soviet Sinologists existing in the United States because it turned out to be absolutely different from the myth created by Sovietologists about the typical Soviet scientific paper. The reviewer correctly understood that the difference exists not between Soviet science and the author of the book but between current notions in the United States about Soviet science and reality.⁴⁷

The centenary of the great Chinese writer's birth was marked all over the world in 1981. On this occasion, Vera Schwarcz published an interview with Chinese literary scholar Yuan Liangjun, the author of a monograph on Lu Hsün published in the PRC in 1978. She wrote that after 30 years the question of how Lu Hsün had become a Marxist again came

⁴² V. F. Sorokin, "Review of the book: V. I. Semanov. Lu Hsün and his Predecessors", *Peoples of Asia and Africa*, 1968, No. 1, pp. 195-197; *Soviet Sinology in the Past Fifty Years* (Literature), Moscow, 1967.

⁴³ E. Galla, "V. I. Semanov. Lu Hsün and His Predecessors", *Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae*, 1969, T. XXII, Fasc. 3, S. 390-392.

⁴⁴ E. Widmer, "Lu Hsün and His Predecessors (Lu Hsün i ego predshestvenniki, Moscow, 1967)" *Modern Chinese Literature Newsletter*, 1975, vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 8-15.

⁴⁵ *Modern Chinese Literature Newsletter*, 1976, vol. 2, No. 1.

⁴⁶ *Pacific Affairs*, 1981, vol. 54, No. 1, p. 146.

⁴⁷ *Chinese Literature*, 1981, No. 1, p. 146.

to the fore, the question that was neither topical nor usual for western scholars studying the history of modern China.⁴⁸ Ms. Schwarcz is correct in saying that for 30 years American Sinology conducted no dialogue with Chinese scholars and showed no interest in Lu Hsün. Imagine the amazing changes political speculation can introduce into American Sinology. A scholarly journal can now show an interest in the problem of how Lu Hsün became a Marxist and discuss it in earnest with literary scholars from the PRC. True, the position of Vera Schwarcz's interlocutor is blemished by simplification: Yuan Liangjun flatly rejects everything written about Lu Hsün during the period of the "rule of the gang of four", this being his entire contribution to scholarship.

American Sinology's approach to Lu Hsün during the past fifty years convincingly shows the dominant influence of political considerations on scholarship in that country. As a creative phenomenon, Lu Hsün was understood and appreciated already by Edgar Snow, which means that since then, the writer and his work were deliberately ignored for political reasons. It was only in the 1970s that Sinologists in the United States intensified their study of modern Chinese literature. And there immediately appeared the possibility of publishing manuscripts stashed away in archives, of putting out new editions of old publications and of launching the journal *Chinese Literature*, in which modern themes hold an important place.

American Sinology now no longer questions the literary importance of Lu Hsün's heritage. There were plans to hold a conference on "Lu Hsün and His Heritage" in Monterrey (California) and to invite scholars from the PRC to participate. Lu Hsün's work has surmounted the barrier of prejudice in Western countries. Now Lu Hsün can be studied there. But will his works be published for the broad reading public? This has not been done so far. For readers in America, this great writer remains either totally unknown or merely a name associated with outlandish Chinese exotica.

The merits of Soviet Sinology in studying and popularising the work of Lu Hsün are undeniable. We understand him and he is close to us. His name is known to all. From 1929 to 1981, his works were printed in a total of more than 1,750,000 copies. In 1981 alone, selected works of this great Chinese writer were published in Russian (75,000 copies) and Ukrainian (30,000 copies). That this great Chinese writer might achieve such popularity and fame in the United States is unthinkable.

⁴⁸ See V. Schwarcz, "How Lu Xun Became a Marxist: Conversations with Yuan Liangjun", *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*, 1981, vol. 13, No. 3, p. 146.

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EARLY CHINESE COMMUNIST, TRADE-UNION LEADER EULOGIZED

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[Article by T. N. Akatova, doctor of historical sciences: "Deng Zhongxia-- Prominent Figure in the Chinese Workers Movement"]

[Text] Every country and every nation goes through periods of great spiritual awakening, of vigorous political activity and an upsurge in the revolutionary struggle. China saw such a period during the first decade of the 20th century which preceded the prerevolutionary upsurge of 1919-1924 and the revolution of 1925-1927.

The events of the period were greatly influenced by the victory of the October Revolution and by the emergence of the world's first country of workers and peasants. The social and economic shifts which had taken place in China by that time became especially evident against the background of the new international situation. From that moment onward, the mounting revolutionary struggle in the country was inseparably linked with the national and political awakening and growing class consciousness of the Chinese working people, with the spread of Marxism-Leninism and the ideas of international proletarian solidarity and with the general course of the world revolutionary process. That period, full of tempestuous revolutionary events produced a constellation of prominent leaders who had assimilated the best features of their nation and at the same time espoused the new ideas of proletarian internationalism. Deng Zhongxia, a Marxist internationalist and an active proponent of friendship with the Soviet Union, exemplified the Chinese leader of that new type.

His short (he died at 36) but extraordinary life, full of intense struggle, is an inseparable part of the destiny of his country and the Chinese revolution.

He was born into the family of a landowner and government employee in Hunan province in 1897. To guarantee him a career as a government official, traditional in his family, his relatives sent him to study at Peking University. His youth, however, coincided with the spiritual awakening of Chinese society. The progressive Chinese intelligentsia was persistently looking for ways of renovating and reviving their homeland. Those of its representatives who were more consistent and revolutionary-minded turned to the experience of the Great October Socialist Revolution and the Marxist-Leninist ideas of transforming reality.

Li Dazhao, a professor at Peking University and China's first Marxist scholar, a man of great erudition for his time and one of the founders of the Chinese communist movement, played a decisive role in

moulding the views of Deng Zhongxia and in his evolution as a Marxist. He became Li Dazhao's closest and most trusted pupil, and then disciple and associate. He saw his baptism of fire in the formidable patriotic May 4, 1919 Movement in which he most actively participated. That political movement was an outburst of protest against imperialist arbitrariness and the terms of the Versailles Peace Treaty, dictated by the imperialist powers, that were humiliating to China. The May 4 Movement was of historic importance for the development of the Chinese national revolutionary struggle. It shook the entire nation and became noteworthy in that within it China's young working class first emerged as a new political force in the national liberation struggle. The May 4 Movement also ushered in a period of acute ideological struggle among the Chinese intelligentsia. The ideas of Marxism-Leninism were increasingly gaining currency, but the scientific study of Marxism-Leninism and the acceptance of the practical experience of the October Revolution were greatly hindered and complicated in China by its extreme social and economic backwardness, by the numerical weakness of the proletariat, and the preponderance of feudal dogmas and traditions of social life. Unlike many Chinese revolutionary democratic leaders of the time who considered themselves Marxists but had a lopsided view of Marxism and could not overcome national narrowmindedness, Deng Zhongxia became convinced of the immense potential of the liberatory nature of Marxist-Leninist ideas and was cognisant of the class essence of scientific socialism and its international nature. From the outset he decided to devote his life to organising the Chinese working class and educating it politically. All revolutionary activities were aimed at putting into effect the main precepts of Lenin's strategy for national revolution, including the development of an independent workers' movement, the turning of the Chinese proletariat into an organised political force—a vanguard of the national revolution—the setting up of a truly proletarian communist party in China, and the establishment of stable international contacts between the Chinese proletariat and the world workers' and communist movement.

Under Li Dazhao's guidance, the young student examined the situation of the Chinese proletariat and mounted revolutionary propaganda among the workers. His relatives opposed his revolutionary activities, so Deng broke with his family and became a professional revolutionary. He was constantly running grave risks under the militarist lawlessness which pervaded the country and due to the foreign imperialists' abuses; he led a life full of privations. Legends were told about his staunchness, resourcefulness and selfless courage.

In Peking in the spring of 1920, Li Dazhao and Deng Zhongxia organised May Day celebrations, marked in China for the first time. Seeking to attract the largest possible number of people to the May Day celebrations, its organisers used ancient customs from traditional Chinese festivals. The demonstrators were given ritual loaves of bread bearing the hieroglyphs "Labour is Sacred!"¹

Early Marxist circles were formed in China in 1920 with the Comintern's direct assistance. Deng Zhongxia was among the founders of the Peking communist circle headed by Li Dazhao and took an active part in preparations for the first CPC Congress. He engaged in major organisational activities, working towards uniting separate communist circles into a single party, but at the same time came out against the ideolo-

¹ *Brave May*, Guangzhou, 1926, pp. 3-5 (in Chinese).

gical opponents of Marxism. It was during the period of preparations for the First CPC Congress that Li Dazhao and Deng Zhongxia resolutely opposed the reformists and anarchists from the revolutionary democratic organisation of "Shaonian Zhongguo" ("Young China") who contended with the Marxists in guiding the youth. Deng Zhongxia was a member of the CPC from its inception.

His name is inseparably linked with the first steps taken by the Chinese communists to set up trade unions of revolutionary workers and with the vigorous upsurge in the trade union movement during the Chinese revolution of 1925-1927.

It is interesting to know how he set up China's first revolutionary trade union of railwaymen in Changxindian. Even before the first communist circles were founded, right after the May 4 Movement, a Lecture Group to Educate the People was set up on Deng Zhongxia's initiative at Peking University in 1919. Its members established contacts with workers at Changxindian, a Peking-Hankou railway junction 23 kilometres from Peking with more than 3,000 employed at railway depots and other enterprises.² When the Peking Marxist circle was set up in the autumn of 1920, the communists started systematic work of organising and educating the employees. To mark the third anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution in the autumn of 1920, Deng Zhongxia and Li Dazhao organised in Peking the publication of the first issue of the *Laodong yin* (The Echo of Labour) weekly dealing with the problems of organising and educating the Chinese workers. This publication continued to appear till the spring of 1921 when it was closed down by the Peking government.³

The organisation of a workers' school for general education in Changxindian was the first practical step in setting up workers' trade unions. The Chinese workers were almost entirely illiterate and extremely backward. For this reason it was decided to expose them to fundamental social and political ideas gradually and to combine revolutionary propaganda with literacy courses and general knowledge. Deng Zhongxia helped produce a special textbook for workers which took into account their specific interests and cultural level.⁴ The Lecture Group to Educate the People and the students' union of Peking University collected the money to equip the school. In daytime it was attended by workers' children and at night grown-up workers came—about 20 young workers at first, but their number grew later on. The first characters studied at school included "work", "railway line", "worker", "exploitation" and "employer". Those were not merely reading classes but lessons in the fundamentals of political and economic theory. Concrete examples from real life were used to convince the workers of the need to set up an independent organisation and to give them an idea of the growing workers' movement and the anti-imperialist struggle throughout the world.

Deng Zhongxia left Peking for Changxindian. The workers' school was his creation, and it provided the first practical experience in developing class awareness among the workers and in combining Marxism with the workers' movement in the difficult, specific conditions of China.

To mark May Day in 1921, on the basis of the Changxindian workers' school Deng Zhongxia formed a workers' club (the name "club" was used at the time to denote a trade union). A grandiose workers'

² *The Chinese Trade Unions*, No. 3, 1961, p. 10.

³ *Struggle for the Russian Far East*, Moscow, 1922, p. 159 (in Russian).

⁴ *The Chinese Trade Unions*, No. 3, 1961, pp. 10-11.

meeting was held in Changxindian on that day, followed by a demonstration with streamers calling for unity among the workers. In Changxindian and Peking, communists passed out leaflets to the demonstrators calling for a struggle for "the three eights" (an eight-hour working day, eight hours of rest, and eight hours of sleep).⁵

Changxindian was visited by workers' delegates from other cities and railway junctions. The foundation and activities of the workers' school, and subsequently, of a trade union club, exemplified the emerging class trade union movement in China and the stronger ties of the young CPC with the workers at large. The Changxindian experience was of extreme importance for the Chinese communists and for the emergence of the CPC as a proletarian party. It is only natural that the club's activists, headed by Shi Wenping, became the first workers to join the CPC in the autumn of 1921.⁶

Under Deng Zhongxia's guidance, the Peking-Hankou railway trade unions set up the Northern Bureau in the winter of 1922 to aid the Hong Kong sailors' strike. A special crew travelled from Peking to Hankou and back on a train decorated with streamers calling for people to support the striking sailors. A considerable sum of donations was collected from the workers.⁷

To coordinate efforts in developing the proletarian trade union movement throughout the country, the communists founded the National Trade Union Secretariat in the summer of 1921. Along with Zhang Guotao and Li Qihan, Deng Zhongxia was one of the founders and leaders who actively participated in the preparations for and the holding of the first national trade union congress in the spring of 1922. Typically, the Congress was opened on May 1st. It was held in Canton legally by permission of the Sun Yatsen government. Ancient Canton streets saw a May Day demonstration of the city's workers and congress delegates on the opening day of the Congress. Streamers carried calls for workers' unity throughout China and throughout the world. "Trade unions are part of the destiny of Chinese workers!" was a popular slogan.

The mounting trade union movement in China was characterised by the struggle between the new, CPC-sponsored workers' trade unions, which advocated class unity and class struggle, and the old shop, guild, or countrymen's corporations, whose members included workers, contractors and businessmen. The Congress was of paramount importance in strengthening ties between the young CPC and the workers and in promoting the class principle of organising the Chinese workers. It passed a decision to start preparations for setting up the National Trade Union Federation (NTUF) on a class basis. Deng Zhongxia worked out its organisational principles and reported them to the Congress.⁸

The Congress appointed Deng Zhongxia executive secretary of the National Trade Union Secretariat, which was instructed to establish contacts with the Red Trade Union International. It is worth mentioning that the Executive Bureau of the Trade Union International issued an appeal "To the Workers of China" during the work of the Congress on

⁵ *The Chinese Trade Unions*, No. 3, 1961, p. 13; *The New Far East*, No. 9, 1923, pp. 132-136.

⁶ *The Chinese Trade Unions*, 1961, No. 3, p. 12.

⁷ Deng Zhongxia, *Brief History of the Trade Union Movement in China*, Moscow, 1952, p. 80 (in Russian).

⁸ *Documents of the National Trade Union Congresses*, Peking, 1957, pp. 5-6 (in Chinese).

May 2, 1922, calling on them to join in the struggle of the international proletariat.⁹

Right after the first National Trade Union Congress, the National Trade Union Secretariat set out to define its programme of improving the workers' working and living conditions. China's first draft labour legislation was worked out under Deng Zhongxia's guidance. It embodied some radical demands, such as the right of workers to organise into trade unions and the right to strike. It also envisaged the fixing of minimum wages, an eight-hour day, paid leaves and so on. Characteristically the draft mentioned the Chinese workers' right to "international association", in other words, to maintain ties with organisations of international proletarian solidarity.¹⁰ The draft was used in elaborating the specific economic and political demands of the Chinese working class by the subsequent national trade union congresses.

Following the Changxindian example, workers in North China set up trade unions and in the summer of 1922, under Deng Zhongxia's leadership, launched strike action to improve working conditions. Changxindian saw an especially massive strike, thanks to which the workers secured considerable wage increases.

In the autumn of 1922, Deng Zhongxia headed a strike by 50,000 miners at British coal mines in Kailuan. He wrote an appeal to the miners with his blood, calling on them to be staunch in the struggle.¹¹

Li Dazhao and Deng Zhongxia's efforts to organise trade unions at the Peking-Hankou railway line, the major railway road in the country, were of paramount importance in strengthening ties between the CPC and the masses of workers. Following the Changxindian example, by the end of 1922, trade unions had been set up in all the 16 key junctions of the railway line and influenced nearly 20,000 railwaymen. Deng Zhongxia directly headed preparations for the united Congress of all those trade unions opened at the Zhengzhou station on February 1, 1923. However, warlord Wu Peifu, alarmed by the growing activity of railwaymen, sent troops to Zhengzhou which disbanded the congress and the Trade Union Council it had just set up. This triggered a general political strike of protest, which was organised by the communists and spread along the entire Peking-Hankou railway line. The strikers' major demand was freedom of the trade union movement. The Wu Peifu government, openly encouraged by the representatives of foreign powers, ruthlessly suppressed the strike. This shooting of the strikers went down in the history of the Chinese workers' movement as the "bloody events of February 7, 1923".

The Comintern and the Trade Union International spoke highly of the strikers' courage. The Comintern Executive Committee issued a special appeal, which read: "Comrades Railwaymen! Through the struggle and sacrifices you made in the latest strike, you joined the class of the world proletariat fighting against exploiters in all countries of the world... You have started your struggle in the right way. Only by winning the right to the organisation of our own forces can we go on fighting for the emancipation of the Chinese proletariat and for the liberation of the Chinese people from the foreign imperialists and their henchmen, the comprador feudal lords."¹²

⁹ *The Red Trade Union International*, No. 4, 1922, pp. 387-388.

¹⁰ *The First Chinese Labour Yearbook*, Part 2, Peking, 1928, pp. 437-438 (in Chinese).

¹¹ Deng Zhongxia, *Brief History of the Trade Union Movement in China*, pp. 100-106.

¹² *Pravda*, March 5, 1923.

The ruthless defeat of the Peking-Hankou strike resulted in a slump in the Chinese workers' movement. Some Communists began doubting the revolutionary potential of the Chinese working class, and thought it would never regain its powers. During that grim period, Deng Zhongxia wrote numerous articles for the party press, arguing that the working class was the most reliable force of the Chinese revolution and that the CPC should attach most serious attention to the organisation of the proletariat, preparing it for fresh battles. When analysing the Communists' experience in setting up workers' trade unions and in leading their strike actions, he came to the conclusion that the CPC itself had to be strengthened in every possible way; it had to be turned into a truly proletarian party, and workers had to be attracted to it.

In 1923 the CPC Central Committee sent Deng Zhongxia to Shanghai. The country's major industrial centre and at the same time the main citadel of imperialism in China, Shanghai became a focal point of acute clashes between the antagonist forces of imperialism and the young Chinese working class which saw in the foreign enslavers the cause of both national and social oppression. When the class trade union movement was still gathering momentum in 1921-1923, before the Peking-Hankou strike was routed, railwaymen in North and Central China played a leading role. Now it was the 800,000-strong proletariat of Shanghai that moved to the forefront.

With Qu Qiubo and other prominent figures in the CPC, Deng Zhongxia took part in founding Shanghai University, an educational establishment destined to become a centre for training communist cadres. On Li Dazhao's recommendation, Deng Zhongxia was appointed head of its General Department. Li Dazhao, Qu Qiubo, Deng Zhongxia, Cai Hesen, Zhang Tailei and other well-known CPC leaders taught at Shanghai University.¹³ One of the University's major tasks was to maintain links with Shanghai workers, to educate and organise them.

From the moment the communist movement emerged in China, Deng Zhongxia was an active member of the Marxist-Leninist internationalist core within the CPC which sought to establish close contacts with the international workers' and communist movement and its leading bodies, the Communist International and the Trade Union International. The Comintern Executive Committee urged the CPC to develop the trade union movement and to strengthen the communist leadership in organising the Chinese proletariat for its struggle, emphasising that that was "the Communists' prime duty".¹⁴

Beginning in the early 1920s, the Comintern and the Trade Union International began rendering direct, practical aid to promote the communist and workers' movement in China. Deng Zhongxia's efforts were aimed at having the Chinese workers make the utmost use of the aid given by the organisations of international proletarian solidarity and at educating these workers in the spirit of internationalism.

The world's first united national anti-imperialist front was set up in China on the initiative of the Comintern and with its help. The Third CPC Congress (June 1923) passed a resolution on setting up a united front with the Guomindang of Sun Yatsen, and it was at this Congress that Deng Zhongxia was elected member of the CPC Central Committee.

¹³ For details see M. F. Yuryev, *The Chinese Revolution of 1925-1927*, Moscow, 1968, pp. 110-113.

¹⁴ *The Strategy and Tactics of the Comintern in the National Colonial Revolution on the Example of China*, (Collection of Documents), Moscow, 1934, p. 114.

He was directly associated with the key areas of party work, that is using the united front to consolidate and organise the Chinese working class, to enhance its role in the nationwide struggle. Lenin's strategy of a united front which the Comintern pursued in China aimed at bringing together all the forces of the oppressed nation to oppose imperialism and, at the same time, to strengthen therein the social and political part played by the working class and its communist vanguard. China's united front created conditions for the speedy emergence of a revolutionary situation and the immense scope of the 1925-1927 revolution.

Convened in January 1925, the Fourth CPC Congress paid prime attention to the establishment of the communist leadership for the workers. The resolution on the trade union movement passed by the Congress stressed the importance of the Communists' work in the country's major industrial centres, above all in Shanghai.¹⁵

Deng Zhongxia threw himself into the work among the proletariat of Shanghai, where militant revolutionary trade unions were set up under his guidance. In February 1925 Shanghai became the scene of a fierce strike action by 40,000 workers at Japanese textile mills for improvement of working conditions, the cessation of dismissals, and the recognition of the trade unions. To guide this large-scale strike, the CPC Central Committee set up a special committee headed by Deng Zhongxia and Li Lisan. The Communists helped the workers organise a strike committee and picket lines armed with home-made weapons. Apart from trade unions at mills, a united trade union of Shanghai textile workers was also set up. The strike has a decidedly anti-imperialist nature and was keynoted by calls to liberate China from Japanese and other foreign enslavers. During that strike, the Communists carried out anti-imperialist propaganda among broad strata of the people of Shanghai, urging them to support the striking workers; the Communists raised money to support them. The Japanese imperialists sought to quell the strike by force, bringing in the marines from their military vessels to the city. There were repeated clashes between the workers and the troops acting in conjunction with the police. One of those clashes ended in a massacre and the arrest of a large group of strikers led by Deng Zhongxia. However, faced with a revolutionary upsurge, the Shanghai authorities were forced to yield to the demands of the workers and the progressive public at large and to set Deng Zhongxia free after the February strike was over.

Though the Japanese imperialists rejected the major demands of the strikers and made only partial concessions, the February strike gave the Shanghai workers a wealth of experience in struggle and organisation, and strengthened the CPC's influence and prestige among them. It foreshadowed the powerful May 30, 1925 Movement, which marked the beginning of the 1925-1927 revolution.

On May 1, 1925, on the eve of the revolution, the Second National Trade Union Congress was convened in Canton under the leadership of the Communist Party. The Congress set up the National Trade Union Federation (NTUF) which joined the Trade Union International. The Congress also appointed Deng Zhongxia NTUF General Secretary and head of the propaganda department.

In the course of the national democratic revolution of 1925-1927

¹⁵ *Resolutions and Declarations of the Fourth CPC Congress*, (n. p.), 1925, pp. 52-57 (in Chinese).

which shook the country, the Chinese proletariat acted at the forefront of the revolutionary forces. The CPC and the NTUF it guided enjoyed great attention and support from the international proletariat, above all the workers of the Soviet Union. The Chinese working class displayed great heroism and self-sacrifice during those years, with its actions being pivotal to the national revolutionary struggle. The workers' trade unions grew larger and stronger, extending their international contacts.

Deng Zhongxia was in the thick of the revolutionary developments. When the revolution began, he was in Canton, organising the operation of the newly founded NTUF.

When the events of May 30, 1925 took place in Shanghai, the CPC and the entire revolutionary camp of the united front faced the problem of promoting, along with the all-out struggle in Shanghai, the revolution on a nationwide scale. It was necessary to make the utmost use of Guangdong province with Canton, its major city and a place where the revolutionary forces of the united front had territory of their own, armed forces (the Huangpu military school) and well organised movement of workers and peasants. The Communist Party had significant political influence there and mounted vigorous activities among the workers and peasants. The holding and consolidation of the Guangdong revolutionary base, which immediately had to put up resistance against the forces of feudal comprador reaction and the British imperialists (who viewed the region as their sphere of influence), had a decisive importance for the fate of Chinese revolution.

The CPC Central Committee entrusted Deng Zhongxia with a task of paramount importance for the development of the revolution—to organise a strike of solidarity with the Shanghai workers in Canton and Hong Kong.

The British colony on the island of Hong Kong, a mere 144 km from Canton, epitomised the direct, undisguised imperialist oppression which existed in Guangdong. One of the most advanced and numerous sections of the Chinese proletariat was concentrated at the foreign enterprises in Hong Kong.

Su Zhaozheng, the Hong Kong workers' leader, became Chairman of the Hong Kong-Canton strike committee set up by the CPC, with Deng Zhongxia acting as his deputy. The famed Hong Kong-Canton strike was a landmark in both the Chinese and the international workers' movement. It involved 250,000 workers and lasted for 16 months, from June 19, 1925 to October 10, 1926.

The strikers left Hong Kong and settled in Canton, where they were joined by employees of a local foreign concession. The strike committee acting in Canton turned into an influential political organisation with extensive functions. It set up hostels, canteens, hospitals and schools for the many strikers and organised a propaganda department which turned out books, pamphlets and leaflets. It set up a finance department and other institutions. The organisation of armed workers' picket lines was of paramount importance for further developments. The number of pickets which were given some military instruction by students of the Huangpu Military School reached 3,000, half of them were armed with rifles, while others had home-made lances and clubs. The pickets controlled the anti-British boycott and helped combat the counterrevolutionaries. They were also empowered to arrest blacklegs (those who violated the anti-British boycott) and counterrevolutionaries. The strike committee also had a court whose rulings were recognised by the Canton government.

Broad sections of the Guangdong population, including the bourgeoisie, which was quite interested in undermining the positions of British capital, its powerful rival, rallied around the striking workers in the anti-imperialist struggle. An anti-British boycott and complete economic blockade of Hong Kong were declared along with the strike.

The latter shattered the economy of Hong Kong, the bulwark of British rule in China, and undermined the positions of Great Britain there. At the same time it created conditions for economic and political strengthening of the first territorial base of the revolution in China with Canton as its centre. This base served the further development of the revolution. During the strike, the working class and the CPC accumulated invaluable experience in struggle and organisation.¹⁶

Deng Zhongxia wrote several books and many articles dealing with the history of that strike, analysing the experience of the united front's anti-imperialist struggle and the role the working class played in it. His major and most stimulating work is *A Brief History of the Trade Union Movement in China*, which narrates the development of the workers' movement throughout the country in the period from 1919 to 1926. The story of this book is extremely interesting and typical of that time.

After the counterrevolutionary coups of 1927, Deng Zhongxia acted as one of the organisers of the famed Nanchang uprising, the first battle offered by the revolutionary forces under the guidance of the CPC against the Guomindang, which had embarked on the road of counter-revolution. Started on August 1, 1927, the uprising laid the foundations of the Red Army, the CPC's own armed forces. Later on he headed the CPC underground committee in Jiangsu province, with its centre in Shanghai, where the CPC concentrated its leading cadres. Despite the difficult conditions of underground activities, the CPC sought in every way possible to revive the militant spirit among the Chinese proletariat and to rouse it to the struggle against the Guomindang. In the autumn of 1927, the CPC Central Committee sent Deng Zhongxia to organise a strike among the workers of the Pudong region, a centre of the Shanghai textile industry. The CPC leadership hoped to invigorate the Shanghai proletariat with the help of that strike. It was then that Deng Zhongxia acted as one of the organisers of the *Shanghai gongren* (the Shanghai Worker) journal which became an organ of the underground General Council of the Shanghai Trade Unions, resurrected after being routed by the Chiang Kaishek clique.

In 1928 Deng Zhongxia, one of the most prestigious and popular leaders of the Chinese workers' movement, was sent to Moscow to represent the NTUF at the Trade Union International. The 5th Congress of the Trade Union International elected him to the Executive Committee of the Red Trade Union International. It was in Moscow that Deng Zhongxia wrote *A Brief History of the Trade Union Movement in China* in which he summed up the historical material and his experience as a leader of the Chinese workers' major actions.

The Guomindang, which had betrayed the cause of the revolution, established fierce white terror in China in those years, so publishing such a book at home was out of the question. To preserve this valuable work, which gave the first Marxist analysis of the key periods in the Chinese workers' movement, and to make it known to the Chinese re-

¹⁶ For details see: T. N. Akatova, *The Siangang-Guangzhou (Hong Kong-Canton) Strike*, Moscow, 1959.

revolutionaries and the world public at large, Moscow carried out an act of internationalist aid by publishing the book in Chinese in 1930. For many years, the Moscow 1930 edition remained the only one. Subsequently, it was republished in the liberated areas of China even before the victory of the revolution. It saw several editions in the PRC after 1949. The second Chinese edition, which appeared in 1942, was translated into Russian in 1952. In this way, Deng Zhongxia's book was again published in Moscow. Every Soviet student of Chinese history is familiar with the book, and its importance cannot be overestimated. To this day it is the most valuable and authoritative work on the history of the workers' movement in China.

A Brief History of the Trade Union Movement in China ends with the events of 1926. Deng Zhongxia stopped working on the book when he left Moscow in 1929 to return to his homeland so he could resume his direct participation in the struggle against the Guomindang reactionaries. The CPC Central Committee appointed Deng Zhongxia political commissar of the Red Army second corps under the command of He Long. The corps' command faced the difficult task of redeploying troops from the Hunan province to the western part of the Hubei province and of building a new guerrilla base in the Honghu region. He Long and Deng Zhongxia successfully coped with the task, as a result of which Red Army positions were considerably strengthened.

He went back to work in Shanghai, which was, as before, the centre of all the underground activities of the CPC in Guomindang China.

Chinese cities were in the grips of fierce reaction. The Guomindang men, who were, until quite recently, allies of the CPC in the united front, were well aware of the Communists' activities among the workers during the revolution and knew the leaders of the workers' movement quite well. They were especially persistent in tracking down Deng Zhongxia. In 1927, right after the Guomindang counterrevolutionary coups, warrants for his arrest were sent to all the major cities in the country.

Communists found it especially dangerous to work in Shanghai, to which the Guomindang government attached special importance.

The workers' movement in Shanghai played a special role against the background of the Japanese aggression which began with the seizure of Manchuria on September 18, 1931. During that period, Shanghai was destined to become the centre of the whole Chinese people's patriotic struggle against the invaders. Shanghai workers took the lead in this struggle, because the majority of Japanese industrial enterprises functioning in China were concentrated in that city. More than 80,000 worked there in the Japanese textile mills alone.

Liu Shaoqi, Deng Zhongxia and Lo Dengxian were among the most authoritative CPC leaders directly connected with the workers' movement and were active in Shanghai in the autumn of 1931.¹⁷ It is interesting to note that Lo Dengxian, who was then a member of the Politbureau of the CPC Central Committee, developed as a revolutionary under Deng Zhongxia's guidance. A common worker from Hong Kong, he was elected to the strike committee during the Hong Kong-Canton strike of 1925-1926. Under Deng Zhongxia's direct influence he then became a Communist, a leading figure in the workers' movement, and a professional revolutionary. After Su Zhaozheng died in 1929, Lo Dengxian succeeded him as chairman of the underground national trade union federation.

¹⁷ Jin Yingxi, "The Workers' Movement in Shanghai in the Period from April 12, 1927 to September 18, 1931." In: *Zhongshan daxue xiubao*, No. 2, 1957, p. 92.

The so-called red trade unions which were led by Communists, were quite weak and not numerous; they found it extremely difficult to function among the workers since anyone suspected of conducting communist propaganda was subject to the death penalty by order of the Guomindang government.

The constant white terror of the Guomindang authorities against the "communist menace" grew even stronger when the Guomindang sought to curb the mass upsurge of the anti-Japanese struggle, to keep it within the "permitted boundaries", and to subordinate it to their leadership completely. Shanghai newspapers were filled with reports of "communist intrigues".

Since the outset of the Japanese aggression which began on September 18, 1931, the workers' movement in Shanghai had but a single aim—to rebuff the invaders. Never since the revolution of 1925-1927 was the Shanghai workers' struggle so intense as in the last months of 1931 and early 1932. The Shanghai CPC Committee called on workers to arm to defend their homeland. Though they were spotty and weak, the underground red trade unions actively participated in the patriotic struggle. The CPC increased its influence among the workers as it stood for a resolute and consistent rebuff of the aggressor. The slogans of resolute struggle for the salvation of their homeland expounded by the Communists were understood by every worker and fully corresponded to popular sentiments, clearly formulating the people's demands and giving them a generalised expression on a nationwide scale.

The anti-Japanese struggle of the Shanghai workers culminated in the famed defence of Shanghai (January-March 1932) when its population, with the workers at the forefront resisted the Japanese army which was attempting to seize Shanghai.

In the grim years of the Guomindang reaction and white terror which set in after the revolution of 1925-1927, the struggle for Shanghai shook the entire nation, revolutionised the working class, and inspired it with faith in its own power. In those days, the Communist International and the Trade Union International called on workers throughout the world to daily oppose the Japanese invasion of China and to support the courageous defenders of Shanghai.¹⁸

The effort to invigorate the patriotic struggle of the Shanghai proletariat, of nationwide significance in the country's resistance to the Japanese enslavers during that period, was the last revolutionary feat performed by Deng Zhongxia. The Guomindang clique succeeded in arresting him in 1933. Chiang Kaishek officers were not in a hurry to execute the popular CPC leader but tried rather to tempt him to betray his cause. After Deng Zhongxia was subjected to unbearably merciless, Jesuitical, medieval tortures, an agent provocateur was put in his cell and tried to tempt him to renounce the Communist Party of China and take the side of the Guomindang. Though he was more dead than alive, he courageously withstood the horrors of the police dungeons and indignantly refused all promises. It was then announced that he was to be publicly executed in the Guomindang capital of Nanking. Before his

¹⁸ *The Strategy and Tactics of the Comintern in the National Colonial Revolution on the Example of China*, Moscow, 1934, pp. 313-315; *International Proletarian Solidarity in the Struggle against the Onslaught of Fascism (1928-1932)*. Documents and Materials, Moscow, 1960, pp. 345-350.

execution Deng Zhongxia managed to smuggle a letter to the Communist Party of China from prison. Here is what he wrote: "Comrades, I am to go to Yuhuatai¹⁹ soon. Go on fighting with all your might. We shall be victorious in the end."²⁰ Deng Zhongxia's life and his very death was an immortal exploit which went down in history.

The name of this communist internationalist has forever been inscribed in the history of the Chinese and international workers' movement. An outstanding leader of the Communist Party who stood at the beginning of the communist and revolutionary workers' movement in China, he gave all his knowledge, power, talent and his very life to strengthen ties between the CPC and the workers and to turn it into a truly proletarian communist party. His whole life was devoted to the great cause of emancipating the Chinese working class and of uniting it to the international proletariat and the Soviet people, invariably loyal to their lofty internationalist duty. With the death of Deng Zhongxia and the other communist internationalists who formed the Marxist-Leninist core of the party during the years of the Guomindang white terror, the CPC suffered an irreplaceable loss.

¹⁹ Yuhuatai was the place where communists were publicly executed in Nanking.

²⁰ For a brief life story of Comrade Deng Zhongxia see: *Brief History of the Trade Union Movement in China*, Moscow, 1952, p. 308.

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RECENT CHINESE DISCUSSION OF ECONOMIC POLICY SURVEYED

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 4, Oct-Dec 82 pp 89-93

[Article by B. Chizhov: "Regulation of the Economy"; not included in Russian-language PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA No 3, Jul-Sep 82]

[Text] **O**f late, the Chinese press has increasingly often carried articles by economists testifying to the strenuous efforts being made in the country to extricate the economy from the grip of the stagnation resulting from Maoist experiments.

According to Chinese economists, it is the "reform of the system of economic management", the "streamlining of the economy" and the skilful combination of planned management with the market regulators that are to play an important part in economic development, the improvement of the entire economic mechanism, and the removal of the present disproportions. The papers keep insisting that the plan should play the chief role, whereas "market regulation" is assigned a secondary, subordinate function. This apparently mirrors the apprehension that market elements may go out of control.

Having corrected the "long-standing leftist mistakes" which inflicted tremendous damage on the economy, Peking was compelled to admit that the harm was so great that a long period of economic regulation would be necessary. This regulation is intended for a long period of time, as recent statistics confirm. Suffice it to refer to China's *Economic Yearbook*. 1981 which, like the well-known reference book, *The Great Decade* (1959), contains comparatively full data on the development of China's economy.

How does this regulation of the economy work, and how does it affect the economy?

The present-day economic policy of the PRC primarily envisages a reduction in the volume of capital construction planned earlier on an unjustifiably broad scale, which proved too much for the unstable Chinese economy to manage. In 1981, the volume of capital investments went down by 20.6 per cent as compared with 1980. More than 150 large and medium projects constructed by state-owned enterprises and offices were dropped. According to *Renmin ribao* of May 21, 1982, what is meant today is the "regulation" of only the "first group of major enterprises" (there are 1,200 of them), whose gross volume of production accounts for one-third of the entire output of all state-owned enterprises. They provide the state with two-thirds of its revenue from industrial enterprises. Reorganisation means that unprofitable factories and works will be closed down; some similar industrial enterprises will amalgamate; a number of enterprises will switch over to the production of other commodities, in particular, some heavy industry plants will begin producing consumer goods, including durables. Such "rectification", creating certain—although limited—opportunities for reducing unemployment engenders fresh problems at the same time.

So, on the one hand, the Chinese leaders are attempting to take measures to diminish, if not eliminate altogether, the disproportions in the economy, such as a considerable amount of capital investment in heavy industry, an excessive rate of capital construction, a tangible lag in light industry which suffered even more from the low rate of agricultural development, shortages of energy resources and raw materials, and a drop in production efficiency. On the other hand, the need to solve new and difficult problems which were engendered by the experiments emerged.

The Chinese economic press repeatedly refers to the trite stereotype of the system of priorities: "agriculture—light industry—heavy industry". To a certain extent, this corresponds to the new economic policy of reviving mixed economy.

In agriculture, complicated processes are underway, intended to spur on the peasants' activity. The system of individual production quotas for each peasant household is widespread in the Chinese countryside. Although China's periodicals spare no effort to explain that the land is still used collectively, that peasants have no right to sell or lease the plots they till, as a matter of fact, collective property is becoming fragmented. Chinese economists explain these innovations by the need to raise the low level of productive forces to the height of collective forms of labour organisation and income distribution. The income of each peasant today depends on the amount of the harvest he receives. In the final analysis, this may lead to a certain increase in agricultural production, which bears the immense burden of providing the billion-strong population with food.

The PRC's domestic market suffers from a tremendous scarcity of staple goods. Light industry, which ranks second in importance after agriculture, has been working for a long time on an obsolete industrial basis which has not been revamped for many years. The heavy industry not agriculture or light industry, has been developing at priority rates in China. Presently, a correction has been effected and some proportions in the economy have been changed, including the switching over of some heavy industrial enterprises to the production of consumer goods for the population, such as bicycles, sewing machines, refrigerators, TV-sets, and so on, to eliminate commodity shortage to some degree. Experience shows, however, that a developed technological basis for putting out high quality commodities cannot be found everywhere. Besides, the production of consumer goods at small enterprises demands scarce raw materials, fuel and electricity. The slump in heavy industry became an obstacle to further increases in the quantity of commodity production by light industry. Having realised that fact, Chinese economists began stressing the need for the balanced development of different branches of heavy and light industry.

According to official data published by the PRC Department of Statistics, the value of the gross industrial output and agricultural produce in 1981 amounted to 749 billion yuan. The national income was 388 billion yuan. The increment of the value of gross output was 4.5 per cent, whereas the growth in the national income was 3 per cent, i.e., almost two times less than in 1980.

According to estimates of the PRC Department of Statistics, the value of the gross industrial output, as compared with 1980, went up by 4.1 per cent, while in 1980 it was 8.7 per cent more than the index for 1979. Thus, we witness lower rates of growth in gross industrial output. A troublesome situation has taken shape in power engineering,

this becoming an obstacle to the development of the industry as a whole. Steel production is decreasing, and in 1982 it had to be reduced to 34 million tons, i. e., by 4 per cent.

The share of light industry in the overall volume of industrial output (51.4 per cent) exceeded the share of heavy industry. However, the uncontrolled production of many items results in a backlog of low quality commodities, while the demand for these same types of products is not satisfied.

At the session of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, reports on the plan and budget for 1982 were made by Yao Yilin, Chairman of the PRC State Planning Committee, and Minister of Finance Wang Bingqian who set the task of accelerated economic development. The situation in the national economy was described as very favourable, but the target figures for 1982 fixed the rates of increment of industrial output at a level of 4 per cent. Similar rates were set for agriculture as well. These figures are much lower than those for 1981.

Are there any positive changes in the economic situation in the PRC in 1982 as compared with the year 1981 which was characterised by *Renmin ribao* as a year of "financial and economic crisis", "when disproportions in the national economy increased and the financial and economic difficulties became more impressive"? In the course of the discussion "Theoretical and Practical Problems of the Economic Management Reform" held in the city of Chengdu last April (a report on this was carried by *Tingji guanli* magazine, 1981, No. 7, and *Xinhua yuebao* 1981, No. 5), in which leading economists from China's two research institutes—the Institute of Industrial Economy, Academy of Social Sciences of China (Peking), and the Research Institute of Social Sciences (Sichuan Province), took part, it was agreed that China's economy "is embarking on a new road" opening up possibilities for its allround upsurge and the enhancement of production efficiency. It was emphasised that a "rationalisation" of the economic structure would be carried out and it was necessary, to this end, to generalise the Chinese organisations' experience in carrying out the reform. The participants in the conferences admitted that many mistakes are being made in the course of the reform. In their opinion, the main problem consists in inadequate control over "microeconomics". The old methods of economic management were denounced ("there is no way out along the old lines"). The main issue of contention was how to achieve balanced development of all branches of the national economy.

The conclusion that can be drawn from the economists' speeches is that the innovations which, they hoped, would serve as economic stimulators have given rise to many difficulties.

The granting of considerable economic independence to enterprises resulted in the failure of the programme to reduce the volume of capital construction, because naturally, enterprises were not interested in the curtailment of production. The expansion of such independence, when there is no clearcut centralised planning and control over the use of resources, tends to stabilise disproportions among individual branches of the national economy, rather than eliminate them.

Voices are heard increasingly often in China today favouring the establishment of state-capitalist enterprises with the participation of foreign capital. By 1981, foreign investment in the economy of China amounted to approximately \$1.5 billion. The Peking leaders plan to attract foreign capital in various ways: enterprises will be set up along cooperative lines; loans will be obtained; the workforce will participate

in the building of enterprises, and compensation deals will be concluded.

The "open doors" policy pursued by the Peking leaders is highly attractive to the West. No doubt, the capitalist partners are primarily concerned with their own interests and make investments, first and foremost, to those industries which provide quick returns. It remains to be seen whether China will profit from this policy but, for the time being, according to China's Minister of Finance, the PRC should spend more than 3.5 billion yuan to pay back debts and the interest on those debts to foreign agents. There are plans to continue to "attract foreign capital". Several so-called special zones where the "mixed" enterprises will be built have been set up on the territory of the PRC. Today, there are such zones in the Shenzhen district, bordering on Hong Kong, and in Zhuhai near Macao. Such a zone has also been created near Shantou. In Shenzhen, 490 different enterprises have been founded with the participation of foreign capital. A considerable number of these enterprises of an industrial or commercial type are already functioning. For the time being, mixed enterprises are small, but their number and size will grow since they are granted certain privileges. This may introduce disproportions in economic planning. Today the Chinese leaders are not satisfied with the rates at which such enterprises are being set up or with their performance.

What are the prospects for economic reforms in the PRC? According to Chinese scholars, their implementation will require a decade or even more. This period has been conventionally subdivided into three stages. The first stage of economic stabilisation envisages strict control over capital investments, the narrowing of their scale, saving on administrative expenditures, an increase in consumer goods output, balancing finances, stabilising prices, and "permanent modest improvement of the people's standard of living, provided the current level of incomes is preserved". Analysing the present economic situation, one may state that today, the Chinese economy is precisely at that stage. Chinese economists have predicted that it will last two years.

The second stage, which is to last three years, implies continued efforts to balance proportions, provided the former economic priorities are preserved. It should ensure the uninterrupted improvement of living standards of "both the urban and the rural population", and increases in the wages of low-paid factory and office workers. The feasibility of such plans seems highly doubtful in view of the difficulties which the Chinese economy is encountering in the course of the regulation. The third stage should be devoted mainly to the solution of the problem of the infrastructure which is lagging behind. This should result in "setting up harmonious ties" within the national economy, and will promote the "enhancement of economic efficiency" and bring about a "considerable improvement in standards of living".

The aforementioned considerations were voiced by the participants in the discussion at Chengdu. It is indicative that economists admitted the fact that the living standards of the Chinese people are much lower today than during the period of the first five-year plan, carried out with Soviet assistance. ("At the third stage one should see to it that rates of growth of the average level of consumption by city dwellers and peasants reach the level of the first five-year plan!") According to preliminary estimates, this period will last five years, but the task of "rationalising the economic structure will not be carried out completely".

It is highly indicative that much of what concerns the implementation of economic reform is unclear even to its originators, both implementers

and theoreticians alike. This mainly refers to such key issues as the determination of expedient proportions in the distribution of incomes, forms of responsibility for losses at different enterprises, amounts of production development funds, social consumption fund, and funds for material incentives, etc. Most Chinese economists tend to believe that it is necessary to switch over gradually to a unitary system of taxation and establish responsibility of enterprises for losses rather than continue with the existing practice of incomes deduction.

No doubt, the economic management reform in the PRC has borrowed some features from the economic reforms carried out in the socialist countries. This, above all, refers to the enhancement of the role played by the law of cost and of commodity-money relations, the expansion of economic independence of industrial and trade enterprises, the improvement of price formation, and the bringing of price levels closer to production costs. At the same time, many innovations are nothing but a return to economic forms which existed prior to the socialist transformations of the 1950s and which may result in irreversible socio-economic consequences. Some Chinese economists realise this and therefore stress the "need to intensify the state planning of the economy on a scientific basis taking due account of the prospects and actual conditions in China". They note that "planning is the fundamental specific feature of socialist economy", and that "planned economy has shown its enormous advantages in China".

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CRITIQUE OF 'ASIAN CENTRISM' IN PRC LITERARY STUDIES REVIEWED

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 3, Jul-Sep 82 (signed to press 12 Oct 82) pp 90-93

[Review by Ye. A. Serebryakov, doctor of philological sciences (Leningrad), of book "Kitayskoye literaturnoye nasledie i sovremennost'" [The Chinese Literary Heritage and the Present Day] by Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences N. T. Fedorenko, Moscow, Khudozhestvennaya literatura, 1981, 398 pages]

[Text] The title of the new book by Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences N. T. Fedorenko, "Kitayskoye literaturnoye nasledie i sovremennost'," testifies to the author's desire to analyze the development and continuity of Chinese spiritual traditions and reveal their importance in the Chinese people's life today and in contemporary world culture. The cultural heritage has been a vital issue in China in our era, and Marxist theory has been conflicting with various bourgeois views (from chauvinistic to cosmopolitan) for many decades. Marxism-Leninism became established in Chinese literary studies when the PRC was founded, but the vulgar and utilitarian attitude toward cultural heritage had a perceptible adverse effect on scholarship. After the gloomy years of the "Cultural Revolution," the interest in classical literature was reawakened in China but literary scholarship has naturally been affected by Marxism's intense struggle against petty bourgeois and bourgeois ideas. It is indicative that the significance of Marxist methodology in the study of culture was the main topic of discussion at the conference convened in the beginning of September 1981 in Beijing by the editors of WENXIUE YICHAN magazine for experts on classical Chinese literature. This conference was necessary because one of the reactions to the "Cultural Revolution" was the appearance of doubts about the validity of the Marxist approach to philological studies. Some experts felt that theorizing about old literature should be abandoned in favor of pure textological studies. Some even asserted: "It is better to analyze a single character than to defend an 'ism.'" Conference speakers noted that Chinese literary scholars are now substituting the ideas of Hegel and other pre-Marxian philosophers for Marxist ideas. They had to acknowledge that "the creation of a team of experts to study Chinese classical literature is something that cannot be postponed. The study of the country's literary heritage is one of the unfortunate areas which suffered most from ultra-leftist errors."¹ Under these conditions, this book by a Soviet scholar about Chinese literary

traditions and will reinforce the Marxist interpretation of the Chinese cultural heritage.

Fedorenko's ideas about the interaction of national and universal factors in the verbal arts are of great methodological significance. The researcher reveals the adverse effect of Eurocentric views, which do not recognize the importance of Chinese works in the world literary process, on the scientific study of the Chinese cultural heritage. The author also criticizes another extreme--so-called Asian centrism. "The attempt to idealize the East and praise its culture and the Eastern way of thinking as absolutely superior to the rest of the world and to all other peoples and cultures is without question just as devoid of objectivity as Eurocentrism," N. T. Fedorenko writes (p 100). He describes how the appeals to "Sinize the theory of literature and art," which often led to violations of the historic principle and to a search for modern aesthetic categories in ancient works, grew out of nationalist feelings. The author contrasts these unscientific theories with Marxist methodology, from the standpoint of which he discusses the complex interaction of literature and society in antiquity and the Middle Ages, the role of religious philosophy in the development of the ideological and aesthetic features of literature, the balance of folk and aristocratic tendencies in the literary process and the place occupied by Chinese literary art in world literature.

Analyzing the natural development of Chinese literature, the author of the work stresses that lyrical poetry prevailed in the Chinese literary process for many centuries. Incidentally, N. T. Fedorenko has done much to familiarize the Soviet reader with the Chinese poetic heritage. He edited, and wrote detailed introductions for, "Kitayskaya klassicheskaya poeziya (Epokha Tan)" [Chinese Classical Poetry (T'ang Era)] (Moscow, 1956) and the four-volume "Antologiya kitayskoy poezii" [Anthology of Chinese Poetry] (Moscow, 1957-1958). In this work N. T. Fedorenko takes a look at the literature of the Sung era (10th-13th centuries) because researchers of Chinese poetry in our country and abroad concentrated for a long time primarily on the works of the T'ang era (7th-10th centuries). N. T. Fedorenko is the first in Soviet Sinology to present such a serious and thorough analysis of the ci, the poetic song genre of the Sung era. In this monograph, the author cites abundant poetic material to substantiate his statement that "the poetry of the ci genre occupies an important place in Chinese literary history: Along with the traditional verse of the shi genre, the ci represents the mainstream of poetic development in China and the classical basis of Chinese poetry" (p 15). The author presents interesting descriptions of the content and form of the ci genre and points out the complex interaction of musical and poetic rhythms in the verses, the highly artful use of words and the importance of artistic detail in the works of the ci genre.

N. T. Fedorenko discusses the work of the major poets Su Shi, Li Qingzhao and Xin Qiji, displaying a thoughtful and careful approach to the literary art of the past. Chinese literary scholars typically make comments like the following when they analyze, for example, the artistic achievements of Su Shi: "His limited class outlook and ideology kept him from perceiving the depths of the people's life and revealing the essence of societal relations and, for

this reason, he did not reach the heights of realism attained by Du Fu. Unlike Li Bo, he was unable to consistently oppose societal defects and aristocratic authority and his romanticism is therefore more passive than that of Li Bo."² In statements like these, in addition to the vulgarized use of the categories of "realism" and "romanticism" to describe the literary process of the Middle Ages, there is a tendency to oversimplify the outlook of the poet and the criteria of the artistic value of literary works.

N. T. Fedorenko strives to reproduce Su Shi's creative talent in all of its variety of facets, in its complex interaction with political and spiritual life in the country and in its connections with Confucianism, Buddhism and Taoism. According to the researcher, "there is no question that Su Shi was most concerned with the ethical meaning and moral significance of poetry." He then goes on to explain: "We are using the term ethics here to signify the particular aspect of the meaning of the poetic songs of the ci genre in which the moral principles, artistic purpose and aesthetic nature of poetry are not clearly defined" (p 49). The author's thorough and comprehensive study of the ideological and artistic essence of Su Shi's poetry allows him to reproduce the spiritual world of the medieval poet, his ideals and his dreams. In the works of Su Shi, just as in all ci of the Sung era, the main thing, according to the researcher, is not the description of events, but the expression of moral and emotional responses to them. N. T. Fedorenko believes that the permanent value of classical Chinese poetry lies in its fidelity to life, its noble emotions, its subtle perception of the beauty of nature and its rich metaphors. "The unique language and style and the profound ideas and feelings of the ci genre make it outstanding and unparalleled," the author of the book concludes (pp 76-77). He proudly reports that Soviet Sinology holds precedence in the study and translation of the ci, noting the particular significance of M. Basmanov's artful translations.

The problem of national uniqueness in relation to features common to all mankind is discussed with the greatest cogency and illustrated with examples from the works of ancient poet Qu Yuan, who accomplished the transition from anonymous lyrical poetry to individual literary artistry. The nature of Qu Yuan's works was colored a great deal by the poet's dramatic conflict with the rulers of the Chu principality, who disregarded the interests of their native land and made concessions to the belligerent Ch'in kingdom. One of the author's statements is central to an understanding and assessment of the poet's works: "These objections to the attempted Ch'in annexation do not mean, however, that Qu Yuan, as some authors have said, opposed the unification of China or was fighting against the consistent development of history. This conclusion is extremely oversimplified and incorrect at the very least" (p 172). Qu Yuan's love for his native land, his concern for spiritual and moral values and his staunch defense of his convictions are the secret of his extraordinary popularity in China. According to the researcher, it was precisely because Qu Yuan was concerned about the historical fate of his native land that he was able to create a world of poetic images which took on universal significance and became the property of all mankind.

In his examination of the works of individual ancient and medieval Chinese authors and of the Chinese literary process in general, the researcher directs attention to the presence of humanistic principles and attempts to understand

the essence of man. "How poor Chinese humanism would be without the 'Book of Songs,' 'Chu Stanzas,' T'ang poetry and Sung ci verses, without Qu Yuan, Tao Yuanming, Wang Wei, Li Bo, Du Fu, Bo Juyi, Su Shi, Ouyang Xiu, Li Qingzhao, Xin Qiji and dozens and hundreds of other outstanding literary artists" (p 8). The researcher's words reveal his awareness that Chinese classical poetry cannot be imagined in isolation from humanistic ideas. This is why the researcher's statements about the attack on humanism and humanitarianism during the "Cultural Revolution" are so bitter and indignant. "Humanism in our country was criticized as revisionism for a long time," RENMIN RIBAO acknowledges and then reports that there is now widespread interest in humanism, but two approaches are apparent, one of which recognizes the connection between Marxism and humanism while the other completely denies this connection, because "humanism is a bourgeois ideology and the product of a specific stage of history,"³ when the bourgeois class rebelled against the feudal order. This report testifies to the pernicious effects of the "Cultural Revolution" on the thinking of the Chinese intelligentsia. In contrast to this theoretical confusion, the Soviet scientist states his views precisely: "Humanism, in our opinion, played the most important role in the artistic creativity of all peoples in all times. Even in our century humanism is the main artistic issue.... In our day humanism has acquired new meaning and a new dimension, although it was the banner of progressive human aspirations and artistic will even in the past. The humanism of our day is composed of inherited and new elements" (p 149). Many Chinese literary monuments are accessible to people of the 20th century precisely because they record the eternal search for the meaning of life and the desire to free the individual spiritually and to affirm human dignity.

In his examination of the Chinese literary heritage, N. T. Fedorenko naturally had to analyze the connection between folklore and literature and determine the place of folk art in the country's artistic traditions. He feels that one of the distinctive features of Chinese classical literature is its respectful attitude toward ancient folk songs and the desire to preserve them. This occurred because the Confucians were quick to recognize the strong effect folk songs could have on the people and they made use of this knowledge when they tried to establish their political and ethical dogmas. Confucius has traditionally been given credit for compiling the "Book of Songs," which was later included in canonical monuments and acquired a didactic nature. Despite all the efforts of Confucian commentators to interpret folklore in light of their own doctrine, however, readers were able to sense the heartbeat of live poetic thought. "Extreme simplicity and immediacy are almost the main features of the lyrical poetry in the 'Book of Songs,'" N. T. Fedorenko states (p 122). He notes that folklore promoted the penetration of written literature by popular ethics and aesthetic ideals and the common features of everyday life. The more closely the Chinese poet was bound to the folk poetic tradition, the more clearly national uniqueness was displayed in his works. Reminding his readers that folklore always enriched the ideological and artistic investigations of the brilliant writers of all times in the West and the East, N. T. Fedorenko singles out the influence of folk art on the origins and development of genres and on the establishment of humanistic ideals as a distinctive feature of the literary development of ancient and medieval China.

The author states that the rulers of China cultivated great-Han contempt for the cultural achievements of other peoples for centuries and that this self-isolation later led to the mistaken idea that Chinese literature was completely devoid of foreign influence. The long-lived prevalence of Sinocentric currents, which tried to explain everything from the standpoint of Chinese national autochthonics and to deny all outside cultural and spiritual influence, must be contrasted to the results of scientific investigations dictated by the belief that "there is no hermetically insulated nation, just as there is no so-called exclusivity. The development of Chinese literature is no exception to this" (pp 216-217). N. T. Fedorenko uses the example of the bianwen genre to demonstrate the strong ties between the Chinese and Indian literatures. The monograph contains important information about the bianwen genre, the scrolls found in the caves of Gansu Province, the history of the publication of texts and the study of dunhuang manuscripts in China and the important contribution made by Soviet Sinology to the scientific investigation of the bianwen. The author narrates the history of the translations of Buddhist sutras into Chinese and describes the intricate interrelationship of the Buddhist doctrine with the Chinese schools of Confucianism and Taoism. He states that Buddhist preachers tried to reinforce their doctrine by using philosophical terms and phrases known to the Chinese, adapting Buddhist subject matter to the beliefs of the local inhabitants and using the stylistic devices of Chinese literature. The bianwen genre grew out of Buddhist sermons. To entertain their listeners, who were sometimes simple and illiterate people, the monks resorted to a unique method of narrating Buddhist parables in which prose was combined organically with poetry. Most of the bianwen dealt with Buddhist subjects, but there were also some secular works which narrated Chinese legends. The narrative style came from India, but the traditions of national prose and poetry led to the birth of an original genre, which was an important connecting link between the budding literary prose of the 4th-6th centuries and the narrative literature which came after the 11th century. The importance of the bianwen genre, as N. T. Fedorenko correctly points out, "would be difficult to overestimate from the standpoint of an objective analysis of the literary process in China and its interaction with the development of literature in the outside world, and specifically with the literature of India" (p 216).

The section entitled "The translation and Interpretation of the Text" is of considerable methodological value. Here the author discusses the principles and criteria of the accurate translation, illustrated mainly with the Russian version of the "Book of Songs." The scientific study and interpretation of ancient and medieval literary works and their artistic translation into the modern language are a major area of concern in China today. The ancient Chinese wenyan language, in which most of the works of past centuries were written, is accessible to only a small segment of the Chinese intelligentsia. The gap between today's Chinese people and their literary heritage was widened by the "Cultural Revolution," which kept many millions of young people from acquiring even an elementary education. It was no coincidence that the 18 December 1981 issue of RENMIN RIBAO contained an article by Li Kan and Zhao Shouyan, entitled "The Work To Put the Old Books in Order Must Be Given the Most Serious Attention," in which they suggest that ancient works should be edited, punctuated and annotated, and even translated into the modern

language so that they will be accessible to anyone capable of reading today's newspaper. This will be a colossal job because, "according to estimates, there are now more than 80,000 of these old books (some believe there are more than 100,000)." Li Kan and Zhao Shouyan admit that "the work to restore the old books and publish them was almost completely stopped during the difficult decade of the 'Great Cultural Revolution'" and that sweeping research and translation projects will be required to save the national cultural heritage from oblivion. Some experience has been accumulated in the translation of Chinese classical works (for example, the "Book of Songs" and the poetry of Qu Yuan and the T'ang poets) into contemporary Chinese, but there are still no serious works on the theory of translation. This kind of indifference toward the study of the theoretical principles of translation could have an adverse effect on the results of translating projects. "The numerous attempts by Chinese philologists and poets to translate the 'Shijing' into modern Chinese have not been crowned with perceptible success," N. T. Fedorenko says (p 287) and then explains the natural laws governing the literary translation. He maintains that the literary translation is a creative endeavor in which two aspects of the mastery of the original and foreign languages are dialectically combined: scientific reason and poetic intuition. The researcher has no doubt that the methodological principles of philology and literature must be combined. "All of this essentially means that the comparison of the translation to the original must be multidimensional, involving various types of criteria--ideological, stylistic, psychological, tonal, emotional, metaphorical, etc." (p 272).

At the end of the book the author presents an almost complete bibliography of studies and translations of Chinese classical and modern literature conducted in our country during the 1970's, attesting to the Soviet people's invariable interest in the Chinese culture. Unfortunately, some works were omitted from the bibliography: For example, there is no mention of the following articles--V. F. Gusarov's "The Politico-Philosophical Views of Han Yu (768-824)" (VESTNIK LENINGRADSKOGO UNIVERSITETA, 1970, No 14), V. V. Zaytsev's "Ji Kang and Religious Intolerance in China" ("Teoreticheskiye problemy isucheniya literatur Dal'nego Vostoka" [Questions of Theory in the Study of Far Eastern Literature], Moscow, 1970), O. P. Bolotina's "The Heroic Principle in Lao She's Novel 'Fiery Burial'" ("Literatura stran Dal'nego Vostoka" [The Literature of the Far East], Moscow, 1979), S. Ye. Yakhontov's "The Grammar of Chinese Poetry" ("Teoreticheskiye problemy isucheniya literatur Dal'nego Vostoka," Moscow, 1974) and others.

The author makes an interesting comment in this book: "My contact with the great literary monuments of ancient China provided me for many years with the incomparable joy of discovering and studying the sources of creativity and the undying art of literature" (pp 213-214). In this new work, N. T. Fedorenko has shared this joy with the Soviet reader, has demonstrated the importance of the Chinese cultural heritage today and has substantiated the Marxist principles of its mastery.

FOOTNOTES

1. GUANGMING RIBAO, 5 October 1981.
2. "History of Chinese Literature," vol 2, Beijing, 1959, pp 408-409.
3. RENMIN RIBAO, 19 October 1981.

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'DEMOCRATIC' JAPANESE POETS INFLUENTIAL AGAINST MILITARISM, NATIONALISM

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 3, Jul-Sep 82 (signed to press 12 Oct 82) pp 94-101

[Article by A. M. Mamonov, candidate of philological sciences: "Democratic Poetry in Japan Today"]

[Text] The ideology of national exclusivity is being instilled on a broad scale in the "prosperous society," as contemporary Japanese bourgeois propaganda describes its country. It is not difficult to detect its class nature, as well as the nature of the myth about the monolithic and self-contained Japanese culture. On the other hand, Marxist ideology and the related democratic current in literature exist in Japan just as they do in other capitalist countries. This phenomenon, as we know, was described in Lenin's statement about the two cultures. Professor G. Leroy, American Marxist critic, wrote the following about the United States: "Although the achievements of socialist realism lie mainly beyond the boundaries of our country, there have been some achievements here as well.... As long as the struggle for socialism continues, the soil for the growth of this kind of literature will exist. The conditions for its development become more favorable as this struggle grows in breadth and intensity and as more and more people take part in it."¹ This is equally true of Japan.

Democratic, realistic poetry in Japan has many features in common with the poetry of socialist realism and with literature reflecting socialist ideas.

Progressive Japanese poetry has been developing under the difficult conditions of the monopolistic bourgeoisie's continuous attacks on the rights and democratic gains of the working public. During the era of technological revolution the bourgeoisie has made extensive use of its achievements for the reorganization of the Japanese economy in the interest of monopolies and for the reinforcement of their position. However, this has also been the era of the collapse of the illusions cultivated in Japan about the crisis-free society and prosperity for all. The technological revolution has supplemented capitalism's old ills with new problems--a severe energy crisis, the ecological crisis, etc.

This is how Soviet historians have described the domestic political situation in Japan during this era: "The high rate of economic growth in Japan in the

1970's was followed by a recession and then a severe and protracted crisis. The situation within the country, according to Japanese Communists, was marked by the exacerbation of the structural crisis of Japanese state-monopoly capital, reflected in unprecedented inflation and depression, the severe crisis of democracy and freedom and cultural and educational decline."²

The decade of the 1970's, particularly the second half, was marked by stronger Japanese-American military and political cooperation. The desire for militarization, encouraged by big monopoly capital, is once again apparent in the country. The hackneyed myth about the "Soviet threat" is being used widely for militaristic purposes.

The activities of the "Congress of Poets" ("Shijin kaigi," founded in 1962), a literary association seeking peace, democracy and progress, are particularly meaningful in this context.

It is the purpose of this article to reveal some trends in the development of Japanese democratic poetry, particularly its sociopolitical aspects, as exemplified in the work of the Congress of Poets, to attempt a definition of the structure and principles of this organization and to determine its place and role in contemporary literature.

But first a few words should be said about contemporary Japanese poetry in general. The poetic process in Japan in the 1970's, just as, incidentally, in previous decades, was distinguished by the absence of names known throughout the country. Of course, this does not mean that there are no great poets. It does mean, however, that there are no poets who are the object of national pride, as Matsuo Basho (1644-1694) or Ishikawa Takuboku (1885-1912) once were. A poet who lives in Osaka might be renowned in his native city and be virtually unknown in Kyoto, Sapporo, etc. Osaka, Tokyo and many other cities have their poets. The works of the great multitude of amateur poets make poetry an art of the masses. A quarter of a century ago, one of Japan's oldest poets, Ono Tosaburo, noted in his book "Poetry and Creativity" ("Shi to sojo") that officially published (we will call them professional) writers of free verse alone numbered around 16,000. If amateur poets were to be added to the total, the number, in his words, would be several million! Some Japanese literary scholars have remarked with regret that so many poems are now being published that it is impossible to give all of them even a brief reading. Today's poet is "a public with poetic inspiration," said Makabe Jin, researcher and compiler of a popular anthology of poetry.³

Poets are generally grouped around literary magazines and associations. The circulation figures of these magazines (particularly in the case of poetry), which number more than 600 in the country, are negligible. The number of copies issued might be 100, 300 or 700. This is also true of the printings of collections of poetry, which are often published by the authors at their own expense. Books by famous poets are the exception. Commercial publications are accompanied by the proper royalties. The membership of poetry organizations ranges from a few individuals to a few hundred and sometimes reaches many hundred. For example, the Congress of Poets has more than 600 members but the "Quartet" poets' group in Kyoto consists of four poets.

Numerous groups and individual poets preach their own ideals and principles-- artistic, religious, philosophical and sociopolitical. The aesthetic ideologies of poetic currents differ widely: from extreme subjectivism and nihilism, taking the form of the most modernist aesthetic principles, to humanistic, democratic and socialist ideals, expressed in language accessible to the broad laboring masses and not just the intellectual elite. The complex domestic political situation, marked by confrontations between democratic and reactionary, antidemocratic forces, and the activities of various political parties and sociopolitical organizations, leave their impression on the state of literary thought. From nationalism to proletarian internationalism, from existentialism to socialist realism--this is the range of artistic outlooks in contemporary Japanese poetry.

A characteristic feature of the contemporary poetic process in Japan is its strong democratic base, supported by leftist forces in the country, the traditions of the workers and communist movement and the fundamental spiritual values of the centuries-old Japanese culture. Contemporary democratic Japanese poetry would be inconceivable without its traditions, which have nurtured more than one generation of progressive poets. Its history dates back to the poetry of the beginning of the century and the proletarian poetry of the 1920's and 1930's, permeated with socialist ideals, back to the works of the great democratic poet Ishikawa Takuboku and socialist poet Kotoku Shusui, executed in 1911, back to the poets of the Folk Poetry Group (Minshushi-ha) of World War I and others who extolled democratic and socialist ideals. At its source, particularly in proletarian literature, embryonic elements and tendencies approaching the literature of socialist realism can be seen. It was precisely from within the milieu of prewar proletarian literature that Kobayashi Takiji's novella "Living for the Party" emerged, as well as other remarkable works which, in the words of prominent Marxist theorist Kurahara Korehito, "laid the basis for the literature of socialist realism in Japan and, in general, can be said to have played the same role as Gor'kiy's 'Mother' in Soviet literature."⁴

Japanese democratic poetry is constructive and humanistic poetry. Its socialist creative method is a tried and tested weapon for the defense of truly and progressive traditions and the protection of the poetic standards which are close to the people, accessible to them and consistent with their experience and aesthetic sensibilities.

There is every reason to say that democratic poetry in Japan is the most public form of art. This is attested to by the associations of professional poets and the many groups of amateur poets expressing the hopes and desires of the average Japanese citizen in their work. This does not mean that democratic poetry dominates the poetic genre, but there is no question that it is its most promising current. It must contend with modernist, elitist and apolitical poetry. Poets who base their art only on the beauty of words and who write lyrics which are devoid of political meaning and any vital connection with real life also occupy a prominent place in Japanese poetry, although a less prominent one than, for example, in the late 1930's and early 1940's, when proletarian poetry dealing with urgent social issues was banned.

There are three main schools of contemporary Japanese poetry: democratic, traditional-lyrical and modernist. Although these categories are extremely hypothetical, they reflect the general alignment of poetic forces in the country. It cannot be said, however, that one current does not have elements characteristic of others. A process of literary diffusion (common genres and images) exists. Poetry is a vital stream and it cannot be confined completely within the rigid banks of distinctions and definitions. Democratic poets work within the traditional genres of the tanka and hokku, and the blank verse form (jiyushi) is sometimes used in such a way that even the Japanese do not know what the poet is talking about and what he is trying to say. Some of the poets who use the traditional five-verse genre (tanka) idealize, in contrast to the democratic poets who use this genre, the ancient past with its "Samurai code of honor," "Samurai virtues" and belief in the immutability of government regulations and moral and ethical standards. When they gather at annual rallies on New Year's Eve, they are firmly united in their defense of general principles which were refuted by reality long ago. In contrast to the traditionalists, there are the representatives of the "tatakau uta" (fight song), who are upholding the best traditions of the proletarian poets who wrote in the tanka genre. In 1979 Iwama Masao, one of the poets of the "tatakau uta" and a parliamentary deputy from the Japan Communist Party, became the 11th winner of the prize named after outstanding communist writers Kobayashi Takiji and Miyamoto Yuriko (instituted by the JCP Central Committee in 1968). He received the prize for his book of poetry entitled "Into the Blizzard" ("Fubuki-no naka")--the best book he had written in the last 30 years.

Perhaps the least apparent and least organized current in contemporary Japanese poetry is the openly antidemocratic one. It would be difficult to find a major poet who is fighting the same kind of fierce battle against leftist forces that was fought in the prewar years by "pure lyricist" Miyoshi Tatsuji, an executive of SHIKI (THE SEASONS) magazine who zealously took an antiproletarian stand.

Self-absorption, formalist tricks which are sometimes carried to absurd extremes, snobbism and contempt for democratic poetry, particularly the Congress of Poets, where "everyone is the same," and the recently more apparent nationalist motives and attitudes--these are the basic characteristics of poetry outside the democratic channel.

Let us take a brief look at the organizational alignment of Japanese poetic forces. At present there are several sizeable poetic organizations in the country, the largest of which is the Society of Modern Poets (Gendai shijin kai), founded soon after World War II. In a conversation with the author of this article, Doi Daisuke, a democratic poet and one of the leaders of the Congress of Poets, described the organization in the following way: "The society has no clearly defined political or aesthetic platform. Its members are poets with the most diverse views and convictions, representing the most diverse artistic currents and methods: symbolists, modernists, surrealists, progressive and reactionary poets and those who try to portray reality from the standpoint of socialist realism. I am also a member of the society."

Obviously, the poets who write "from the standpoint of socialist realism" or, more precisely, from a standpoint converging with this creative method, are progressive poets, such as Doi Daisuke himself and other members of the Congress of Poets. As we can see, membership in this organization does not preclude membership in other artists' groups. The members of the Congress of Poets, as we will strive to demonstrate, are distinguished by militant enthusiasm, a love of life and a belief in a better future for the people.

In 1965 the now extremely influential Japan Democratic Literature Union (Nihon minshu bungaku domei) was founded. This is a mass artists' organization which acquired more than a thousand full members and around 2,000 candidate members in the first years of its existence. The nucleus of the organization consists of writers who defend the interests of the working class and are known to readers in our country: Shimota Seiji, Kubota Sei, Nakazato Kisho and others who oppose the revival of militarism in Japan and advocate the creation of a unified democratic front. The union publishes a monthly journal, MINSHU BUNGAKU (DEMOCRATIC LITERATURE), on the pages of which the verses of famous poets are regularly printed and new poets are discovered. A detailed study of the productive and multifaceted activities of this union is something that still remains to be undertaken, but some steps are already being taken in this direction.⁵

In the last decade the current of Japanese democratic literature lost many major talents who had made a significant contribution to its development and became famous at the time of the prewar proletarian movement in literature. It lost Tsuboi Shigeji, Kaneko Mitsuharu, Sakai Tokuzo, Kurodo Saburo and Nakano Shigeharu. All of them (with the exception of Nakano Shigeharu) were connected to some degree with the founding and activities of the Congress of Poets.

The Congress of Poets, which has become a notable phenomenon in Japanese literary life, will soon be 20 years old. Its roots go back to the events of the early 1960's. The political crisis which shook the nation in 1960 in connection with the prolongation of the Japanese-American "security treaty" ended in a retreat by progressive forces in spite of passionate demonstrations by millions of laborers. In the atmosphere of apathy, defeatism and artistic commercialization which followed this crisis, there was a new revival of democratic poetry in connection with the appearance of the Japan Congress of Poets (Nihon shijin kaigi) or, as it is more commonly known, the Congress of Poets, in 1962. The organization came into being as a sign of protest against the wave of pessimism and against the indifference of the creative intelligentsia, including writers, to politics and urgent social problems.

The Congress of Poets was founded as a creative organization of poets and amateur poets with its own charter, program, administrative organs, branches in many prefectures and a press organ--the monthly journal SHIJIN KAIGI (CONGRESS OF POETS), which began to be published in January 1963. The Congress of Poets, which has more than 60 people on its board, is headed by a president. Conventions are held regularly and are attended by delegates from all parts of the country, representing the organization's more than 600 members.

Communist poets are prominent in the organization. Its best past and present poets include Tsuboi Shigeji, Sakai Tokuzo, Kuroda Saburo, Oshima Hiromitsu, Doi Daisuke, Jo Susumu, Akagi Saburo, Kataha Torohei, Kusaka Sotokichi, Kadokura Satoshi, Narusawa Takeo, Asao Tadao and others. Many of them are also renowned as leaders of their organization.

The Congress of Poets unites, as its charter states, those "who seek to implement the ideals of peace, independence and democracy." The movement's principal aim is the reform of poetry and of reality by means of poetry. In the 1970's this general goal was clarified in the "Appeal to Japanese Poets and Readers," which asked them to unite their efforts on behalf of creativity and democracy, "promote the development of a rich poetic culture and join the opposition against all types of reactionary politics for the sake of peace and a better life."⁶

From the very beginning the congress' policy documents advocated "broad realism," which was interpreted in various declarations either as realism in all the wealth of its artistic possibilities or as a symbiosis of any and all creative methods. Jo Susumo, the main speaker at the debates organized in 1972 by SHIJIN KAIGI, explained the term "broad realism" or "realism in the broad sense" (hiroi imi de-no riarizumu): "We must have deep faith in the superiority of our realism to modernism. It is realism that is the quintessence of humanism. This is a method of a mass nature."⁷ The preamble to the amended charter of the Congress of Poets, approved by the ninth convention (1973), says: "We are advancing, overcoming differences in creative aims and methods, united by a single desire--the desire for peace, progress and democracy."⁸

The artistic practices of this union testify that virtually all of its members support true realism. Not one of them has immersed himself in purely personal emotions or engaged in scholastic arguments over imaginary problems. Through their art, they are working toward real goals: They are defending human dignity, protecting the individual against oppression and exploitation and stretching out a helping hand to those who need friendship and solidarity. The themes of struggle and protest are exceptionally strong in their work, as are the voices calling for peace, friendship and the international fraternity of workers. It is probable that the final goal of the declared eradication of boundaries between various artistic methods is not the creative mastery of "boundless realism," but the creation of a broad front of democratic forces and the renunciation of sectarian attitudes. Besides this, this position could also be a reaction to the opinion of many Japanese critics that all democratic poets are "exactly alike" and that this is due to their adherence to "dogmatic realism."⁹

The declared main uniting principle of the members of the Congress of Poets is the hope of "making poetry a mass art on a progressive and democratic basis." The objective of making poetry a "mass art" (shi-no taishuka) was set at the fourth convention in 1965. This policy has been modified with a view to changing conditions but its basic content has remained unchanged.

The desire of the Congress of Poets to give democratic poetry a mass nature is being realized successfully. Its practical activity is quite varied.

Poetry readings, exhibits of illustrations and paintings with verse captions, symposiums, talks and other events are held at plants, in rural areas and in schools. The poets tirelessly seek contact with their readers: They read their verses to large audiences at rallies and meetings, write songs, record their works and use every opportunity to express their ideas on radio and television and in magazines and newspapers. They take an active part in the work of numerous central and local poetry clubs and the prefectural branches of the Congress of Poets, which encompass almost the entire nation. The "Poetry School" ("Shi-no gakko") in Tokyo is quite popular.

The objective of making poetry a "mass art" should not, however, be measured only in quantitative terms. It is much more significant that the poets are striving to make their work accessible to the masses. They have encountered many difficulties. Doi Daisuke and his colleagues are trying to overcome these difficulties. They, in the words of Mayakovskiy, do not say that "we are the only ones who know the secrets of the art of poetry," but that "we are the only ones who can reveal these secrets, the only ones who do not want to speculate in the absorption of art by religious worship."¹⁰ In an article entitled "Mayakovskiy and Our Poetic Movement," Doi Daisuke announced his complete agreement with the idea the Soviet poet expressed in his work "How Is Poetry Written?": "Organs of mass enlightenment must shake off their reverence for old aesthetic garbage." He supported this belief in the interest of the development of mass poetry and a belief in the need to democratize and update it.

In the same article the Japanese author mentioned another of the difficulties facing democratic poetry: "When we talk about making poetry a mass art, we must remember that we who live in Japan are working under the difficult conditions of a country which had no Pushkin and no Nekrasov--a country in which there is no large reading public fond of reciting Pushkin and Nekrasov."¹¹ It would be difficult, however, to agree totally with this remark. Is it true that Japan has no great poets of its own? In the current of democratic poetry there is Ishikawa Takuboku. Nevertheless, it is true that there is some validity to Doi Daisuke's comment. After all, he is far from the first, and probably not the last, to state with regret that Japan has no Pushkin of its own. Comments like these reflect the hope of the Congress of Poets that Japan will one day have a highly developed school of democratic poetry, distinguished by the organic combination of ideological wealth with genuinely artistic form. The present problem is a complicated one--these poets must write verses which are artistic and accessible to the public without the legacy of giant talents that Russian poetry, with its clearly defined democratic current, had.

When the author of this article asked whether the fact that both professionals and amateurs belonged to the Congress of Poets presented any problems, Doi Daisuke replied: "Of course, there are many problems facing our movement. Frankly, the principal danger is dilletantism. This lowers the level of poetry in general." The congress is making great efforts to eradicate this dangerous tendency. It is completely understandable that success in this case will depend on the concerted efforts of all democratic writers in the country. This is why it was stressed at one convention of the Congress of

Poets that its members, while striving for poetic art based on reality, would continue "to cooperate and compete with poets in general."

One of the distinctive features of the Congress of Poets is cooperation with famous poets who are not members of the congress but who do agree with its humanistic and progressive ideals. This is why such prominent poets as Kaneko Mitsuharu, Tanikawa Shuntaro, Ishigaki Rin, Ooka Shin, Nakagiri Masao, Yamamoto Taro and others have lectured students in the "Poetry School" (in various years). Cooperation on a broad scale is also a distinctive feature of the poetry readings conducted by the Congress of Poets along with famous poets who belong to other organizations.

The Congress of Poets also believes in the "need to acquire a broad outlook and to acknowledge domestic and foreign achievements, particularly the new poetry of the post-Meiji era, proletarian poetry and postwar contemporary poetry, and to use these as a point of departure for more penetrating research and criticism and the development of constructive criticism and self-criticism."¹²

Literary prizes are one of the means of encouraging art in Japan. There are more than a hundred of them, including the most famous prize (in prose), named after renowned classic Akutagawa Ryunosuke, and the prestigious "H" prize for poetry, bearing the initial of its anonymous founder. In 1972 a Congress of Poets Prize was instituted to encourage the democratic poetic movement. The first winner of the prize was Murakami Kuniharu, who had published "The Poetry of Murakami Kuniharu." The Congress of Poets also awards another prize to the most promising "newcomer." Sometimes members of the congress compete in contests conducted by other associations and organizations and win honors. All of this is contributing to the prestige and popularity of the congress. Its international contacts are serving the same purpose.

The Congress of Poets wants to become an important link in the "united front in defense of peace and democracy." It makes appearances in the international arena to strengthen literary ties with poets and poetic movements in various countries, particularly in Asia, Africa and Latin America. It has particularly broad fraternal internationalist ties with the writers of Indochina, especially in socialist Vietnam, whose heroic struggle against American aggression was given moral support for many years by the Congress of Poets. The successful establishment and reinforcement of these contacts can be seen in the journal SHIJIN KAIGI, which prints translations of the works of major progressive poets, such as Pablo Neruda and others. Works by Soviet poets, from Sergey Yesenin to Rasul Gamzatov, are also published.

The productive activities of the congress are also attested to by purely statistical indicators. At the beginning of the 1970's its members published 52 collections of poetry just during the interval between the eighth and ninth conventions. This is an impressive figure, particularly in combination with the work of poets in other genres.¹³ Numerous publications of various types were also published in subsequent years.

Some of the members of the Congress of Poets are also critics, script writers, playwrights and writers of prose. Doi Daiske, for example, works successfully

as a poetry critic and a playwright. His play about the Japanese workers movement of the 1920's, "Red Rose in a Storm" ("Arashi-no nakano akai bara"), was published in 1980.¹⁴ Kusaka Sotokichi is also a literary critic, a researcher of Russian literature and the translator of works of Russian and Soviet poets. Akagi Saburo, Kataha Torohai, Narusawa Takeo and Kadokura Satoshi are other poets with a variety of talents.

Poet Kuroda Saburo was also known as a writer of prose and a critic. From October 1977 to April 1979 the journal MINSHU BUNGAKE printed his essays, which were recently published in book form under the title "Frankly Speaking" ("Sekirara-ni kataru"). These wonderful essays, sparkling with wit, reflect, as Akimura Hiroshi commented, "the realities of the author's daily life."

Now that we have completed this overview of the history and activity of the Congress of Poets, let us take a look at some of the problems of contemporary Japanese poetry and reality. Their examination will shed more light on this organization's place and role in Japanese life and literature.

Two quite important tendencies are characteristic of Japanese poetry in general. The theorists of the Congress of Poets have clearly defined the watershed in Japanese poetry: "Faith or a lack of faith in the individual, internationalism or individualism, the hope of community or the despair of loneliness, the proper resistance of harsh reality or blind submission to it. All tendencies revolve constantly around these problems."

Poet Mikata Masaru once remarked: "Continuing to write poetry in our era is in itself a form of resistance."¹⁵ This is an extremely intriguing aphorism! It is an apt description of the atmosphere in which Japan's democratic poets have to live and work. It is far from a simple matter to be a poet for the sake of principles and for the sake of high ideals and to live in a capitalist society without succumbing to the noxious influence of an environment stricken by mercantilism.

Democratic artists' organizations are trying to actively oppose the colossal industry of bourgeois mass culture, which is flooding the Japanese market with its products for overt or covert "brainwashing" of the "necessary" type. The documents of the Congress of Poets indicate that the objectives of the organization are struggle against "degradation and reaction" and the "alienation and impotence" propagated by the mass culture, and the popularization of truly democratic, humanistic ideas.

It is no secret that the notorious theory of the "mass society" regards the world as a chaotic set of unrelated elements, phenomena, events and human lives, as something disorganized and hostile and alien to people. Of course, democratic poets do not agree with the antihuman and antidemocratic principles of this theory, which continued to be propagated by reactionary, conservative forces in the 1970's. For this reason, the world is depicted in a different way in the works of democratic poets: People are not hostile to one another by their nature, but the antihuman social structure which cripples the individual both physically and spiritually is alien and hostile to the individual.

Democratic poets oppose the mistrust of the individual, misanthropy and elitism, and they advocate humanism and, naturally, the accessibility of poetry to the masses.

The existence of such organizations as the Congress of Poets and the Japan Democratic Literature Union testifies that there are opposing forces in the Japanese literary community, which reflects the basic structure of the class society. With whom are democratic writers engaged in a confrontation, what do they oppose and what do they support? It would be impossible to answer this question without a view to the domestic political situation, which was analyzed briefly above.

The main difference between democratic literary organizations and their undemocratic counterparts consists in the fundamental incompatibility of their views on the future of their native land and people and their feelings about sociopolitical prospects. Power to the people or power to the monopolies, real democracy or the illusion of democracy in the so-called "society of equal opportunities"--the answers to these questions reveal the irreconcilability of their positions. This is also the reason for their radically differing approaches to literary phenomena, trends and currents.

The Congress of Poets and the Japan Democratic Literature Union object to the literature of decadence, defeatism and existentialism because this kind of literature disarms the reader psychologically and distorts his consciousness by contributing to the preservation of a world order which progressive writers want to change. Although they are seeking a united front of leftist forces, on the level of ideology and aesthetics they objectively oppose all types of modernist currents, literature devoid of spiritual values, pornography and, in particular, the literature of militarism and fascism. They also oppose the aesthetic concepts of existentialism, which is quite popular in Japan, advocate the realistic depiction of life and support literature which takes democratic and socialist ideas as a guide.

Who do Doi Daisuke and his colleagues consider to be their opponents on the literary front? In a conversation with the author, Doi Daisuke repeated that he was also a member of the Society of Contemporary Poets and described his ideological struggle in detail: "Both inside and outside this association, we--that is, poets with a proletarian, communist outlook--are fighting against our reactionary opponents in literature and art. This is also the guiding principle of the Congress of Poets, some of whose members are also our opponents, although their number is negligible in comparison to those who do not belong to the organization. Who are our opponents? Above all, they are writers who do not want a united democratic front to be established in our country. We are fighting against Trotskyists and Trotskyism, which has infected some of our young students. We are discrediting works which support Trotskyism, preach its antiproletarian ideology and injure our common cause--the unity of the laboring masses and democratic writers."

The activities of the Congress of Poets are closely connected with a profound awareness of the interaction of politics and literature. This has been the subject of many works by Kurahara Korehito and other prominent Marxist

critics. Let us examine the views of Tsuboi Shigeji (1898-1975) on the connection between politics and poetry.

Democratic poetry in Japan owes a great deal to Tsuboi Shigeji. As a major poet and veteran of the prewar proletarian literary movement, he had a great deal of authority and influence in the Congress of Poets and was its president for many years, right up to his death. An essay by Tsuboi Shigeji, "What Is Political" ("Seijiteki de aru koto"), a kind of manifesto which set forth the goals of the new poetic movement, was printed in the first issue of the new magazine SHIJIN KAIGI in 1963. This work explains one of the most important aspects of the creative activities of the Congress of Poets.

Noting that many people in Japan, especially poets, at the beginning of the 1960's were apolitical, Tsuboi Shigeji called "the times in which we are living" the "most political of eras," a time when poets "must be part of the gigantic machinery of politics." "The poet who ignores politics because a poet is merely a poet is ignoring the most important part of life," he said.¹⁶

The essay by Tsuboi was published at the beginning of a decade of unrest. The decade of the 1960's, when the poetic movement of the Congress of Poets came into being and gathered strength, was also a time when questions of politics and literature were hotly debated. Critics with anti-Marxist feelings presented their own arbitrary interpretation of V. I. Lenin's famous work "The Party Organization and Party Literature," indulging in fierce attacks on writers of the democratic movement. These arguments later extended beyond the bounds of journalism. Their echoes were heard in literature reflecting the violent student rebellions throughout the country and the vehement protests against the American intervention in Vietnam. The essay by Tsuboi Shigeji played an important part in the development of Japanese democratic literary criticism.

Increased political activity, as speakers at the conference on "The Literature of the Capitalist West in the 1970's" (Moscow, November 1979) correctly pointed out, was the main characteristic of the past decade.¹⁷ Political journalism became involved more closely in Japanese democratic poetry, confirming the impact of the writer's principal function--his social function. The foreword to the anthology "The Japanese Novella, 1960-1970" correctly noted that "hardly anyone now denies the need for a connection between literature and politics. But the Japanese writer's interpretation of this connection is a different matter. The relationship between politics and literature is being viewed from a new vantage point: Should literature be 'involved on the left' or 'involved on the right'?"¹⁸

Tsuboi Shigeji marched under the banner of poetry "involved on the left" and was its singer and theorist. His ideas about political poetry lay at the basis of the aesthetic ideology of the Congress of Poets. "The essence of political poetry," he wrote, "does not consist in the lavish use of so-called 'political terminology'.... Its purpose is to reveal the internal world of the individual who is scorned by contemporary politics, to expose its innermost strata and to shed brilliant light on them."

Here it would be useful to recall F. Engels' opinion that the bourgeois state owes its development to the politization of all areas of life. The economy has taken on the additional function of serving as a channel of political pressure. It is closely related to politics and ideology. The mass culture itself is a strong factor in the political "education" of the masses in the capitalist world.

An awareness of this "politization" as the main feature of the 1970's has been made all the more important by the spread of modernist, apolitical poetry, which is a product of the "suprapolitical" ideology. This is why it is essential to trace and reveal the "germination" of politics in all areas of life, including the individual's internal world. It is the job of literature to reflect this accurately, to make the masses aware of the objective laws governing the development of society and thereby accomplish the first step toward the reorganization of societal relations. "The most political is simultaneously the most literary," Tsuboi Shigeji declared.¹⁹

In many cases the politization of literature cannot be regarded in isolation from the party connections of literature. Communist poets (such as Makimura Hiroshi and Ueda Susumu) have always marched in the vanguard of Japanese democratic poetry. They are still playing a significant role in the development of democratic literature. Here is the poetic creed of one of them, Doi Daisuke, who was highly esteemed by Tsuboi Shigeji: "I personally tend to interpret the term 'democracy' from a Marxist standpoint. Mayakovskiy is my model. The great Soviet poet wrote press releases for ROSTA [Russian News Agency (1918-1935)], and I am now writing propaganda verses. They could be called press releases, journalistic articles or responses in verse--whatever you like. This is extremely difficult work. Mayakovskiy brilliantly showed how poetry and politics should be combined. I am trying to do the same. I am trying to create poetic images by portraying aesthetic objects through the prism of the Marxist view of the world. For example, 'Tokyo May Day' was directly influenced by Mayakovskiy. I love Mayakovskiy very much. His poetry is very dear to me. He and I have the same class consciousness and the same outlook. I agree wholeheartedly with the enthusiasm of his words, which he might have said on behalf of me and many of my colleagues, about the hundred volumes of party booklets which represent a 'Bolshevik membership card'!"

It seems that many members of the Congress of Poets, which is celebrating its 20th anniversary this year, could put their signature under these words. Their work testifies that truly democratic poets believe that literature must be accessible to the public and reflect party spirit and that something V. I. Lenin said more than half a century ago is still pertinent today: "Anyone who consciously or unconsciously takes the side of the bourgeois order must experience a loss of party spirit."²⁰

FOOTNOTES

1. Quoted in: "Sovetskaya literatura i mirovoy literaturnyy protsess. Ideyno-esteticheskiye problemy" [Soviet Literature and the World Literary Process. Questions of Aesthetic Ideology], Moscow, 1975, p 300.

2. I. I. Kovalenko, "The JCP's Struggle for Democratic Reforms," PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA, 1980, No 1, p 53.
3. Makabe Jin, "Japan's Poetic Awakening," Tokyo, 1966, pp 1-20.
4. Kurahara Korehito, "Articles About Contemporary Japanese Literature," Moscow, 1959, p 48.
5. "Yaponiya. Yezhegodnik" [Japan Almanac], Moscow, 1976, pp 210-233.
6. SHIJIN KAIGI, 1973, No 8, pp 36, 45.
7. Ibid., 1972, No 10, p 19.
8. Ibid., 1973, No 8, p 41.
9. Ibid., 1974, No 6, p 43.
10. V. V. Mayakovskiy, "Izbrannyye proizvedeniya" [Selected Works], Moscow, 1963, pp 491-492.
11. SHIJIN KAIGI, 1973, No 10, p 70.
12. Ibid., No 8, pp 29, 40.
13. For example, Asao Keiji published the book "The Poet and the Government"; Doi Daisuke published "My Notes on Poetry" and "The Poet and Human Life"; Tsuboi Shigeji published "Contemporary Poetry"; Oshima Hiromitsu published the translations of "The Poetry of Aragon" and "The Poetry of Neruda"; Kusaka Sotokichi translated Bryusov's story "Republic of the Southern Cross" and Pushkin's verses (the first volume of the Complete Collected Works of Pushkin); Matsuoka Toshikazu published "The August Poet" and "The Poets of Hiroshima." Anthologies were compiled jointly by Doi Daisuke and Akimura Hiroshi, who published "Contemporary Labor Poems" and "Contemporary Youth Poems," and Abe Tadao compiled and translated "Vietnamese Poems of National Liberation."
14. MINSHU BUNGAKE, 1980, No 1, pp 32-77.
15. SHIJIN KAIGI, 1973, No 8, pp 37-54.
16. Ibid., 1972, No 1, p 109.
17. VOPROSY LITERATURY, 1980, No 3, pp 307-311.
18. "Yaponskaya novella 1960-1970" [The Japanese Novella, 1960-1970], Moscow, 1972, p 7.
19. SHIJIN KAIGI, 1972, No 1, p 109.
20. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 12, p 137.

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SOVIET-CHINESE FRIENDSHIP SOCIETY MARKS 25 YEARS

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 4, Oct-Dec 82 pp 94-105

[Article by G. V. Kulikova, executive secretary of the Central Board of the Soviet-Chinese Friendship Society: "A Significant Anniversary"]

[Text] **O**ctober 29, 1982 marks 25 years since the foundation of the Soviet-Chinese Friendship Society, the first society for friendship with a foreign country to be organised in the Soviet Union. Its foundation reflected the long-standing sympathy of the Soviet people for China and their sincere desire to promote friendship and cooperation with the PRC.

Lenin himself stood at the cradle of the revolutionary friendship between the Russian and the Chinese peoples, a friendship the foundations of which were laid by the Great October Socialist Revolution. The revolutionary movement, which mounted in China under the influence of the October Revolution, received aid from the Leninist Party and all the peoples inhabiting the Soviet Union from the very outset.

China's progressive revolutionary leaders had a great deal of respect for Lenin's role and recognised the historic importance of the October Revolution to the destiny of the Chinese people. Great Chinese revolutionary democrat Sun Yatsen wrote: "In the many centuries of world history, thousands of leaders and theoreticians have appeared with beautiful words on their lips which were never transformed into reality. You, Lenin, are an exception. Not only did you speak and teach but you also put your words into action. You have created a new country. You have shown us the road of joint struggle."

In the period from 1924 to 1927 when China became the scene of large-scale revolutionary activity which internal reaction and foreign imperialism sought to contain in every possible way, on the initiative of the All-Union Central Trade Union Council, the "Hands Off China!" society was founded in the Soviet Union. Its membership exceeded one million in the very first months. On the international scene, the Soviet Union resolutely supported China when the Japanese imperialists seized Manchuria on September 18, 1931. In those years, the movement of solidarity with the Chinese people spread to the entire Soviet Union.

The routing of the crack Kwantung army by Soviet troops in 1945 played a decisive role in defeating militarist Japan and became an important international factor of the victory of the Chinese revolution. The moral, political and diplomatic support rendered by the Soviet Union prevented American imperialists from interfering directly in China's home affairs and became another key factor in the historic victory scored by the Chinese people in 1949.

Soviet policy during the Chinese people's struggle for a democratic revolution was highly appreciated in China in those years. Chairman of the Chinese-Soviet Friendship Society (CSFS) Song Qingling wrote: "Beginning in 1917—first during our protracted struggle and later on, after

we had emerged victorious—the Chinese people enjoyed the revolutionary and comradely sympathies of the Soviet people and their Communist Party and government. On countless occasions, they rendered us enormous and decisive help in the spirit of proletarian internationalism. We shall never forget that at the time, the imperialists planned to destroy our state. Without Soviet aid, the Chinese people's struggle would have been even more protracted and difficult.”¹

The Soviet people warmly welcomed the victory of the people's revolution in China and the proclamation of the People's Republic of China on October 1, 1949. The next day the Soviet Union recognised the young republic and established diplomatic relations with it. On February 14, 1950, a Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance was signed in Moscow, laying a sound foundation for the further broad development of Soviet-Chinese relations.

The extensive economic aid rendered by the Soviet Union and its support on the international scene ensured that the PRC was able, not only to restore its national economy rapidly, but also to begin gathering momentum for the building of a socialist society.

Professor K. S. Silin, member of the Central Board of the Soviet-Chinese Friendship Society and Lenin Prize winner who holds the degree of Doctor of Sciences in Technology and is a Merited Inventor of the Russian Federation, worked in China for more than 10 years. A graduate of the Moscow Institute of Transport Engineers, he went through the war and rebuilt many a bridge ruined in our country by the fascist invaders. In 1949, along with the Soviet Army units, he found himself in north-eastern China. Nine bridges, which were built with the help of the well-known Soviet bridge-builder, still span the waters in the Chinese land. The nearly 2km-long double-decker bridge across the Yangtze was called a symbol of Chinese-Soviet friendship in China in those years.

While the would-be firstling of the Chinese automotive industry was still being built in Changchun with the help of 200 workers from the Moscow motorworks, more than 550 of its future workers, engineers and technicians were acquiring their skills at the Likhachyov Motor Works in Moscow. The telegram received by the Likhachyov Motor Works on October 15, 1956, the day the Changchun Motor Works was put into operation, read: “Our workers are sincerely thankful to the Soviet Union for the help it rendered our plant and will never forget Soviet experts and all the employees of the Likhachyov Motor Works, who spared no effort in building our plant.”²

In appreciation of the selfless fraternal aid of the Soviet Union, *Renmin ribao* wrote in February 1959: “Soviet aid in the economic development of our country, both numerically and in scale, is unprecedented in history.”

Cultural relations between the Soviet and the Chinese peoples were extensively developed on the basis of an intergovernmental long-term agreement on cultural cooperation signed on July 5, 1956. The USSR Ministry of Culture and artistic societies, the All-Union Society of Cultural Relations With Foreign Countries (VOKS) and other public organisations in our country actively participated in putting this agreement into effect.

Those were the events preceding the organisation of our Society.

...On October 29, 1957, at a meeting of 1,750 representatives of governmental and public organisations in our country, scientists, cultural work-

¹ See *Far Eastern Affairs*, No. 2, 1978, p. 66.

² *The History of the Likhachyov Motor Works in Moscow*, Moscow, 1966, p. 461 (in Russian).

ers, Army and Navy delegates, workers, collective farmers and students held in the Big Hall of the Tchaikovsky Conservatory in Moscow, the decision to set up a Society of Soviet-Chinese Friendship in the Soviet Union was taken. Broad sections of the Soviet and the Chinese public met this decision with warmth and approval. "The establishment of the Soviet-Chinese Friendship Society is a new link in the broad cooperation between the Chinese and the Soviet peoples," *Renmin ribao* pointed out. "The Chinese people sincerely welcome the establishment of the Soviet-Chinese Friendship Society with its lofty aims and wish it every success."³ The message of greetings sent by the Central Board of the Chinese-Soviet Friendship Society to the constituent assembly of the Soviet-Chinese Friendship Society read: "The Chinese people are fully aware of the great importance of friendly cooperation between China and the Soviet Union. Based on proletarian internationalism, the friendly unity of the Chinese and the Soviet peoples is not only a guarantee of our two countries' prosperity and power but also a bulwark of peace throughout the world. The foundation of the Soviet-Chinese Friendship Society is convincing proof of the fact that friendly cooperation between China and the Soviet Union is growing stronger and is developing with every passing day and will further promote stronger unity and friendship between the peoples of our two countries. The Chinese people warmly welcome the establishment of the Soviet-Chinese Friendship Society."⁴

The Society also received hundreds of letters and telegrams from various Soviet republics, areas, regions and cities in which the Soviet people, workers at enterprises and employees at cultural and research centres, teachers and students at higher educational establishments and schools, welcomed the foundation of this new Soviet public organisation.

The nature and goals of the Society's activities were determined by its Rules. The Soviet-Chinese Friendship Society is a voluntary public organisation, whose aim is to promote in every possible way the development and strengthening of fraternal friendship and cooperation between the Soviet and the Chinese peoples. The Society set itself the task of giving the Soviet public an extensive understanding of the life of the Chinese people, their history and culture, and also to promote the familiarisation of the Chinese public with the life of the Soviet people, the state, economic and cultural development of the USSR, and the peaceloving foreign policy of the Soviet state. The Society defined its tasks as follows:

- to maintain on-going friendly relations with the Chinese-Soviet Friendship Society, to exchange experience and, by mutual agreement, to carry out actions promoting the successful operation of the two societies;

- to promote friendly relations between the cultural, research, youth, sports, tourist and other public organisations and institutions, between figures in culture, science and the arts and representatives of individual professions in the two countries, using for these purposes mutual trips by delegations and individuals and also exchanges of literature, periodicals, works of art and other materials;

- to promote the dissemination in the USSR of different Chinese publications, including those put out by the Chinese-Soviet Friendship So-

³ *Renmin ribao*, Oct. 31, 1957.

⁴ The Archives of the Union of Soviet Societies of Friendship and Cultural Ties With Foreign Countries, Vol. 1, p. 43.

ciety, the translation of works by Chinese writers, scientists and public figures into the languages of the Soviet peoples, the organisation in the USSR of exhibitions sponsored by the Chinese-Soviet Friendship Society, Chinese film shows, theatrical productions and radio and TV programmes, and other efforts to portray the Chinese people and their success in building socialism;

- to publish a magazine in Chinese sponsored by the Soviet-Chinese Friendship Society, to render assistance to the Society of Chinese-Soviet Friendship in giving the Chinese people an idea of the life in the Soviet Union by sending exhibitions, literature, and different materials about the Soviet Union to the PRC;

- to hold meetings devoted to memorable events and to organise rallies, parties, concerts and other functions in keeping with the goals of the Society.

Well-known Soviet statesman and public figure A. A. Andreyev was elected Chairman of the Society's Central Board, which included among its members heads of governmental and public organisations of this country, outstanding industrial and agricultural workers, celebrated Soviet military leaders, scientists, writers, artists, actors and representatives of the Soviet youth. Branches of the Society were opened in the Ukraine, Byelorussia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Kirghizia, the Maritime Territory, the Khabarovsk Area, the Leningrad, Novosibirsk, Chita and Irkutsk Regions, Riga and Ussuriisk. More than 400 major industrial enterprises, collective and state farms, higher and other educational establishments and offices in the country joined the Society as primary organisations.

Soon after its founding, the Soviet-Chinese Friendship Society became a representative Soviet public organisation the activities of which involved hundreds of thousands of Soviet citizens. The signing of an agreement on cooperation between the Union of Soviet Societies of Friendship and Cultural Ties With Foreign Countries and the Soviet-Chinese Friendship Society, on the one hand, and the Chinese-Soviet Friendship Society, on the other, on November 12, 1959, was an important stage in the Society's further work and in strengthening its ties with the Chinese-Soviet Friendship Society. This agreement promoted the establishment of direct contacts between the Society's branches in republics, areas and regions and the CSFS branches in Chinese provinces, between Soviet and Chinese primary organisations and between Soviet and Chinese workers, peasants, scientists, men of art and cultural workers. All this laid a good foundation for the further development and strengthening of friendship and cooperation between our two nations.

The Society's activities to mark the anniversaries of the establishment of the PRC, of the conclusion of the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance Between the USSR and the PRC, and other memorable events in the history of the PRC and Soviet-Chinese cooperation became socio-political campaigns carried out on a mass scale. The Society commemorated the May 4 Movement and other events in Chinese history, and prominent figures in the national liberation and revolutionary movement of the Chinese people. A lot of most diverse activities were carried on by the Society in Moscow, the capitals of union and autonomous republics, regional centres and cities of our country within the framework of Soviet-Chinese Friendship Month devoted to the 10th anniversary of the foundation of the PRC. The Society's branches in Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Minsk, Tbilisi, Baku, Yerevan, Dushanbe, Tashkent, Irkutsk and Vladivostok sent to the Chinese-Soviet Friendship Society and

Chinese organisations thousands of warm and friendly letters and telegrams in which industrial and office workers, collective and state farmers, teachers and students at higher educational establishments and secondary schools congratulated their Chinese colleagues and invariably expressed their readiness to contribute to the cause of building socialism in the PRC. To mark anniversaries of the establishment of the PRC and other memorable events in the country's history, the Society also organised photo exhibitions, lectures and talks on Soviet-Chinese cooperation and the life and work of the Chinese people. The Society's leaders and activists and members of delegations of the Soviet public who visited China wrote articles for central and local newspapers and magazines, giving expression to their joy upon seeing the growing economic potential of fraternal China and the sincere manifestations of friendship and sympathy of the Chinese to Soviet visitors at the time and also to their pride in their homeland which was scrupulously fulfilling its lofty internationalist duty towards the Chinese people.

To give the Soviet public an idea of the rich cultural heritage of the Chinese people, the Society did much to commemorate outstanding representatives of Chinese culture, science and art. Performers of the Soviet Army Song and Dance Company and of that of the People's Liberation Army of China met at Moscow's House of Friendship. The Society also organised a meeting between renowned members of the Bolshoi company—Galina Ulanova, Maya Plisetskaya, Galina Oleinichenko and others—and the troupe of the Central Experimental Theatre of Peking which was on tour in Moscow. The Society's activists accorded a warm reception in the House of Friendship to Chinese pianist Liu Skikun, winner at the First International Tchaikovsky Competition of Violinists and Pianists in Moscow, to the Guandong Folk Instruments Orchestra, to Hong Xiannü, famous Chinese film actress and soloist with the Guandong Folk Opera, and other celebrated Chinese performers.

The Society devoted much attention to organising all sorts of photo, book and other exhibitions illustrating various aspects of the Chinese people's life. Muscovites visited photo displays "Our Friend China" and "Along the Banks of the Yangtze" mounted by the Society. Residents of the Central Asian republics could see the photo display "The Building of Irrigation Canals in the PRC", and another photo display "China's Literature and Art" was offered to the inhabitants of Georgia and Azerbaijan. The Society organised exhibitions of Chinese applied art, Chinese drawing, Hunan and Suzhou embroidery, Hanzhou brocade, children's drawings, the Rongbaozhai colour xylographic reproductions and Chinese photo art. On the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the PRC, the Society held in Moscow an exhibition of works of Chinese literature and art received from Peking. The Moscow public and visitors to the capital showed great interest in the exhibitions of works by Soviet artists who had travelled to China. Such exhibitions were organised by the Society jointly with the Soviet Artists' Union and included works by K. Maximov, V. Bogatkin, O. Vereisky, V. Klimashin, A. Konstantinovskiy, M. Pikhov, L. Kravchenko and I. Bogdesko, who managed to convey the Chinese people's spirited labour efforts and to show the beauty of China's landscape, ancient monuments and new buildings. All these works were keyed by the idea of Soviet-Chinese friendship and brotherhood.

The Society's branches and primary organisations became important centres of establishing and developing friendly relations between the Soviet and the Chinese public. On the Society's initiative, contacts were

established and maintained between the Ukrainian republic branch of the Society and the CSFS branch in Hubei province, the Georgian republic branch of the Society and the CSFS branch in Guangdong province, the Azerbaijani republic branch of the Society and the CSFS branch in Fujian province, the Uzbek and Kazakh republic branches of the Society and the CSFS branch in Xinjiang-Uighur autonomous region, the Byelorussian republic branch of the Society and the CSFS branch in Hebei province, the Leningrad branch of the Society and the CSFS branch in Shanghai, the Society's branch in the Khabarovsk area and the CSFS branch in Heilongjiang province, the Society's branch in the Maritime Territory and the CSFS branch in Jilin province, the Society's branch in Irkutsk region and the CSFS branch in Liaoning province, the Society's branch in the Chita region and the CSFS branch in the Autonomous Region of Inner Mongolia, the Riga branch of the Society and the CSFS branch in Jiangsu province.

In 1959, 100 Leningrad enterprises took part in making equipment for China, among them the renowned Elektrosila electric engineering plant, the Russki Dizel works, the Krasnaya Zarya factory, and the Sverdlov machine-tool plant. Scientific and technological documentation was supplied to China by 150 Leningrad design organisations. Thousands of Chinese students attended higher educational establishments in Leningrad, and quite a few leading Soviet scientists, actors and workers shared their knowledge and skill with Chinese people. The Leningrad optical instrument-making factory maintained close contacts with its counterpart in Shanghai; the Elektrik plant in Leningrad with the electric welding unit-making plant in Shanghai; the Ostrovsky Drama Theatre in Leningrad with the Shanghai Theatrical Institute, and the Leningrad Young Pioneer House with its Shanghai counterpart; Leningrad's Zenit and the Shanghai soccer team held matches at Leningrad and Shanghai stadia.

Many higher educational establishments of Moscow, Leningrad and other cities in this country—the Society's primary organisations—maintained friendly ties with corresponding higher educational establishments in China. Moscow University maintained extensive links with Peking University; the Moscow Institute of Aircraft Engineering with its Peking counterpart; the Moscow Institute of Power Engineering with Qinghua University, and so on. Apart from exchanging curricula and teaching aids, they held Friendship Months and Weeks and track-and-field competitions on the basis of results scored, and exchanged students, graduate students and trainees.

Friendship societies helped develop and strengthen friendly relations between the Soviet and the Chinese public by exchanging delegations and specialised tourist groups. On the Society's invitation, the Soviet Union was visited by numerous delegations and specialised tourist groups of active members of the Chinese-Soviet Friendship Society in the period from 1957 to 1965. The Soviet-Chinese Friendship Society organised visits to enterprises, collective and state farms, and cultural and educational centres for them as well as meetings with its own active members. Representatives of the Chinese public had many opportunities for making contacts with Soviet people and addressed diverse Soviet audiences. They could get to know the life and work of the Soviet people and their rich revolutionary traditions and see for themselves how the Soviet people rallied around the CPSU and the Soviet government, and they could feel the Soviet people's sincere striving for friendship and cooperation with the Chinese people. Quite a few well-known Chinese public figures, veteran members of the CPC and participants in the revolu-

tionary struggle of the Chinese people, leaders of trade unions, youth and women's organisations, outstanding workers and peasants, who had just embarked upon the road to cooperative agricultural production, visited the Soviet Union in delegations and tourist groups. Chinese scientists and other intellectuals, including Mei Lanfan, celebrated Chinese actor, writers Ba Jin, Lao She and Mao Dun and poet Emi Xiao, also came to this country.

Chinese people who visited the Soviet Union felt that the Soviet people displayed feelings of brotherhood and internationalism toward them. Cao Jinhua, professor at Peking University, Deputy to the National People's Congress, and member of the CSFS Central Board wrote in the article "The Great Soviet People Marches To the Victory of Communism" after his visit to the Soviet Union on the Society's invitation: "Our trip to the USSR has been very useful. Soviet accomplishments in building communist society and the feelings of profound friendship the Soviet people have for the Chinese people have inspired us and had a deep educational effect on us."⁵

Envoys of the Soviet public were accorded a warm, brotherly reception in China in those years. Delegations and specialised tourist groups composed of the Society's active members visiting China in the period from 1957-1965 included heads of ministries, departments and public organisations, veteran CPSU members and veteran servicemen in the Soviet Armed Forces, front-ranking industrial workers and farmers, and representatives of the Soviet youth and the intelligentsia. "Wherever the Soviet visitors went, be it the big Wuhan bridge, the construction site of the Wuhan steel works, the Palace of Chinese-Soviet Friendship in Shanghai or the Wuhan heavy machine-building plant, they were always met by the Chinese people as if they were brothers," *Renmin ribao* wrote in November 1957 when the Society's delegation headed by its Central Board Chairman A. A. Andreyev visited the PRC. Meetings of Chinese-Soviet friendship attended by many thousands were organised by the Society of Chinese-Soviet Friendship in Peking, Tianjin, Xian, Chengdu, Changsha, Chongqing, Wuhan, and Shanghai when the Society's delegation headed by well-known Soviet poet Nikolai Tikhonov, Deputy Chairman of the Society's Central Board and Chairman of the Soviet Peace Committee, visited the PRC to take part in the celebration of the 10th anniversary of the foundation of the PRC.

The Society's branches also actively exchanged delegations. Among those who visited their Chinese colleagues were active members of the Society who could share their knowledge and experience and be of practical use to their Chinese friends. At the Fushun opencast colliery, excavator driver V. S. Sofonov, a member of the Soviet delegation, on his Chinese colleagues' request, taught them high-speed methods of work used by Soviet excavator drivers. Turner A. V. Dzhumak, who came to China with a delegation of the Society's Irkutsk branch, spoke at a conference of front-ranking workers in the Liaoning province, and demonstrated high-speed methods of cutting metal at the Sheniang cable works.

Work with Chinese college students and graduate students studying at Soviet higher educational establishments was of paramount importance in the Society's activities. Friendship meetings of the Soviet and the Chinese youth were organised as were excursions to landmarks, showings of Soviet films, visits to Soviet industrial enterprises, and meetings with front-ranking workers, party veterans and heroes of the Great Patriotic

⁵ *Druzhba*, 1959, No. 32, p. 5.

War. Along with the Komsomol Moscow City Committee the Society held meetings and parties for young people in Moscow and other Soviet cities devoted to the PRC's anniversaries and May 4, the festival day of Chinese youth. Chinese students often spoke at the Society's branches about the life of their people and the participation of the Chinese youth in the liberation struggle of the Chinese people and in building a new socialist China. On the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the PRC, the Society arranged 300 public speeches at Moscow enterprises and farms in the Moscow Region by Chinese students attending the Moscow Institute of Power Engineering. On the request of the Society's Leningrad branch, Chinese young people made speeches for Tallinn's workers.

During the early years of the Society's existence, it was greatly aided in its work by the Chinese-Soviet Friendship Society. On October 5, 1949, the CSFS held its founding meeting in Peking, attended by 1,500 delegates from different public organisations of Peking, Shanghai, Tianjing, Jingan, Hankou, Nanking, Shenyang, Harbin, and other cities and regions of the country. A delegation of Soviet cultural figures headed by A. A. Fadeyev and Soviet chargé d'affaires in the PRC, S. L. Tikhvinsky, took part in the work of the meeting.

The Chinese-Soviet Friendship Society, which was established on the 4th day of the existence of the PRC, became the most broadly-based public organisation in the country with branches in practically all of China's provinces and major cities. During the first decade of its existence, it was actually a centre of propaganda in the PRC to inform people about the Soviet experience in economic, governmental and cultural development. The CSFS carried out mass political undertakings in China, including Friendship Months, functions, meetings and parties devoted to the anniversaries of the Great October Socialist Revolution, the signing of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Aid between the PRC and the USSR, and other memorable events in the life of the Soviet Union and commemorating prominent Soviet political, public and cultural figures, scientists and men of art. Millions of Chinese citizens participated in those mass campaigns of Chinese-Soviet friendship.

The Soviet-Chinese Friendship Society also rendered aid to the CSFS, sending it thousands of new books in the areas of politics, popular science, and fiction, many copies of Soviet newspapers and magazines, and photo and other displays illustrating different aspects of life in the Soviet Union. Chinese readers could also learn about life in this country from the magazine *Sovetsko-Kitaiskaya Druzhba* (Soviet-Chinese Friendship) published in Chinese by the Society.

...Beginning in the mid-1960s, relations between our countries dwindled considerably as a result of deterioration of Sino-Soviet contacts. This adversely affected the development of contacts between Soviet and Chinese public organisations, including the friendship societies. Prior to 1964, Soviet-Chinese friendship societies annually signed cooperation plans, including commitments to conduct joint activities, to develop contacts between the societies' branches, to exchange delegations, and so on, on the basis of an agreement concluded in Moscow on November 12, 1959. But beginning in 1964, the Chinese side suggested that exchanges of delegations alone be coordinated rather than the signing of plans. Beginning in 1968, relations between the Soviet-Chinese Friendship Society and its Chinese counterpart were discontinued. The CSFS itself practically ceased operating. The sponsors of the "cultural revolution" were interested in substituting alienation and enmity for friendship and cooperation between the USSR and PRC.

Guided by the stable, consistent line of the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet government towards maintaining goodneighbourly and friendly relations with the Chinese people, the Society offered to invigorate its activities. Now that there were no contacts with the CSFS, the Society was forced to change the form of its activities while leaving its contents unaltered. It worked out a plan for measures to continue familiarising the Soviet public with China, its ancient history and culture and the glorious revolutionary traditions on the basis of friendship and respect for the Chinese people.

The Second National Conference of the Soviet-Chinese Friendship Society was held in Moscow in January 1969. The Rules of the Society were adopted unanimously and the resolution of the conference stated on behalf of the Soviet public that the Society's major task was "to promote the preservation, strengthening and development of fraternal friendship and cooperation between the peoples of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China and to familiarise the Soviet public on a broad basis with the life of the Chinese people, their history and culture". The Society considerably stepped up its activities in keeping with the resolution of the Second National Conference.

The Third National Conference of the Society held in Moscow in February 1978 summed up the results of this work. The Conference was attended by 240 delegates from Moscow, Leningrad, all republic, district, regional and city branches of the Society and the primary organisations of the Likhachyov Motor Works, the Shcherbakov Silk Mill and so on. Staff members of the Chinese embassy in Moscow were also present.

The First Deputy Chairman of the Society's Central Board S. L. Tikhvinsky said in the report of the Central Board that since the Second National Conference, the Society had carried out more than 100 different undertakings devoted to landmark events in the history of the revolutionary struggle of the Chinese people, prominent figures in the national liberation and revolutionary movement of China, Chinese cultural and literary figures of world renown and memorable events in the history of Soviet-Chinese relations. To inform the Soviet and foreign public of its activities, the Society had greatly expanded its contacts with radio and the press. The central Soviet press and TASS special reports within the Soviet Union and abroad regularly carried information about the Society's work. Special rubrics "At the Soviet-Chinese Friendship Society" have been introduced in the *Soviet Union* and *Soviet Woman* magazines published in Chinese and in radio broadcasting for listeners in China. Many central newspapers and magazines publish regular articles about the Society's activities.

On the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the Society, a documentary *For the Sake of a Noble Cause* was made, telling about the work of the Society since the moment of its inception. On the 30th anniversary of the foundation of the PRC, the film was shown on Central Television in the USSR.

The Third National Conference of the Society declared on behalf of the Soviet public that the Society was ready to resume and develop contacts with the CSFS on the basis of the agreement of November 12, 1959. "We are ready to resume exchanging information on the work we have carried out," the statement said, "to exchange delegations and specialised tourist groups of active members of the friendship societies and to supply the CSFS with literature, films, photos and other materials illustrating life in this country and to receive information from the CSFS."

In connection with the Third National Conference of the Society, the photo exhibition "The Soviet Union's Leninist Internationalist Policy Towards China" was on display in the House of Friendship and highlighted the most notable events in the history of Soviet-Chinese relations and the Society's activities. Delegates to and guests of the conference, including staff members of the Chinese embassy, could also see a book exhibition including 300 titles of translations of Chinese authors into Russian and books by Soviet authors on problems of Chinese literature, art and history. Such books have been published in this country in a total of more than 6 million copies in the past few years.

The Third National Conference of the Society confirmed anew that the Soviet public wholeheartedly approved of and supported the policy of trying to normalise Soviet-Chinese relations, reiterated by the 24th-26th CPSU Congresses, and was willing to put this line into effect by active work within the Society.

At present, the Society is preparing to mark its 25th anniversary. It has undertaken more than 150 different projects in the Soviet Union in the past few years alone to mark significant events in Chinese history and in the history of Soviet-Chinese relations.

The Society has sponsored conferences "Lenin and China" and "The Great October Socialist Revolution and China", and extensively marked the 60th anniversary of the Appeal of the Soviet of People's Commissars of the Russian Federation to the Chinese People and to the Governments of South and North China, which was the first to formulate the fundamental principles of the Soviet Union's Leninist policy towards China. The Society devoted its activities to the 50th anniversary of the Soviet mass movement keyed by "Hands off China". Meetings of veteran activists of Soviet-Chinese friendship were held on a regular basis. The Society organised get-togethers of the first military advisers who were sent by the young Soviet republic to China on Sun Yatsen's request and took part in training personnel and in working out the Northern March operations. A meeting of veteran servicemen of the Soviet Armed Forces who participated in battles against militarist Japan was held to commemorate Soviet aid to China in liberating Manchuria and setting up the Manchurian revolutionary base.

In connection with the 45th anniversary of the beginning of China's war of resistance against the Japanese aggression, the Society held a meeting commemorating Soviet aid to China in rebuffing the aggression of Japanese imperialism. The 30th anniversary of transferring the Soviet share of the Chinese Changchun railway line to China is to be marked by a meeting of Soviet railwaymen, medics and other experts.

Paying tribute to the history of the national liberation and revolutionary struggle of the Chinese people, the Society marked the 110th anniversary of the birth of revolutionary democrat Sun Yatsen, the great son of the Chinese people, the 60th anniversary of the democratic May 4 Movement, the 60th anniversary of the foundation of the early Marxist circles in China, the 60th anniversary of the CPC, the 55th anniversary of the Shanghai and Nangchang uprisings, the 55th anniversary of the uprising of the Canton proletariat and the Canton Commune, and the 55th anniversary of the May 30 Movement and the Chinese revolution of 1925-1927. The Society also marked the 125th anniversary of the Taiping uprising and the 70th anniversary of the Xinhai revolution. It also organised meetings to commemorate prominent Chinese communist internationalists and trade union leaders, including Li Dazhao, Qu Qiubo, Peng Bai, Zhang Tailei, and Wang Ming.

The Society devotes a good deal of its time to outstanding representatives of Chinese literature, art, music, theatre and cinema. Jointly with the Soviet Writers' Union, it marked in 1981 the centennial of the birth of Lu Xin, the great Chinese writer and founder of modern Chinese literature. To mark the event, meetings were held in Moscow and Leningrad and the Institute of the Far Eastern Studies, and the Institute of Oriental Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences held a scientific conference along with the Society.

In the past few years, the Society marked in various ways anniversaries of well-known Chinese writers Zhou Libo, Zhao Shuli, Mao Dun, Lao She, Ba Jin, Zheng Zhenduo and others, classics of Chinese literature Li Bo, Du Fu, Bo Juyi, Li Qinzao, Han Yu, In Fu and Tao Yuanming; Chinese composers Ne Er and Xi Xinghai; artists Qi Baishi and Xu Beihong; and the celebrated actor Mei Lanfan.

Immensely popular are readings of Chinese classical poetry and exhibitions of Chinese painting, ceramics and porcelain and applied art organised by the Society at the Museum of Oriental Art. The Society regularly shows Chinese documentaries and feature films.

Beginning in 1971, staff members of the Chinese embassy have been invited to many an undertaking of the Society. Concerts and film showings traditionally held during functions to mark the anniversaries of the foundation of the PRC are attended by the Chinese Ambassadors to the USSR. The concert and meeting held in the House of Friendship to mark the 30th anniversary of the foundation of the PRC was attended by Wanq Youping, Deputy Foreign Minister of the PRC and head of the Chinese delegation at the Soviet-Chinese negotiations.

In November 1981, the Society's leaders and activists warmly received at the House of Friendship the Chinese sports delegation which came to Moscow to take part in the 21st World Gymnastics Championship. Last April, the Society welcomed the Chinese gymnasts who came to take part in the *Moscow News* international competitions. Late last April, Soviet scientists, active members of the Society, met at Moscow's House of Friendship Chinese economists who came to the Soviet Union as guests of the Chinese embassy. The Society organised visits to several enterprises in Moscow and Kiev for them.

The CSFS has been carrying out individual undertakings in the past few years. It annually organises film shows to commemorate the October Revolution and Lenin's birthday and takes part in the ceremony of laying flowers to the monuments of Soviet soldiers who had perished in China defending the Chinese people. The Society also helps work out programmes for visits to China by Soviet scientists and active members of the Soviet-Chinese Friendship Society who come to China as guests of the Soviet embassy.

Speaking in Tashkent on March 24, 1982, Leonid Brezhnev pointed out: "We have never considered the state of hostility and alienation between our countries as something normal. We are ready to negotiate without any preliminary terms measures acceptable for both sides to improve Soviet-Chinese relations on the basis of mutual respect for each other's interests, noninterference in each other's affairs, and mutual benefit and, of course, without detriment to third countries. This refers to economic, cultural, scientific and political relations, as soon as the two sides are ready for specific steps in any of these fields."⁶

⁶ *Kommunist*, 1982, No. 6, p. 21.

Marking its silver anniversary, the Society states anew on behalf of the Soviet public that it is ready to resume and develop contacts with the Chinese-Soviet Friendship Society and the Chinese public.

The Union of Soviet Societies of Friendship and Cultural Ties With Foreign Countries and the Society of Soviet-Chinese Friendship have invited a delegation of the Chinese People's Society of Friendship With Foreign Countries and the Society of Chinese-Soviet Friendship to take part in jubilee celebrations.

This year will see an important event in the life of the Soviet Union and the Soviet people. With all their friends abroad, the Soviet people will celebrate the 65 anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution and the 60th anniversary of the foundation of the USSR, the world's first integral, federal, multinational state of workers and peasants. The resolution of the CPSU Central Committee "On the 60th Anniversary of the Foundation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics" states that "by its entire activities and purposeful ideological work, the Party educates the working people in the spirit of Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism so that they will be proud to be a part of their great, united Soviet homeland."⁷ To be an internationalist, Lenin emphasised, "one must *not* think only of one's own nation, but place *above it* the interests of all nations..."⁸

Guided by our Party's course, the Soviet-Chinese Friendship Society will continue working for the noble cause of friendship and cooperation between the peoples of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

⁸ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 22, p. 347.

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ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF PRC POPULATION

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 4, Oct-Dec 82 pp 106-111

[Article by A. M. Reshetov, candidate of historical sciences]

[Text] New data on the ethnic composition of China's population was published in the Chinese press late in 1980 and early in 1981.¹ It is again stressed in these publications that China is a single multinational state. Its population, exclusive of Taiwan, is 972.2 million. The Han people (the Chinese proper) constitute 94 per cent of the population, and the remaining 6 per cent consist of other peoples who inhabit from 50 to 60 per cent of the PRC's territory. Statistics deal only with the so-called "national minorities". Among the "national minorities" in China, there are peoples which are not only numerous and are in no way inferior to the Han in level of historical development, but have already evolved as national entities. These include the Zhuang (12 million), Uighur (5.4 million), Manchu (2.6 million), Buyi (1.7 million), Koreans (1.6 million), etc.

It would be wrong to put the Han on a different plane than the other peoples because they are only the biggest ethnos among other typologically similar ethnoses of the country. Besides, it is known that in ethnic and cultural respects, the Han nation, especially its northern and southern groups, are not a uniform entity. The question of the unity of the Han (Chinese) language is a debatable question in Sinology to this day. In any case, it is admitted that the differences between its northern and southern (e. g., South Fujian) dialects are greater than between modern English and German. Even anthropologically, the Chinese are by no means uniform. Now classified as Han people are the Danjia, Lang and others, who early in the 1950s were still regarded as independent ethnic groups. So the question of the unity of the Han ethnos is a pressing problem awaiting scientific resolution. In any case, we are justified in contending that the Han nation has not yet reached the conclusive stage of its ethnic development.

Groundless is the conclusion of the well-known Chinese historian Fan Wenlan that "starting with the Qin-Han epoch, the Han were neither a people of the epoch of state decentralisation nor a bourgeois nation of the epoch of capitalism, but were a special nation that had formed under specific social conditions".² But irrespective of the degree of consolidation of the Han, typologically they are not the only nation in the PRC.

It is stated in Wang De's article that there are 55 "national minorities" and three ethnic groups in the PRC. The question of the number and size of the non-Han peoples in China was raised repeatedly after

¹ Wang De, "China's National Minorities", *China*, No. 1, 1981, pp. 8-13; *The Chinese Encyclopaedic Year Book*, Peking-Shanghai, 1980, pp. 668-669 (in Chinese).

² *Collection of Materials Related to the Discussion of the Question of the Formation on the Han Nation*, Peking, 1957, p. 13 (in Chinese).

1949. There were no statistics on the ethnic composition of the country's population in the first reference books that were published immediately after the formation of the PRC. In accordance with the June 30, 1953, census in the PRC, more than 60 peoples with a total size of 40 million were singled out.³ The official reference book for 1957 listed only 46 peoples,⁴ while the list for 1958 includes 51 peoples.⁵

The definition of ethnic entities in the PRC is not an easy matter. For instance, the Miao, who are scattered and actually speak several different languages, thus differing among themselves ethnically and culturally, were declared to be a single people. The Nong and the Sha, who retain their ethnic specificity and were initially declared to be independent peoples, were later included among the Zhuang, while the Axi and Sangyi were included among the Yi.

The names of new peoples start to appear in the Chinese press since 1960, e. g., the Pumi (formerly known under the Chinese name of Xifan) in the northwestern part of Yunnan province and the Luoba (a collective Tibetan name for several ethnic groups meaning "mountaineer") in southeastern Tibet. The names of other groups began to be mentioned in the Chinese periodicals: the Kucong and the Menba. According to 1977 statistics, there were 54 peoples in China besides the Han.⁶ In June 1979, the PRC State Council adopted a decision to designate the Jino as a separate people. The Kucong (about 4,000) and Jino are two small ethnic groups living in the south of Yunnan province, while the Menba are a people living in the southeastern part of Tibet. Thus the number of peoples in the PRC (exclusive of the Han) reached 55. The data concerning these peoples are cited in the publications of 1980 and 1981.

Since this list is of unquestionable interest, we shall reprint it in full, leaving unchanged the order accepted in China.

These publications contain extensive new material for comparative study of the dynamics of change in the size of the PRC's peoples. Of course, a detailed analysis of the published figures is yet to be made, but even now, one cannot but notice the changes in the size of the peoples. Today not 10 but 13 peoples exceed a million in size, among them the Yao, the Dong and Bai. Some peoples have drastically shrunk in number, first of all Russians (from 22,600 in 1958⁷ to 600).

It should also be noted that in the list of China's peoples, the names of two of them have one and the same meaning: Gaoshan and Luoba. The first is a Chinese word and the second a Tibetan one, but both mean "mountaineer". The absence in each of them of a clearly expressed ethnic self-awareness backed up by a common self-name does not allow ethnographers to speak of the Gaoshan and Luoba as definite ethnic entities. Changes have also appeared in the names of some peoples: Dai instead of Tai, Wa instead of Kawa. There is interesting new information on the

³ *Renmin shouce* (Reference Book of Peoples), Peking, 1955, p. 252. Earlier published works by Chinese linguists Luo Changpei and Fu Maoji devoted to a classification of the languages of China's peoples mention a much larger number of peoples. See *Kesue tunbao* No. 5, 1951, pp. 491-495; *Zhungo Yuiven* No. 3, 1954, pp. 21-26.

⁴ *Renmin shouce*, Peking, 1957, p. 623.

⁵ *China's National Minorities*, Peking, 1958, p. 56. Yi Qun (compiler), *Concise Information about China's National Minorities*, Peking, 1958, p. 195 (in Chinese).

⁶ *Unity and Equality. National Minorities in China and Their Progress*, Peking, 1977, p. 5 (in Chinese).

⁷ Fang Ren, "The Size and Settlement of China's Small Peoples, *Dili Zhishi*, Vol. 9, No. 6, 1958, p. 258 (in Chinese).

settlement of peoples. The presence of Gaoshan in Fujian province is mentioned for the first time.

The greatest attention is attracted by those names of new peoples which are mentioned by Wang De for the first time without any further comment, just as three ethnic groups—the Kucong, Deng and Sherpas, living in Yunnan and Tibet—have now been singled out in the PRC in addition to the 55 peoples. We do not have, unfortunately, any information on the size, ethnic composition or linguistic characteristics of the Deng. As to the other new peoples and ethnic groups he mentions, they all belong to the Tibetan-Burmese language group, mostly the Himalayan branch.

Special attention should be allotted to the new data about the ethnic composition of Tibet. Singled out here are the Luoba and Menba peoples and the Sherpa ethnic group. Whereas there was mention of the former two in the past,⁸ this is for the first time that the presence of Sherpas in Tibet is mentioned. The data on the size of the Menba—40,000 and Luo-

Population (in thous.)

Name of people	According to Wang De's article	According to the 1980 Year Book	Areas of residence
1. Mongols	2,600	2,600	Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang, Liaoning, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Qinghai
2. Hui	6,400	6,490	Ningxia, Gansu, Henan, Hebei, Qinghai, Shandong, Yunnan, Xinjiang, the cities Peking and Tianjing
3. Tibetans	3,400	3,450	Tibet, Qinghai, Sichuan, Gansu, Yunnan
4. Uighur	5,400	5,480	Xinjiang
5. Miao	3,900	3,920	Guizhou, Hunan, Yunnan, Guangxi, Sichuan, Guangdong
6. Yi	4,800	4,850	Sichuan, Yunnan, Guizhou, Guangxi
7. Zhuang	12,000	12,090	Guangxi, Yunnan, Guangdong
8. Buyi	1,700	1,720	Guizhou
9. Koreans	1,600	1,680	Jilin, Liaoning, Heilongjiang
10. Manchu	2,600	2,650	Liaoning, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Hebei, Inner Mongolia, Peking
11. Dong	1,100	1,110	Guizhou, Hunan, Guangxi
12. Yao	1,200	1,240	Guangxi, Hunan, Yunnan, Guangdong

⁸ The book "Confidently Advancing Tibet" (Peking, 1958) says that living in Tibet are Tibetans, Han, Hui, Mongols, Luo (i. e., Luoba) and Man (perhaps, Menba?), (pp. 8, 9, 115). There is mention of Luoba and Menba in lists contained in the *Dictionary of the Most Frequently Used Hieroglyphic Characters of the Chinese Language* (Hanzhou, 1973, pp. 681-684) and the *Dictionary of the Modern Chinese Language* (Peking, 1976, pp. 590-593). These lists name 54 peoples, but do not yet contain data on the Tsino. The *Sino-Russian Dictionary* (Peking, 1977) mentions all the peoples of China except Luoba, although in 1954 prominent Chinese linguists Luo Changpei and Fu Maoji when mentioning the language of the Nu people express the view that it is linked with Nepalese languages and the languages of the Luoba. It can be conjectured that in the PRC, not all hold the view that the Luoba live within the borders of China.

Continued

Name of people	According to Wang De's article	According to the 1980 Year Book	Areas of residence
13. Bai	1,000	1,050	Yunnan
14. Tujia	770	770	Hunan, Hubei
15. Hani	960	960	Yunnan
16. Kazakhs	800	800	Xinjiang, Gansu, Qinghai
17. Dai	760	760	Yunnan
18. Li	680	680	Guangdong
19. Lisu	470	470	Yunnan
20. Wa	260	260	Yunnan
21. She	330	330	Fujian, Zhejiang, Jiangxi, Guangdong
22. Gaoshan	300	300	Taiwan, Fujian
23. Lahu	270	270	Yunnan
24. Shui	230	230	Guizhou
25. Dongxiang	190	190	Gansu
26. Nasi	230	230	Yunnan
27. Chinpo	80	83	Yunnan
28. Kirghiz	90	97	Xinjiang
29. Tu	120	120	Qinghai
30. Daur	70	78	Inner Mongolia, Heilongjiang
31. Mulao	70	73	Guangxi
32. Tsian	80	85	Sichuan
33. Bulang	50	52	Yunnan
34. Salars	50	56	Qinghai, Gansu
35. Maonan	30	31	Guangxi
36. Gelao	20	26	Guizhou
37. Sibo	40	44	Xinjiang, Liaoning
38. Achan	10	18	Yunnan
39. Tajiks	20	22	Xinjiang
40. Nu	10	19	Yunnan
41. Uzbeks	7	7.5	Xinjiang
42. Russians	0.6	0.6	Xinjiang
43. Evenks	10	13	Inner Mongolia, Heilongjiang
44. Benlung	10	10	Yunnan
45. Baoan	6	6.8	Gansu
46. Uighur	8	8.8	Gansu
47. Chin	5	5	Guangxi
48. Tatars	2	2.9	Xinjiang
49. Dulung	4	4.1	Yunnan
50. Orochon	3	3.2	Heilongjiang, Inner Mongolia
51. Xeché	0.8	0.8	Heilongjiang
52. Pumi	20	22	Yunnan
53. Menba	40	40	Tibet
54. Luoba	300	200	Tibet
55. Tsino	10	10	Yunnan

ba—300,000, and about the existence of Sherpas cannot but lead to further reflection.

The "discovery" of new peoples is taking place in the PRC. And we are dealing not with mere tiny groups. According to the above-cited figures, the Luoba should be listed among China's larger peoples.

According to the latest statistics, Tibet has a population of 1,830,000.⁹

⁹ *Beijing Review*, No. 7, 1981, p. 6.

Its area is 1.2 million square kilometres; population density is an average of 1.5 persons per square kilometre. The first publications about Menba and Luoba twenty years ago in the Chinese press did not mention their size, while now these figures have been published and the first mention has been made of Sherpas, but without any indication of their number. According to 1961 statistics, there were supposedly 3,800 Menba¹⁰ in China, while according to the latest statistics, there are already 40,000. This almost ten-fold population increase cannot in any way be explained by natural growth. Chinese statistics show that even if the percentage of population increment is high, it takes decades for such a substantial increase in population. The Zhuang, for instance, numbered 6.6 million in 1953, 7.78 million in 1961 and 12 million in 1978; that is their number doubled over a period of 25 years.¹¹

It is regrettable that not a single work on the ethnography or language of these peoples has so far been published; as of now, concrete information has yet to be published on their settlement and structure. In Wang De's article, definite emphasis is placed on the historical unity of all the peoples of China. He writes: "In the year 221 B. C., after the unification of the entire country by Qin Shihuang, China became a feudal country which retained uniform centralism for a long time. In the course of lengthy historical development, close ties in the political, economic and cultural fields were established between the various peoples of China, the central place among whom was held by the Han. United, they jointly created the civilisation of the Chinese nation with its age-long history."¹²

Of course, it would be unscientific to deny the deep ties and mutual influence of the peoples of China and the Han. At the same time, strength and depth of these ties are quite varied. These ties are much deeper, for instance, among the peoples of South China than those of the North, including the Han who live there. Thus, the history of the Zhuangs in past centuries is rather closely linked with the common history of all the peoples of South China, the Taiping uprising being an example.

The Han feudal lords oppressed the small peoples of China and the Han peasants equally; "the relations between the peoples were relations of inequality".¹³ It can be conjectured that in the future, new peoples may be named, and subsequently their size may also be announced. When reporting on Yunnan, where 22 of the 55 peoples live, the Chinese authors also mention the existence of two "forest tribes" which, for instance, have not received official status as nationalities.¹⁴ When and under what circumstances will they receive it?

Wang De writes that in the PRC all nationalities are equal, that national unity is growing stronger, and notes the need to respect the customs, mores and creeds of the "small peoples" in political and social life. It is reported that in the PRC there are now five autonomous regions (Inner Mongolia, Ningxia-Hui, Xinjiang-Uighur, Guangxi-Zhuang and Tibet), 29 autonomous regions, 67 autonomous districts and 3 autonomous huoshung, and that national cadres from the small peoples are

¹⁰ *Renmin shouce*, Peking, 1965, p. 116.

¹¹ See *Renmin ribao*, Nov. 1, 1954; *Renmin shouce*, Peking, 1965, p. 115.

¹² Wang De, *Op. cit.*, p. 10.

¹³ *Ibidem*.

¹⁴ *Beijing Review*, No. 4, 1981, p. 30.

being trained. The article contains a call for the continuous regulation and improvement of relations between the nationalities and for a further strengthening of national cohesion. "At the same time, with the retention of vigilance and action against division and undermining of the cohesion of the country's nationalities from without, it is necessary to pay constant attention to, and to liquidate, the internal factors that do not facilitate national cohesion; constantly to prevent and overcome great-Han deviationism and the deviation of petty nationalism, especially the former."¹⁵

It is admitted in China that "not all issues of the national problem have been resolved". Tensions remain to this day in relations between peoples. During a recent inspection tour of the northwest, when visiting a disputed area where the Gansu and Qinghai provinces join, Panchen-Ertnei called on the cadre workers of every level to resolve outstanding issues on the bases of mutual understanding, mutual concessions, justice, and rationality.¹⁶

Characters designating peoples have been published in the *Sino-Russian Dictionary* (Peking, 1977). Usually each such name of a people living in China is supplied with a note that this is "one of the national minorities of China".¹⁷ Such a definition is absent in the case of the names of the Turkic peoples—Uighur, Kazakh, Kirghiz, Uzbek, and Tatar; the Tungus-Manchu peoples—Manchu, Evenk, and Orochon; the Mongol peoples—Mongol and Daur; as well as in the case of Tibetans, Tajiks, Russians and Koreans. The principle of such a classification of China's peoples is difficult to understand. Of course, among the latter are peoples which live predominantly outside China, for instance, the Koreans, Evenks, Kazakhs, Kirghiz, etc. But there are also peoples that live exclusively (Manchu, Sarykol Tajiks) or predominantly (Tibetans) in China. At the same time, among the peoples listed as national minorities in China, there are many, representatives of which live outside China to a greater or lesser extent, for instance, the Qin (Vietnamese), Buyi, Yao, Wa, Qinqo (Kachin), etc.

There is no denying that the problem of solving the nationalities question, one of the aspects of which is the identification of ethnic composition, is not at all simple and cannot be quickly or easily solved in such a multi-ethnic country as China. In their time, Chinese scholars have admitted the absence of precise data on the size of many peoples in China.¹⁸ Nonetheless, it has been determined administratively and published in official works. Questions of China's ethnic composition require a special study.

¹⁵ Wang De, *Op. cit.*, p. 11.

¹⁶ *Beijing Review*, No. 3, 1981.

¹⁷ *Sino-Russian Dictionary*, Peking, 1977. See, for instance, bai—p. 15, hani—p. 338, Qinqo—p. 473, Lahu—p. 530, miao—p. 618, Yuigu—p. 1113, etc.

¹⁸ See, for instance, Lin Yaohua, "Some Pressing Problems Facing Chinese Ethnographers in Connection with the Solution of the National Question in the People's Republic of China", *Sovetskaya etnografiya*, No. 3, 1956, pp. 79-91.

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SOVIET PROFESSOR RECALLS TEACHING IN CHINA IN 1950'S

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 4, Oct-Dec 82 pp 112-117

[Article by I. V. Strazheva: "In the China of the 1950's"]

[Text] **F**rom the editors: The author of these reminiscences, Doctor of Technical Sciences, Professor I. V. Strazheva, taught at the Peking Aviation Institute in 1956-1957. In those years, Soviet specialists were rendering the Chinese people immense selfless assistance in building a socialist society. As a direct participant in this, Strazheva saw for herself the appreciation of the Chinese people for this fraternal assistance, and the love and respect with which they treated all Soviet people. It is impossible to negate the good past in relations between the Chinese and Soviet peoples—the author of these reminiscences is firmly convinced of this.

* * *

Late in 1955, I was summoned to the personnel department of the Ministry of Higher Education of the USSR and offered the chance to go to the People's Republic of China for a year.

"You will be a consultant at the department of aerodynamics and hydraulics of the Peking Aviation Institute", I was told by an official at the Ministry. "Under the existing agreement on mutual assistance and cooperation, another big group of specialists from our country, including some from your Moscow Aviation Institute, will be sent to China next year."

Many of our specialists had visited the Peking Aviation Institute (PAI) after 1949; they lectured on special subjects and helped organise the course of study. The study and research laboratories at PAI in many ways resembled those of the Moscow Aviation Institute. The curricula were also similar.

In the spring of 1956, my candidature received final approval from the Ministry.

...During my first meetings with the lecturers and the officials of the Institute, I also made the acquaintance of two interpreters: Xiao Peihou, a man of small stature, and the dark eyed, mercurial Chen Zhen. They were to be my helpers throughout the year. They would translate my lectures on dynamics of flight into Chinese, be present at my talks and consultations, and go on business trips with me. The department gave me a very tight schedule, and its success depended to a large extent on these interpreters.

The beginning of the academic year at the PAI was marked by a huge meeting at a stadium. The new arrivals from Moscow and the teachers who were working there for the second or even the third year were invited to the main stand. Photographers fired away and smiling girls in their Sunday best presented flowers to the specialists.

Late September. The Chinese papers were full of materials about the 8th Congress of the Communist Party of China which just ended. Placing several issues of *Renmin ribao* on the table, Chen Zhen acquainted me with the contents of the report of the CPC Central Committee and the decisions adopted by the Congress.

"Without the great international solidarity of the proletariat of all countries and without the support of the international revolutionary forces, the victory of socialism in our country is impossible and, should such a victory be attained, it would be impossible to consolidate", stated the CPC CC's report to the Congress.

The 8th CPC Congress outlined its further foreign policy course proceeding from the principles of proletarian internationalism. And Mao himself said at the Congress: "One must know how to learn from the Soviet Union which is marching ahead, one must know how to learn from the countries of People's Democracy, one must know how to learn from the peoples of all countries."

November 7th. On this day all thoughts were about my homeland.

On the days preceding this holiday, we received numerous written and oral congratulations from the rectorate of the institute, from colleagues and acquaintances. We were given lovely post-cards showing fish, birds, flowers and landscapes covered with Chinese characters wishing us health and success.

On the eve of the celebration at the Institute, the leader of our group asked me to prepare a speech. For many hours that evening, I thought about the words I was to address to the unknown, and predominantly young, auditorium.

My nervousness increased a hundred-fold when our Chinese comrades invited us into the hall—or to be more correct, into a huge indoor stadium filled to capacity. Students were sitting on benches, window sills, and even on the roof trusses.

"Four thousand at least", the head of our group told us.

I went to the speakers rostrum. I did not have any prepared text for the interpreter and paused after every two or three sentences for him to translate. What I told them was that on the eve of this Soviet national holiday, as all those present might well understand, our thoughts and feelings were with our homeland. But the heartfelt friendship of our peoples made our stay far away from our country less trying. This friendship gave us warmth and charged us with new energy for hard work.

I also said that the Soviet government has sent us to China to offer fraternal assistance and that we were all readily sharing our knowledge and skills. We understood that the friendship between our peoples should be safeguarded not only when the sun shone brightly but also when thunder clouds appeared on the horizon.

The reaction of the auditorium was what impressed me most. As I spoke the huge hall was silent. But when the interpreter began to speak cries were heard from all sides. The hall was correcting his slips. Many students had an excellent knowledge of Russian.

On New Year's Eve, my colleagues and I also received numerous congratulations: from the rectorate of the institute, teachers, the Second Machine-Building Ministry. There was also a message addressed to each specialist.

"Dear Comrades,

"On New Year's Eve, 1957, permit me on behalf of the government of the PRC and the Chinese people to convey to you sincere congratulations.

"The old year has passed, but the fraternal assistance you have given to the Chinese people in the outgoing year and your valuable contribution to the cause of building socialism in China will long remain in the memory of the Chinese people. The government and people of China express their heartfelt gratitude to you.

"We hope you will usher in the New Year with joy. We wish you good health.

Chen Yun,
December 31, 1956".

...A business trip to Shenyang, the main city of Liaoning Province. The calendar showed 18 January 1957.

The blue express train carried me from warm Peking into the cold winter. I stepped out of the coach and grabbed up a handful of snow. How I longed for the white snows of Russia! The Chinese comrades who were there to meet me nodded their heads with understanding: they also liked snow.

I began work at once. Gave consultations on questions of aircraft aerodynamics at the design bureau and studied the organisation of production practice for students from PAI. I also visited the aviation plant. I spent much time inspecting the production shops. Everywhere, there were new machine tools with labels "Made in USSR". Workers greeted me in a friendly manner: "Nihao sulian ren".

There was an unexpected and very warm meeting with our specialists—the former students of the MAI. Alexei Karev and Mikhail Krasivov shook hands with me. It is pleasant to encounter fellow countrymen. Quite naturally, we recalled our own student years and our institute. I invited them to attend my report on "Some Questions of the Aerodynamic Layout of a Modern Airplane". The management of the enterprise also came to listen.

At the time, many Chinese engineers who got their higher engineering education in the Soviet Union were already doing important work in the PRC's growing aviation industry. Some of them were graduates of the aircraft building department of the MAI and had attended my lectures on flight dynamics there.

During one of our first talks at the Soviet Embassy, we were told about some specifics of life in China, the customs and mores of the Chinese people. It is only natural that in every country, one sees both positive and negative aspects, we were told by the counsellor who briefed us. Our Chinese friends are only beginning to get their feet on the ground, are only beginning to overcome the heritage of the past. We would like your eyes to see the new, the progressive, he said.

I recalled this talk when looking out of the window of my hotel room in Nanchang... An old man was hauling an impossibly huge bundle of thick bamboo sticks on his back. The burden was virtually pinning him to the ground... A father, mother and three children were pulling a cart loaded with their belongings. Making stops from time to time, they mopped the sweat from their faces with their sleeves... A rickshaw trundled past... Yet another old Chinese man wearing a broad-brimmed straw hat hunching under the weight of bamboo...

But the seedlings of the new life were gaining in strength, and one could sense that clearly. I felt this when inspecting the production shops of a new aircraft works in Nanchang. And how joyful was my meeting here with an old acquaintance—the AN-2 plane. I had flown it a bit myself... Imagine that yet another bunch of pupils of that amazing aircraft designer, Oleg Antonov, is to be found so far away from home!

It was pleasant to hear the workers at the aircraft plant telling us how they had built these well-lit, modern production shops, how they started work on the assembly line. What a holiday for the entire collective was the completion of the first plane! Thousands of people—no exaggeration—saw it off out of the factory gates. And, of course, their joy was shared by the Soviet specialists, many of whom had been in Nanchang for a long time.

Later on, I fulfilled a pleasant assignment: conveying to Oleg Antonov

friendly greetings from all those who were building the famous "An-nushka", as the plane is fondly called. The name of this outstanding Soviet designer was written in Chinese characters on the fuselage.

...The workday had ended. We were just preparing to leave for home when our Chinese comrades came up to us.

"We hope you have some time to spare to speak with us",—one of them said.

"Of course".

"We are former pilots and are now working at the plant's testing centre," a Chinese dressed in blue work clothes started the conversation. "I would like to tell you that Soviet volunteer pilots helped our people very much in the difficult years of the war against Japan. The skies of China have not forgotten their exploits".

"We called them the 'Sword of Justice'," another comrade joined in. "You know people sing songs in our country about Soviet pilot Georgy Kravchenko. His group shot down many enemy planes. The Yangtze became the tomb of this courageous pilot in a forced landing on the river. A ruined plane and a wounded hero... The waters of the Yangtze remember him..."

"I am from Wuhan", said a third. "I knew Anton Gubenko. He rammed an enemy plane in a dogfight".

Our conversation continued for hours. The battles in the skies over China were recounted and the hero pilots of 1937-1940.¹ At the time, first-class aircraft were sent from the Soviet Union to the front of the Chinese people's national liberation struggle. Flying I-15 and I-16 fighters devised by outstanding designer N. Polikarpov and the fast, heavy SB, TB-3 and DB-3 bombers, our volunteer pilots engaged the enemy in the air, displaying unprecedented heroism. And if, in the vastness of the air, the routes once traced by planes remained in the skies of China, it would be possible to name them analogously with the terrestrial streets named after A. Blagoveshchensky, A. Gubenko, G. Kravchenko, G. Kulishenko, K. Kokkinaki, S. Suprun, and many others.

On February 14, the Central Society of Chinese-Soviet Friendship and the Peking Society of Chinese-Soviet Friendship invited the Soviet specialists to a meeting in honour of the 7th anniversary of the signing of the treaty of friendship, alliance and mutual assistance between the PRC and the USSR. It was held at the Celestial Bridge Theatre.

The concert that began after the ceremony opened, by tradition, with the song "Moscow-Peking". It was sung by the performers and all those present in the hall.

The Chinese songs "Flowers of Victory", "Longing for the Huanghe River", "White Snow in Sunny Spring", "I Live Near the Yangtze River", "Love Song on a Tea Hill" and then the dances "On the Mount of Tea Plantations" and "Peacock" were interspersed with Russian songs and dances. Arias from the operas "Carmen" and "Traviatta" were sung in Russian. Music by Tchaikovsky and Glinka sounded in the hall.

...Lectures. They were attended by teachers who came to Peking from various towns. I felt that many of them knew Russian sufficiently well and had a command of technical terminology. But, of course, the fact

¹ You will find a detailed account about the exploits of the volunteer pilots of those years in the book *Over the Skies of China. 1937-1940. Reminiscences of Soviet Volunteer Pilots*, Moscow, 1980.

that formulas, equations and charts are the main language of the dynamics of flight helped me a lot.

A few minutes after the beginning of every lecture, the door opened and an assistant brought in a traditional bowl of green tea on a tray.

I did a lot of consulting. Mostly for staff members of the department. Sometimes representatives of industry came for consultations on various questions.

...International Women's Day. A wonderful spring holiday that was enjoyed by men, it seemed, no less than women. And how pleasant it was, so far from home, to be sent beautiful baskets of flowers early in the morning. They are both from coworkers who came with me to the PRC and from my Chinese colleagues.

On March 8, the Women's International Democratic Federation and the Peking Democratic Federation held a reception at the Hotel Peking. How many flowers there were!

At first there was an informal conversation with Chinese women who spoke of their joys, problems and plans for the future. I met many Chinese women at the meeting, among them political figures, scientists, and ordinary workers. The wives of some of the PRC's leaders were also present. The topics of conversation were extremely diverse: working women, peace, children and, naturally, the friendship closely linking our peoples.

A big concert rounded off the reception. The public reacted in a lively manner to the humorous funny sketches. The reception devoted to women's friendship was a great success!

The next day, the holiday was continued at the Soviet Embassy. This time representatives of our embassy's women's committee were the hosts. And again the word "friendship" sounded repeatedly in many languages.

In April, a friendly visit to the PRC was paid by Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet Kliment Voroshilov. On that trip, he was accompanied by the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of Uzbekistan, Sharaf Rashidov, the Minister of Higher Education of the USSR, Vyacheslav Yelyutin and Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Nikolai Fedorenko.

In connection with this event the newspaper *Renmin ribao* wrote in its issue of April 15, 1957:

"Friendly cooperation between our countries in economy, politics and culture has grown and strengthened daily since the conclusion of the great fraternal alliance between China and the Soviet Union on February 14, 1950. In foreign policies, we come out shoulder to shoulder for the relaxation of world tensions and for international cooperation."

My archives include the April 18, 1957 issue of the newspaper *Druzhba* (Friendship), put out in Russian by the Chinese-Soviet Friendship Society in Peking. On the front page is a long article "Zhou Enlai Holds Banquet in Honour of Kliment Voroshilov". The banquet was attended by Chairman of the PRC Mao Zedong, Deputy Chairman Zhu De, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress Liu Shaoqi, members of the government, deputies of the National People's Congress, leaders of democratic parties and public organisation, marshals and generals of the People's Liberation Army, the Soviet Ambassador to the PRC P. Yudin, and staff members of the Soviet Embassy. In all, more than 1,400 people had gathered in the huge banquet hall. Many Soviet specialists working in the PRC were also invited to this reception.

The newspaper *Druzhba* wrote: "On the evening of April 16, the Premier of the State Council of the PRC Zhou Enlai held a banquet in the Hotel Peking in honour of the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme

Soviet of the USSR Kliment Voroshilov and other dear guests who had come with him to our country."

A bit further it wrote:

"At the beginning of the banquet Zhou Enlai raised his glass and said: 'Today, with a feeling of great joy, we are holding a reception in honour of Comrade Voroshilov and the Soviet comrades accompanying him. To express our common joy, I invite everyone to raise their glasses and drink for the great Soviet people, for the great fraternal and inviolable friendship between the peoples of China and the Soviet Union, for the unity of the countries of the socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union, for peace throughout the world...'"

That day, Voroshilov made a big speech at an enlarged meeting of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress. Greeting the guests and expressing words of gratitude for the USSR's fraternal support, Liu Shaoqi said:

"The Chinese people have learned by experience that the great friendship between China and the Soviet Union is in accord with the supreme interests of the peoples of our two countries. The Chinese people have learned by experience that the great unity of China and the Soviet Union, the great unity of the socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union, is the most reliable guarantee of universal peace and progress for mankind. The Chinese people are prepared to make every effort to ensure the steady strengthening of this friendship and unity."

...Ever more often the head of our group spoke of our departure for home. There were no more lectures. Preparations were under way for exams. It was becoming more difficult to work: the heat grew with every passing day.

On June 17, I delivered the final lecture. I wrote the final formulas on the blackboard, drew a line under them, and put down the chalk. Every success to you, my attentive students, in your educational endeavours!

The parting meeting with the staff members. The big assembly hall was packed to capacity. The specialists were on the podium. Everything was moving.

After a brief speech, the Director presented government awards to the specialists. A medal in a red box. The interpreter read out the text:

"As a sign of gratitude for your selfless and truly enthusiastic assistance to the cause of building socialism in our country, I present to you the medal 'Chinese-Soviet Friendship', Signed: 'Premier of the State Council Zhou Enlai'."

On returning to the MAI, I continued my work at the department. Many Chinese students and post-graduates received their training at this institute. And not only at the MAI, but at many other Soviet establishments of higher education, engineers and scientists of a high calibre were trained for work in the PRC.

All this took place.

"We remember well the times when the Soviet Union and People's China were united by bonds of friendship and comradely cooperation," Leonid Brezhnev said in his speech in Tashkent on March 24, 1982. "We have never considered the state of hostility and alienation between our countries as something normal".²

² *Pravda*, March 25, 1982.

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NEW SOVIET DICTIONARY OF CHINESE PLACE NAMES PUBLISHED

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 3, Jul-Sep 82 (signed to press 12 Oct 82) pp 121-123

[Article by Ya. A. Miropol'skiy: "Dictionary of Chinese Place Names"]

[Text] A three-volume "Dictionary of Chinese Place Names" has been prepared for publication by the Main Administration of Geodesy and Cartography of the USSR Council of Ministers in conjunction with the Far East Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences. It was compiled by Ya. A. Miropol'skiy and G. Ye. Tikhonova. The dictionary will be published in 1982 by the Nauka Publishing House.

The purpose of the dictionary is to establish the standard and scientifically sound Russian spelling of Chinese place names in scientific, reference, academic, informational and cartographic publications and in periodicals. It will be compulsory for all Soviet ministries, agencies and institutions.

The compilation of this dictionary was made necessary by the great difficulties arising in the translation of Chinese place names into Russian. These difficulties stem from the following:

The pictorial script (with several different ways of reading the same character);

The multinational composition of the Chinese population responsible for the complex system of place names in this huge state;

The numerous dialects of the Chinese language--resulting in various forms of the same name;

The distortion of Mongolian, Tibetan, Uighur and other non-Chinese place names when they are transcribed in characters;

The existence of several systems of Romanized script for Chinese characters in China (prior to 1958) and abroad*;

* The Chinese phonetic "pinyin" alphabet was not adopted as the international standard for the transcription of Chinese place names and personal names until 1977.

The shortcomings of the official Romanized script used in the transcription of non-Chinese place names in the PRC;

Differences between the phonetic systems of the Russian and Chinese languages and other languages of China.

The transcription of Chinese place names in Russian is also complicated by the fact that the regulation of administrative divisions has not been completed as yet in the PRC, as a result of which the boundaries and names of administrative units are changed frequently, administrative units of one category are transferred to another and administrative centers (particularly of district status) are moved from one populated point to another.

The specialist who works with small-scale Chinese maps must always bear in mind the peculiar designation of third-class administrative units (districts and commune units) and their centers in China. The problem is that the names of administrative units and their centers are generally the same, and the populated point which is also an administrative center is generally marked by only one name. However, in those cases (and they number more than 30 percent) when the name of the administrative unit does not coincide with the name of the center, the reference point on the map is inscribed with two names. The first is always the name of the district or commune and the second, in parentheses, is the name of the seat (this name is not always enclosed in parentheses). The old name of the populated point might also be enclosed in parentheses. Therefore, the specialist who wishes to determine the name of the administrative center must supplement the map with other informational resources.

This is the reason for considerable differences in Russian translations of Chinese place names. The following sets of names can be encountered in various publications: Girin and Tszilin', Kanton and Guanchzhou, Bayse and Bose, Kul'dzha and Inin, Chushul and Tsyuyshuy, Sisyan' and Shesyan', Tyan'an'myn' and Tyan'an'men', Kayfyn and Kayfen, Dan'syan' and Shan'syan', Gonkong and Syangan, etc. Sometimes the reader does not even know that these are different names for the same places.

The publication of the official "Dictionary of Chinese Place Names" will standardize the spelling of Chinese place names in various Soviet publications. The dictionary will contain more than 10,000 of the most commonly used Chinese place names. The entries will include:

The names of first, second and third-class administrative units--that is, the names of provinces, autonomous regions and cities of central jurisdiction; okrugs and autonomous okrugs, regions and urban territories; districts, autonomous districts, communes and autonomous communes;

The names of all administrative centers, cities of provincial and okrug jurisdiction and other large populated points;

The names of populated points located at highway and railroad junctions;

The names of large physical geographic units, geographic and historic territories and some scenic areas in China.

The names in the dictionary are alphabetized according to the Russian alphabet. Each entry will contain:

- 1) the name in Russian,
- 2) the type of unit (mountain, bay, lake, island, province, etc.),
- 3) a brief description of the unit,
- 4) the administrative jurisdiction of the unit,
- 5) the name written in characters,
- 6) the name written in Romanized script.

Russian Transcription of Place Names

Chinese, Mongolian and Tibetan names will be transcribed in the dictionary in accordance with the regulations of the new Instructions on the Russian Transcription of Chinese Place Names (Moscow, Main Administration of Geodesy and Cartography, 1982); Uighur names will be transcribed in accordance with the regulations in the Instructions on the Russian Transcription of Place Names in the Xinjiang-Uighur Autonomous Region of the PRC (Moscow, Main Administration of Geodesy and Cartography, 1971).

Some places listed in the dictionary will have two names. The names in parentheses might signify:

A variant spelling;

The old place name, traditionally used in Chinese maps;

Chinese names used in ethnic regions of China along with ethnic names;

Russian and European names coined by Russian and foreign researchers and traditionally used in Soviet and foreign maps and scientific literature.

Border territories might also include place names in the languages of neighboring countries in parentheses. For example, the river on the border with Korea will be called Yalutszyan (Amnokkan).

The names of some places will be transcribed in the dictionary in the form traditionally used in Russian literature and maps. For example, Peking and not Beijing, the Yellow Sea and not Huanghai, the Taiwan Strait and not Taiwanhaixia, and the Great Canal and not Dayunhe.

Mongolian, Tibetan, Uighur and other non-Chinese names will generally be transcribed in their ethnic form, which will be determined by the authors on

the basis of new Romanized maps published in the PRC. As we know, maps and atlases with place names designated in characters usually did not transcribe non-Chinese names in their correct ethnic form and many of these names were therefore translated into Russian incorrectly. Chinese geographic terms of one or two syllables will generally be transcribed and written as one word with the basic toponym incorporated: (lake) Tayhu, Shenshan'tszyao (sea), Chzhoushan'dao (island), Penkhuledao (islands), Beyyun'he (canal).

Mongolian and Tibetan place names will be transcribed and written with a hyphen: (lake) Tsagan-Nur, Mayum-La (pass).

Uighur place names with no suffix will be transcribed and written as one word with the basic toponym incorporated: Kuruktag (range), Uzunbulak (spring).

Uighur place names will be translated if they do include the suffix i (y) or si (sy): Manas koli--Lake Manas, Urumchi der'yasi--Urumchi River.

Many of the non-Chinese names on Romanized maps published in the PRC are accompanied by only Chinese geographic terms. In this case the Chinese terms will be translated in the following manner: Tarim Ne--Tarim River, Kongur Shan--Mount Kongur, Mu Us Shamo--Mu-Us Desert.

In China's national regions many places have Chinese names in addition to their ethnic names. In these cases the dictionary will first give the ethnic name and then the Chinese name in parentheses: Kul'dzha (Inin), Chuguchak (Tachen), Nagchu (Heihe), Dardo (Kandin), Eren-Khoto (Erlyan').

Place names made up of components of different languages (Chinese and Mongolian, Chinese and Tibetan, etc.) will be written in Russian with a hyphen and capital letters: Dun-Udzhimchin-Tsi, Bey-Khulsan-Nur, Ulan-Khua, Chumar-Heyan', Shan-Gongma, Tarim-Bachan, Da-Khingian-Lin.

An extensive system of cross references will be used in the dictionary: from obsolete names, existing variant spellings, ethnic forms distorted by transcription in character form, etc. For example:

Kyaochao, bay, see Tszyaochzhouvan', bay; Dayren, see Dalyan' (Dal'niy); Bayse, see Bose; An'yemachen, mountain, see Machen-Gangri, mountain; Machzha, see Mazar; Keyankershan', mountain, see K'yangkar, mountain.

Romanized Transcription of Place Names

The Romanized spelling of Chinese names in the dictionary will be based on the phonetic pinyin alphabet approved by the NPC in 1958 and instituted in 1979 as the standard for the transcription of Chinese place names and personal names in foreign language publications published in China. Mongolian, Tibetan and Uighur names will be written in a special Romanized script developed in China and based on the Chinese phonetic pinyin alphabet. In contrast to pinyin, however, the letters j, q, x, z and zh signify other sounds in this Romanized system. According to the Chinese Romanized script they are written: j--tsz ('), q--ts ('), x--s ('), z--tsz, zh--chzh; in

In Uighur Romanized script the letters j, q, x and z are transcribed dzh, ch, shch and z; in Romanized Mongolian and Tibetan the letters j, q, x and z are transcribed dzh, ch, sh and dz; the zh combination is written dzh in Romanized Tibetan script.

In several cases the Russian spelling of Chinese and non-Chinese names will differ from their Romanized spelling. This will occur when the traditional form is used in Russian and the correct ethnic form is used in the Romanized spelling. For example: Peking and Beijing, Kul'dzha and Culja, Chuguchak and Qoqek.

Chinese, Mongolian and Tibetan place names in Romanized script will be separated from the basic toponym and both elements will be capitalized: Taihang Shan, Leizhou Bandao, Dabsan Nur, Narin Gol, Nam Co, Mayum La.

Uighur place names will be combined with the basic toponym: Aksu, Aqqikkol, Kuruktag.

The dictionary will include an index of Chinese place names in Romanized script with their Russian equivalents.

For the more convenient use of the index, it will be preceded by a table of the Romanized letters used in China for the transcription of Chinese, Mongolian, Tibetan and Uighur names and their equivalents.

The dictionary will also include five appendices and a detailed map of China.

This is the first dictionary of its kind to be published in our country.

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TWELFTH CONGRESS OF CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 4, Oct-Dec 82 pp 118-121

[Text]

The 12th Congress of the Communist Party of China, attended by 1,545 delegates, was held in Peking from September 1 to 11, 1982. Its agenda included the report of the CPC Central Committee, the adoption of the Chinese Communist Party's new Constitution, the report on the work of the CPC Central Disciplinary Commission and also elections to the leading CPC bodies.

Deng Xiaoping, Vice-Chairman of the CPC Central Committee, addressed the Congress with a brief opening speech. He pointed out that the present Congress was the most important forum in the history of the CPC since the 7th Party Congress.

Deng Xiaoping formulated three basic tasks "facing the Chinese people in the 1980s"—"to intensify socialist modernisation, to struggle for the unification of the homeland, including the recovery of Taiwan, and to struggle against hegemonism to preserve peace throughout the world". Economic development, he pointed out, underpins the three aforementioned tasks because it is the "basis for the solution of China's external and internal problems".

The Congress also heard the report of the CPC Central Committee made by Hu Yaobang, Chairman of the CPC Central Committee. He characterised the period since the "counterrevolutionary grouping" of Jiang Qing was defeated in October 1976 and especially since the Third Plenary Meeting of the CPC Central Committee of the 11th convocation (December 1978) as a period of a "great historical change".

The speaker pointed out that during that turning-point period "the onerous many-year shackles of dogmatism and personality cult in the field of ideology were broken", an end was put to "prolonged social troubles", "the apparatus of the Party and Government officials of all levels was gradually readjusted, regulated and strengthened", and "Party and Government work" was focused on the "implementation of socialist modernisation", with economic development being pivotal to it. During that period, he said, "leftist mistakes in the economic activities began to be eliminated".

He said that great efforts had been made to build up a modernised regular army. "The road we have traversed," he went on to say, "was far from plain sailing, and the ten years of internal troubles have left the Party and the country with exceptionally deep wounds". "The leftist mi-

stakes of the cultural revolution period and of that preceding it," he pointed out, "had deep-going and far-reaching effect. They have caused quite serious damage." He urged "along with the profound denunciation and criticism of the two counterrevolutionary groupings of Lin Biao and Jiang Qing... completely to eradicate leftist mistakes of the cultural revolution and the preceding period".

The CPC Central Committee, the report continued, "analysed and criticised the years-long leftist mistakes" and also the "mistakes made by Mao Zedong in the last years of his life", reestablished the "true image of the thought of Mao Zedong" and determined "Mao Zedong's place in history".

The speaker emphasised the need to persistently put into effect the course towards "regulating, transforming, readjusting and increasing" while implementing the 6th Five-Year Plan (1981-1985) and carrying out the technological reconstruction of the enterprises on a large scale and gradually reorganising the economic management system while implementing the 7th Five-Year Plan (1986-1990).

The report went on to say that special attention would be paid to some "problems of principle" in economic development. Above all, it was a matter of concentrating resources on fulfilling key projects and improving economic indices with the aim of speedily raising the national income.

It was stated that the development of foreign ties and the expansion of technological and economic exchanges with foreign countries on the basis of equality and mutual advantage constituted China's unchanged strategic line. Trade with other countries should be expanded in every way, and foreign capital that could be attracted should be made utmost use of in construction. At the same time Hu Yaobang urged "to take guard against and to cut short the baneful influence of bourgeois ideology and to oppose any admiration for things foreign".

Speaking about prospects for China's economic development in general, the Chairman of the CPC Central Committee said that in the coming 20 years the country would strive to quadruple its annual industrial and agricultural output. "The attainment of this goal," he went on to say, "would place China in the front rank of the world in terms of national income and gross output of the main types of industrial and agricultural products, while the national economy in general would progress immensely in the course of modernisation, earnings of the urban and rural population would go up by 100 and even more per cent, and the material and cultural standards of our people's life would be world average. Though per capita income will remain relatively low by that time, economic and defence power will have increased considerably, as compared with the present level."

Special attention was paid to the draft of the new constitution, which contains many key ideas worked out "in the course of developing socialist democracy since the third plenary meeting of the CPC Central Committee".

As far as class struggle was concerned, it was pointed out that, after the class of exploiters was abolished as such, most of the antagonisms in Chinese society were no longer of class nature and hence class struggle ceased to be the main conflict in social life. The declaration and implementation of the principle "class struggle is the key link" were recognised erroneous.

Dealing with the draft of the revised Constitution of the CPC, which was proposed for the consideration by the 12th Party Congress, Hu Yao-

bang said that "many cardinal changes have been introduced" in it and "leftist mistakes done away with".

The new Constitution laid "more rigorous ideological, political and organisational demands" on the party members and the party cadres, as compared with the previous Constitutions of the CPC.

Hu Yaobang pointed out that the draft new Constitution "directly and unambiguously" states that the party "forbids all forms of personality cult". The draft contains many new ideas about improving central and local organisations, introducing stricter party discipline, and strengthening the bodies of party control and the primary party organisations.

The new CPC Constitution abolishes the post of the CC CPC Chairman and says that there will be "only the General Secretary, whose duties will be to convene the sittings of the Political Bureau and its Standing Committee and to exercise leadership of the activities of the Secretariat". The central and provincial commissions of advisers are to be set up. "Within the framework established by the party Constitution, party Congresses at corresponding levels will elect discipline inspection commissions."

When describing the situation in the CPC, Hu Yaobang confessed that "the pernicious influence of internal stormy upheavals in the course of ten years had not been eliminated" so far and that "the baneful influence of the ideology of the exploiter class had somewhat increased in the new circumstances". The task was set of "rectifying the style of party work", the leading bodies were to be strengthened and "all party members were to be reregistered", as a result of which "those not meeting the demands laid on the party members would be expelled from the party or asked to leave it."

The report contained a foreign-policy chapter, in which the Chairman of the CPC Central Committee said that "China would follow independent foreign policy". He did not exclude the possibility of "Sino-Soviet relations moving towards normalisation". Much space was given in the report to substantiating the thesis that China "was not after hegemony" in its international policy but adhered to ensuring and safeguarding peace throughout the world.

The report conveyed hopes for further development of Sino-Japanese and Sino-American relations and voiced concern over the attempts by some forces in Japan to revive Japanese militarism. It was pointed out that "a cloud still hangs" over Sino-US relations because of American policy of treating Taiwan as "an independent state formation".

The report stressed China's affiliation with the "Third World" countries and voiced readiness to conduct jointly with those countries "resolute struggle against imperialism, hegemonism and colonialism".

The Plenary Meeting held under the chairmanship of Hu Yaobang on September 10, passed a resolution on the report of the CPC Central Committee and a resolution on endorsing the new CPC Constitution.

The resolution on the report to the Congress recognised "the line, course and political precepts worked out by the Central Committee since the 3rd Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee as correct". The Congress declared that the programme and some political precepts, "aiming at creating a new situation at all the fronts of socialist modernisation" should form the basis of the Party's entire work in the future.

The new Constitution, which takes effect since the day of its adoption, the resolution on the Constitution pointed out, recorded, among other things, changes in the structure of the central bodies and local organisations of the CPC.

The policy-making chapter of the new Constitution said "in its activities the Party is guided by Marxism-Leninism and the thought of Mao Zedong".

The Plenary Meeting of the Congress on September 10 also elected members of the CPC Central Committee and the Central Advisory Commission. 210 CC CPC members and 172 Central Advisory Commission members were elected. The 12th CPC Congress closed its work on September 11. The closing session of the Congress passed a resolution on the report about the work of the Central Discipline Inspection Commission and also elected 138 Alternate Members of the CPC Central Committee and 132 members of the Central Discipline Inspection Commission. The first Plenary Meeting of the CPC Central Committee of the 12th convocation was held on September 12, which elected the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee consisting of 25 members and three Alternate Members, and the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee consisting of Hu Yaobang, Ye Jiaying, Deng Xiaoping, Zhao Ziyang, Li Xiannian, and Chen Yun. Hu Yaobang was elected General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee. The Plenary Meeting formed the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee and appointed Deng Xiaoping Chairman of the Military Council of the CPC Central Committee.

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U.S. BOOK ON JAPANESE, KOREAN SECURITY PROBLEMS REVIEWED

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 4, Oct-Dec 82 pp 122-124

[Review by V. I. Osich of the book "Asian Security in the 1980's. Problems and Policies for a Time of Transition", edited by Richard H. Solomon, Cambridge, 1980, 324 pages: "U.S. Plans in Asia in the 1980's"]

[Text] A group of eminent US political scientists, experts on Asian problems consisting of Richard H. Solomon, Director of Rand Corporation's research programme on international security policy; Admiral N. Gayler, ex-Commander-in-Chief, US Pacific Forces; R. Sneider, former US Ambassador to South Korea, currently a consultant on Asian affairs at Columbia University; P. Langer, official of the Rand Corporation specialising in the analysis of Asian policy issues, and a number of others have attempted to analyse the development of international situation in Asia in the 1980s and to define the policy of the USA, Japan and China on the Asian continent. The book that is the result of their efforts was edited by Richard H. Solomon, and deals with Asian security in the 1980s.

This work claims to provide an allround analysis of military-strategic, economic, political and other factors and to show their influence on the Asian policy of Washington for the current decade. The apologists for the imperialist interests of the United States are trying to prove that in the 1980s, they will be faced with serious problems on the Asian continent as a result of the "global Soviet challenge" (p. 4) to which America, its allies and friends must respond effectively.

The authors of the book admit that the defeat of the USA in Indochina and the further consolidation of the progressive forces in Asia, expressed first of all in the formation of a united socialist Vietnam as well as the victory of the people's revolutions in Kampuchea and Laos, the victory of the April revolution in Afghanistan, and the collapse of the Shah's regime in Iran have seriously jeopardised the interests of US

imperialism in Asia. Hence the conclusion that in the 1980s, Washington ought to consolidate its positions in Asia, paying close attention to its relations with China, Japan, South Korea and the ASEAN countries, for

in the opinion of the book's authors, the success or failure of the US Asian policy will, to a great extent, depend on the nature of its relations with these states.

The authors of the book do not conceal their concern over the probable change in the Asian situation as a result of a possible "reduction in Sino-Soviet tensions" (p. 10). This is exactly what the US strategists, the most reactionary circles of the US ruling class, fear most.

Passing over to the evaluation of the role played by the Japanese factor in the US Asian policy in the current decade, the authors point to the necessity for Japan to take a more active role in Asian affairs and call on it "to enlarge contribution to their joint national security effort" (p. 88). The intensification of the role played by Tokyo in Asia is viewed by the US scholars as a result of the further consolidation of the US-Japanese coalition. P. Langer believes that "we [Americans.—V. O.] can expect a qualitative strengthening of Japan's self-defence capacity, greater Japanese efforts toward more effective defense cooperation with the United States" (p. 88). The work provides a detailed foundation for the thesis on the necessity of the rearmament of Japan and its transformation into a powerful military state. In the chapter "Outlook for the 1980s", P. Langer writes, "Even if the Japanese should devote no more than 1 per cent of their GNP to a continuing defense buildup, they will possess a highly sophisticated military establishment by the 1980s, making Japan one of the world's larger military powers in terms of defence capacity" (p. 88). These forecasts are corroborated by the present state of Japan's military capacity. The development of a new programme of modernisation and buildup of the "self-defence forces" for 1983-1987 has been completed. According to S. Ito, head of the Defence Agency, priority in martial matters will be attached to the buildup of the navy and the air force. The

new programme will cost 16,400 billion yen.

The United States is constantly bringing pressure to bear on the ruling circles of Japan, trying to pass on to it the lion's share of military commitments in the Asian region. As I. Nagai, Professor of the Tokyo

Institute of Technology wrote, US efforts to force Japan to increase its military budget are aimed, first, at seeing that Japan represents a military threat to the Soviet Union; second, that it open its market for the purchase of American arms still wider; and third, such a step will reduce the competitiveness of Japanese goods.¹

The conclusion reached by the Japanese professor is similar to the views of the authors of the book under review. P. Langer writes in this connection: "The enlargement and modernisation of Japan's defense programmes will inevitably lead to some extension of the country's defense perimeter" (p. 88). It is common knowledge that the May 1981 meeting of Reagan and Suzuki was crowned with an agreement to the effect that Japan would patrol the large area of the Pacific west of Guam and north of the Philippines. And, last January at the session of the Japanese-US consultative commission on the "security treaty", a decision was taken to study possible joint actions in case of "extraordinary circumstances" in the Far East. Nevertheless, the USA is not satisfied with the rate of Tokyo's involvement in the sphere of military commitments in Asia and in the Pacific. US Ambassador Mansfield is demanding outright that the Japanese ought to, the Japanese can, and the Japanese will do more.²

The examination of the problem of the intensification of the military and political role of Japan in Asian affairs is linked by the authors with the US military presence on the continent, and the higher efficiency of the Japanese-American "security treaty". Admiral N. Gayler points out: "The most fundamental leverage in regional security lies in control of the sea and air lines of communication" (p. 65). The admiral suggests that such a control should be continued from the US naval and airforce bases in Japan, South Korea and the Philippines. But it is common knowledge that in Japan alone, there are more than 140 US military bases and 46,000 US servicemen.³ The extension of the military cooperation between Washington and Tokyo will make Japan a

direct accomplice of American gambles in Asia.

Considerable space in the book is devoted to the examination of problems of regional security from the point of view of the interests of the USA in Asia. In the second part of the book entitled "Regional Conflicts and Security Perspectives", special stress is laid on the situation in the Korean Peninsula. Japanese scholar T. Kubo and former US Ambassador to Seoul R. Snider practically deny the possibility of a peaceful solution of the Korean problem in the interests of the population of North and South Korea. The authors state, for instance, that "the enduring military confrontation between North and South Korea ... will likewise not disappear in the 1980s" (p. 12). That is, they forecast the insolubility of the Korean problem. And if this is so, proper measures are needed to preserve the status quo on the peninsula. T. Kubo believes that a "security system" formed by the USA, Japan and South Korea should serve as a guarantee of peace in the region (p. 99).

Examining the military and strategic situation in South Korea, the Japanese professor attempts to substantiate the thesis of the necessity of joint support from the USA and Japan for the pro-imperialist Seoul regime. The point of view of T. Kubo as regards South Korea is identical with the opinion of Henry Kissinger who stated in the 1970s that stability and security of South Korea has a decisive importance for security in East Asia.⁴ In this connection R. Snider draws the conclusion that the US military presence in Northeast Asia [including South Korea.—V. O.] remains vital (p. 286). He calls for greater American interference in Korean affairs. Today the United States has nearly 40 military bases and almost 40,000 servicemen in South Korea. The US army stationed in South Korea has nuclear weapons (over 700 nuclear charges).⁵ Annually joint manoeuvres are held in the South, and the joint Washington-Seoul command is functioning.

The book states that Carter's plan for a partial withdrawal of US troops from South Korea which, as we know, remained on paper, was a reckless move. In R. Snider's opinion, the realisation of such a plan

¹ See *Asahi*, Nov. 17, 1981.

² *US News and World Report*, Nov. 16, 1981, p. 44.

³ *International Affairs*, No. 11, 1977. (in Russian).

⁴ *New York Times*, Aug. 20, 1974.

⁵ See *Nodon sinmun*, March 20, 1981.

would tip the military balance in Korea and, what is more important, would further the "process of erosion of Asian confidence in the US security commitment" (p. 132).

The Reagan Administration has stopped any talk of withdrawing US troops from the South of the Korean Peninsula and has taken steps to further consolidate the unpopular Seoul regime. In the course of the visit of Chon Du Khvan to Washington in February 1981, the US President assured him that the United States did not plan to withdraw its land forces from the Korean Peninsula and confirmed that the USA would supply Seoul with fresh arms and technology to develop the military industry.⁶ Using the rather battered thesis of the "threat from the North", the United States gives every encouragement to Seoul's military ambitions, thus maintaining the hotbed of tension in Korea.

Examining the stand of Japan on the Korean problem, the authors emphasise the exceptional role of Tokyo for the existence of the South Korean regime. And they point out, at least three circumstances: first, the importance of Japan for the support of the American troops stationed in South Korea; second, Japan's great possibilities as regards giving support to the South Korean forces from the rear in case of military conflict on the peninsula; third, Japanese economic aid to Seoul as a guarantee of South Korea's security (p. 132). It is simultaneously stressed that South Korea is vitally necessary for the security of Japan itself.

"Of special importance to us," the Japanese Premier Suzuki pointed out, "are the relations with South Korea, which is in direct proximity to Japan." While the military and political aspects of these relations are covered in great detail in the book under review, the economic problems are not properly dealt with. Moreover, they are a major element of Tokyo's Korean policy. The Japanese capital has deeply penetrated the economy of South Korea. In 1980, Japanese private credits alone accounted for nearly 30 per cent (\$393.2 million) of all the commercial loans received by Seoul from abroad.⁷ Intensive talks are under

way now on granting South Korea new Japanese subsidies. The South Korean administration demands no more no less than \$6 billion. Taking into account the fact that the South spends 6 per cent of its GNP for military purposes, it is obvious in which direction the Seoul regime will channel the money it is begging from Tokyo. At the same time, South Korea, as the authors of the book under review stress, will be strengthened in the military and economic respect not just at the expense of Washington and Tokyo but due to its own efforts, too. R. Sneider is positive that in the course of the 1980s, the South Koreans will greatly strengthen their military potential (p. 127). But even now Seoul possesses significant military forces. Its army is one of the largest in Asia: the total numerical strength of the armed forces is 635,000 men, including land forces of 560,000 men; a navy of 25,000 with seven destroyers, an airforce of 30,000 men with 335 planes and over 1 million reservists.⁸ The authors believe Seoul is capable of mastering the production of nuclear weapons. The conclusion of the former American ambassador is laconic enough, asserting that in the coming decade, the South will gain military superiority over the North (p. 128).

Summing up this examination of the most important problems in the work under review, it should be pointed out that its authors' attempt to show possible developments in the situation in Asia in the 1980s from the positions of anti-communism and reactionary bourgeois political thought. Analysing Washington's Asian policy they proceed first of all from the necessity of a "theoretical" substantiation of the aggressive foreign policy course of the USA and its allies aimed at preventing the erosion of the positions of imperialism in Asia and the strengthening of progressive tendencies on the continent. But such a policy does not take into account present-day realities and runs counter to the objective processes of socio-economic development in Asia and the whole world; therefore, it is naturally doomed to failure.

V. OSICH

⁶ See *Korea Herald*, Feb. 4, 1981.

⁷ See *Korea Annual 1981*, Seoul, 1981, p. 164.

⁸ See *Asia 1978 Yearbook; Far Eastern Economic Review*.

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BOOK ON JAPANESE ECONOMIC PENETRATION IN AFRICA REVIEWED

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[Review by Yu. Ye. Bugayev of book "Yaponiya i Afrika (politicheskiye i ekonomicheskkiye otnosheniya)" [Japan and Africa (Political and Economic Relations)] by I. V. Volkova, Moscow, Mysl', 1981, 218 pages]

[Text] It has become obvious in the early 1980s that the conditions in Japan which determined its rapid economic development during the first postwar decades: cheap manpower, relatively low cost of imported raw materials and fuel, low-priced foreign technology, emphasis on new kinds of products in demand on the world market, have mostly lost their significance.

The aggravation of the class struggle, which has entailed raising wages to the level of West European countries, sharp price rises for oil, ores and other imported raw materials—all these factors have had a detrimental effect on the development of Japan's economy and foreign trade.

The dependence of the Japanese economy on external factors which became especially pronounced as a result of the oil crises of 1970s forced Japan to promote the priority development of science-intensive production, to limit the production of articles demanding much power and materials, and to transfer the production processes (first of all those which consumed much power and greatly polluted the environment) outside the country to provide more reliably for its needs in raw materials, to take advantage of cheap manpower and, if possible, to evade customs barriers. The tendency to diversify foreign investments became pronounced, too. The crises of 1970s showed how risky it was to play one's only trump.

In this situation, the eyes of Japanese monopolies turned to Africa in particular. I. V. Volkova's book *Japan and Africa* is devoted to the relations of Japan with the countries of that continent. With some exceptions, the questions of Japan's penetration into Africa have not been properly ex-

amined in Soviet scholarly books, so the book under review, which centres its attention on the study of the various aspects of the foreign policy strategy and economic expansion of Japanese imperialism on the African continent, is of no mean interest.

At the present time, the share of the African countries in world's mining of 10 out of 16 major metals and non-metal minerals varies from 22 to 95 per cent. Africa is second to none in the reserves of gold, chromites, manganese and other ores in the non-socialist world and it is third in oil-extraction there. All that in combination with the vast reserves of cheap labour, the untouched domestic market, as the author points out, "is conducive to the enhancement of the role of Africa in the production capacities of world capitalism" (p. 3). The Japanese monopolies, which are ever more resolutely competing with Britain and France, as well as the USA and the FRG, for sources of raw materials and markets, have taken note of this.

Volkova singles out three main tasks which Japan's foreign political strategy is called upon to solve: "to ensure the stable spheres of capital investment and sources of raw materials and fuel, to find ways and means of compensating for imports by exports of manufactured goods, and exploit cheap labour abroad" (p. 7).

The ruling circles of Japan are trying to find the solution to these tasks along the path of "many-sided" or "multi-level" diplomacy, the essence of which is to establish balanced relations in the fields of economy, trade and culture with the industrialised capitalist countries, developing and socialist states.

The enhancement of the role played by the developing countries in Japan's international relations is considered by the author to be one of the major trends in its "diversified diplomacy". "In 1977 these countries accounted for 65.8 per cent of Japanese imports of raw materials, fuel and semi-finished goods, including 84.6 per cent of oil and other kinds of mineral fuel, 42 per cent of all industrial raw materials, 46.2 per cent of all metals and 49.6 per cent of all textile semi-finished goods. In the future,

this dependence will grow even more, for the raw material supply is a key problem of the further economic development of Japan", Volkova concludes (p. 8), and not without reason.

An instrument of Japan's political manoeuvring on the African continent is "economic diplomacy" or diplomacy of "economic co-operation" meeting the principal strategic task of imperialism: to keep the newly-free states within the framework of the capitalist system and to prevent them from embarking on the non-capitalist road of development. To achieve these aims, they use both state "aid" and private investments. Aid to the newly-free states is becoming a major "priority of Japanese economic diplomacy" and is regarded by Japanese ideologists as the only opportunity "to withstand the danger of the socialist countries' economic offensive" (pp. 10-11).

A concrete analysis of Tokyo's course as regards African countries is preceded in the book by a study of the theory of the Japanese policy toward the developing countries in general. Such an approach to the treatment of the subject enables one better to understand the neocolonialist essence of the foreign strategy of the Japanese ruling circles, often concealed by verbiage about "aid" and "equal cooperation".

The works of Morinosuke Kajima, Kuyoshi Kojima, Terutomo Ozawa, Saburo Okita, Akira Onishi, Masao Maruyama and other eminent bourgeois scholars and politicians often closely connected with monopoly capital, despite the diverse approaches to the individual problems, are often united by the aspiration to defend the general strategic interests of imperialism in the developing countries and by concern for the security of interests of Japanese imperialism, first and foremost.

The consolidation of the economic strength of Japan and the desire to enter the international arena as an independent political force have led to the resurrection of nationalist tendencies in the policy of its ruling circles. Theories of historical development invented by Japanese bourgeois scholars and providing theoretical grounds for the "will to power" which, as well-known historian and sociologist Kentaro Hayashi alleges, is "especially pronounced in international relations" (p. 15), serve as the ideological basis of those aspirations.

Japan's attempts to consolidate its position as a leading world power began in the

Far Eastern region in the shape of plans to set up an "Asian-Pacific community", bringing back the old slogan of "Pan-Asianism" with Japan at the head. However, due to the growing role of the African continent in Japan's foreign policy early in the past decade, the Japanese press advanced a new slogan: "From the Asian era of the 1960s to the Asian-African era of the 1970s".¹ And the Japanese monopolies, as Volkova demonstrates, did not waste time bringing this about.

To provide a theoretical basis for their expansion, bourgeois ideologists had to revise the old theoretical tenets. "Japan," the author quotes from Japanese historian Hideo Ota, "shaping its African policy anew, must advance an original theory of the 'third world' which will correspond to the changes in the present-day international situation" (p. 16).

Paying lip-service to "freedom of choice" of ways of economic development, Japanese theorists simultaneously insistently popularise the thesis of Japan's "special mission", which it is called upon to fulfil in the present-day world in view of the "extraordinary qualities" of the nation which has made such a spectacular economic leap. In such a way, the capitalist system, especially its "Japanese version" is idealised as an example for the developing countries. "The originality" of Japanese theories of development of the "third world",—and this becomes crystal-clear upon close examination—boils down, first of all, to the obviously racist emphasis on the fact that the Japanese are a "non-white" nation, allegedly a precondition for the necessity of joint struggle against "white capital". The "special role" of Japan as an intermediary between the countries of Asia and Africa on the one hand, and the USA and Western Europe on the other is also a favourite topic for Tokyo's propaganda, although no one has assigned this role to Japan. Volkova convincingly demonstrates the invalid reasoning of the Japanese economists of the "common destinies" and ways of economic progress since "in fact the industrialisation of Japan, in contrast to that of African countries, was mostly based on domestic capital resources.

¹ *Japan Press*, Feb. 14, 1970.

The share of foreign investments was not large, which enabled Japan to preserve its independence in the development of its economy. Besides, Japan could use the markets of the underdeveloped countries, a chance the newly-free countries lack" (p. 21).

Let us take note of the fact that it would be very useful to make a thorough critical analysis, from a Marxist-Leninist stand, of other theories and models of the apologists of Japanese imperialism mentioned in the book, not confining oneself to a brief outline.

Beside purely economic aspects, the development of relations with the countries of Africa is used by Japan to try and increase its political weight in the UN and other international agencies. Africa is taking an ever more active part in the life of the international community, becoming an ever more important factor influencing the international situation as a whole. This is clearly seen, in particular, in the UN where the result of voting depends, to a large extent, on the positions taken by the African and Asian countries, which are more and more often joined by the Latin American states. It was exactly because of this that in 1974, the conference of Japanese ambassadors in African countries adopted a decision to pay closer attention to the development of both economic and political relations with African states.

The tasks Japan is faced with in Africa insistently demand the formulation of an independent course corresponding to the doctrine of "self-asserting diplomacy", which means a departure from unconditional support of American foreign policy. To follow the American lead undermines Tokyo's own interests in the developing countries in a number of cases. Analysing the results of its former course in the Middle East, which entailed a temporary cessation of oil supplies from Arab countries to Japan, its government has decided not to allow such "political failures" to take place in its relations with African countries rich in natural resources. At every opportunity, they proclaimed from the roof tops "Japan's sincere sympathy for the struggle of the African nations for their independence and economic development" and its readiness "to help these efforts" (p. 32). Convincing examples cited by Volkova (pp. 32-36) demonstrate

the inconsistency of such declarations of Tokyo's ruling circles.

While developing its policy in Africa, Japanese imperialism has made a note of its postwar expansion in Asian countries where it has acquired the reputation of "economic aggressor".

The outburst of anti-Japanese sentiments in Southeast Asia gave impetus to the elaboration of a more flexible course in those regions where Japan's reputation is not too bad yet" (p. 40). But still the author believes that the further penetration of Japan into the African continent will inevitably cause stronger anti-Japanese sentiments among the various strata of the African population. This stems from the colonial structure of trade, the small volume and "strings attached to aid", the unwillingness of monopolies to invest capital in branches of the national economy important to African states, as well as Japan's solidarity with the position of the West concerning problems of principle with respect to prospects for the development of Africa.

Japanese imperialism's expansion in Africa causes the aggravation of competition between the other leading imperialist states "both, former mother countries—Britain, France, Belgium and Portugal—which have deeply penetrated the economies of the African states, and the USA and the FRG who came to the continent comparatively recently, but have a more stable financial basis than Japan for the development of their expansion" (pp. 43-44). Japan is trying, and as the monograph shows, rather successfully, to weaken the "grip" of competition, using the principle of collective neo-colonialism, meaning the setting up of joint enterprises with West European and American capital in various countries of the continent. Japan uses the close economic ties of the EEC members with the African countries to expand its penetration, and the countries of Western Europe consolidate their own influence with the help of Japanese capital.

Oriental experts will, no doubt, be interested in the regional policy of Japan in Africa examined in great detail in the monograph (special attention is paid to the countries of North Africa; in 1977 they received "62 per cent of the total financial and technical 'aid' given by Japan to the continent")

(p. 70). The author examines thoroughly the specific features of the foreign trade relations with the African countries which are characterised by the high rates of trade turnover, a chronic deficit of Africa in mutual trade and its typically colonial structure. The detailed analysis of the forms and dynamics of export of Japanese private capital to Africa (pp. 125-150) convincingly demonstrates the aggressive tactics of Japan's monopolies in the 1970s, carried out "by means of setting up numerous joint companies and increasing export credits" (p. 152). The definite advantage of that section is the abundance of factual material supporting the author's propositions.

The author has good reason for devoting a special chapter to the analysis of Japan's relations with South Africa graphically demonstrating the falsehood and duplicity of Tokyo's African policy. "The essence of this duplicity," the author notes, "boils down to the fact that Japanese monopolies go on actively trading with South Africa while the Tokyo government, in its official policy, condemns racism in all its manifestations and supports the national liberation movement in the South of Africa" (p. 78).

Volkova concludes this work with an ex-

amination of the policy of Japan's "economic cooperation" with the countries of Africa. The author has successfully examined the essence of the programme of "economic cooperation" aimed "not so much at establishing intensively proclaimed equality in economic relations with the newly-free countries of the continent, as at the further consolidation of Japan's positions in their economies" (p. 155). Almost all state "aid" in the form of loans and credits is spent on the development of the infrastructure, "thus paving the way for more intensive expansion of private capitals and greater imports of African raw materials to Japan" (p. 160).

Volkova's book gives a clear idea of the present-day foreign policy and economic strategy of Japan in Africa. The author convincingly exposes the falsehood of the "disinterestedness" propagated by Tokyo as regards the liberated countries of Africa and shows that Tokyo's African course is based on the "pursuance of old neocolonialist policies with new, more flexible methods and in a better concealed form" (p. 188). Summing up her study, Volkova makes a well-founded conclusion that "Japan remains an enemy in the struggle of African nations for real political and economic liberation from imperialist exploitation" (p. 190).

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1981 JAPANESE SECURITY YEARBOOK'S MILITARY EMPHASIS CRITICIZED

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[Review by V. N. Bunin of book "Asian Security, 1981" published by Research Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS), printed by Nikkei Business Publishing Co., Ltd., Tokyo, 1981, 214 pages: "The Evolution of Japanese Militarism"]

[Text]

The third Yearbook of the Japanese Research Institute for Peace and Security, *Asian Security, 1981*, has come off the

press. Among other things, it deals at length with the military buildup in Japan whose ruling quarters have been trying of late to regard military force as the most important means in achieving their foreign policy goals. The fact that in the 1981 Yearbook, military matters take up four times more space than in the 1979 Yearbook and almost twice as much as in the 1980 Yearbook demonstrates the growing importance of military aspects in Japan's domestic and foreign policies.

The collection examines military matters, starting with a historical survey of the emergence and development of the Japanese armed forces which are still camouflaged as "Self-Defence Force", though this term has long since lost its original meaning, inasmuch as in character, combat equipment

and mission, the so-called "Self-Defence Force" are equal to a modern army, with functions far exceeding purely defensive needs. The collection expounds at length the evolution of Japan's military policy, the attitude of the opposition parties to the Japanese army and to the Treaty on Mutual Cooperation and the Guarantee of Security ("Security Treaty") with the USA signed in 1960 for a term of ten years (since 1970, the Treaty is automatically prolonged annually).

The conceptual foundation of the military buildup in Japan is formed by the Fundamental Course of National Defence, adopted on May 20, 1957, which served as a prototype of Japanese military doctrine, and the General Programme for National Defence, adopted on October 29, 1976, which summarised all the main features of Japanese military and political concepts. Till the end of the 1970s, their essence consisted in limited armament of a defensive nature and constant strengthening and further development of the military alliance with the USA.

In recent years, Washington's military-political leadership has been persistently and resolutely demanding that Japan increase its military potential and raise military allocations considerably to the level of the NATO countries. The Pentagon has long held that Japan's military expenditures are insignificant as compared with its economic might. Therefore, the US "brass hats" believe that Japan is playing the role of a "stowaway" within the context of the US security system (p. 152).

The Carter Administration began pressuring Japan to increase its military might. Then US Secretary of Defence Harold Brown voiced US demands in January 1980 to Japanese Premier Masayoshi Ohira. In March and May of the same year, Washington demanded that Tokyo shorten by one year the fulfilment of the five-year plan for the strengthening and developing of the "Self-Defence Force" for 1980-1984, so that Japan military allocations would amount to one per cent of the country's GNP (p. 153).

In 1981, Tokyo boosted its military allocations by only 7.6 per cent instead of the 11.9 per cent expected by Washington, and, according to the compilers of the

Yearbook, the Pentagon was highly disappointed. Under the Reagan Administration, the pressure brought to bear on Japan became even stronger. At the summit meeting in May 1981 and particularly at the regular sitting of the Japanese-US council on the fulfilment of the "Security Treaty", Pentagon spokesmen demanded that Japan reconsider its military programme because it was allegedly meant exclusively for peace time without taking account of recent developments in the international situation.¹

The compilers of *Asian Security, 1981*, devote much attention to the debates on the defence problems under way in Japan. They seek to impose on readers an unscientific interpretation of "military potential". According to them, the "Self-Defence Force" cannot be regarded as having military potential because it is not "equipped with weapons designed exclusively to destroy foreign territory" such as missiles of medium and intermediate range, intercontinental ballistic missiles, atomic submarines, aircraft carriers, long-range bombers, and fighter-bombers (p. 156).

At the same time, they maintain that the Japanese Constitution allows the country to possess tactical nuclear weapons, and chemical and bacteriological means of warfare because, in their opinion, these types of weapons do not fall into the category of military potential and are meant only for self-defence. As an argument, the March 1978 statement by Premier Fukuda to the effect that "Japan could possess any type of weapon if it falls within the necessary minimum for self-defence purposes, even if it means nuclear or bacteriological weapons" (p. 156) is cited. As for the "minimum" indispensable for defence, Japanese political scientists interpret this on a rather broad scale. In their opinion, the limits of Japan's defensive capabilities are relative: they can change depending on the international situation, the level of military technology, and other factors. Such an arbitrary interpretation of military potential and self-defence capability enables Japanese military-political quarters to sidestep prohibitions provided for by Article 9 of the Constitution and to

¹ *Japan Times*, June 17, 1981.

equip the army with all types of modern weaponry, including offensive armaments.

The book traces the dynamics of the Japanese army's growth in the course of the implementation of the four programmes for strengthening and developing the "Self-Defence Force", the so-called self-defence plans, the first of which was elaborated in 1957. The main objective of that plan was to deploy Japan's ground forces to fill the vacuum which took shape after the withdrawal of US ground forces and the formation of the backbone of the Navy and Air Force. At that time, the USA supplied the Japanese army with the basic types of weaponry. By the completion of the first plan in 1961, the ground forces already numbered 170,000 officers and men; the displacement of ships in the Navy amounted to 112 thousand tons; and the Air Force received 1,113 planes.

The objective of the second defence plan (1962-1966) was to create armed forces capable of rebuffing a small-scale aggression, while Japan was guaranteed a "nuclear umbrella" within the framework of the Japanese-US security system. In accordance with the plan, the first anti-aircraft missiles Hawk and Nike, were deployed in Japan, and the building of the Bage anti-aircraft defence system was completed (p. 169).

In November 1966, the third defence plan (1967-1971) was adopted, and a fabulous sum—2340 billion yen—was earmarked for its implementation. The plan provided for the equipment of the "Self-Defence Force" with Japanese-made armaments, the production of which was sufficient to meet ninety per cent of the army's needs. After the completion of the fourth defence plan (1972-1976), the National Defence Agency abandoned its five-year programmes and began elaborating annual plans. The authors explained that the avalanche-like 'growth of military expenditures was a reason for the changes in planning: due to the large sums for the military budget for the five-year period, the National Defence Agency was having difficulties in obtaining the necessary funds from the government. According to Japanese statistics, military spending doubled every five years, whereas the military budget for the 1981 fiscal year alone exceeded the total

sum of the third defence plan, and amounted to 2399.6 billion yen.²

In 1977-1979, the building of the "Self-Defence Force" was carried out on the basis of annual plans. Such planning, however, was not to the liking of military-industrial quarters, because the lack of perspective made it difficult to distribute military orders in industry. On the insistence of the Defence Production Committee of the Federation of Economic Organisations of Japan (Keidanren), the National Defence Agency returned to the principle of five-year planning of military buildup starting in 1980.³

In March 1981 the "Self-Defence Force" had about 250,000 officers and men and 13 divisions, including one armoured division. The equipment of the "Self-Defence Force" was as follows: 850 tanks, 540 armoured carriers, 890 field guns, 1,860 mortars, 1,470 recoilless guns, 70 rocket-throwers: 350 communication, transport and reconnaissance planes (ground forces); 48 destroyers, 14 submarines, 40 mine-sweepers, 8 landing ships, 250 anti-submarine planes and helicopters (the Navy); 333 fighter-interceptors, 70 support fighters, 10 reconnaissance planes, and 40 transport planes (the Air Force) (p. 162).⁴

The fifth five-year plan for strengthening and developing the "Self-Defence Force" for 1980-1984 was elaborated in July 1979 (to lead public opinion astray, the National Defence Agency referred to it as "medium-range estimates" which, as an internal document, was not subject to approval by the National Defence Council). The plan expounds a programme providing for the modernisation of the Japanese Armed Forces, primarily the Navy and Air Defence. It envisages spending 2,800 billion yen to purchase new armaments, including 300 M-74 tanks, 140 203- and 155-mm self-propelled howitzers, 16 anti-submarine destroyers (by 1984 their number will reach 58, 35 of them equipped with rockets), five diesel submarines, 37 anti-submarine patrol

² *Defence of Japan*, Tokyo, 1981, p. 12.

³ *Yearbook on the Armaments of Self-Defence Force, 1980*, Tokyo, 1980, p. 480 (in Japanese).

⁴ See *Defence of Japan*, p. 9.

planes, 77 F-15 interceptors, and 13 direct support fighters.

In order to substantiate the military buildup, the authors of the report spare no effort to prove that the "Self-Defence Force" still does not meet the tasks it is facing. A large section in the book deals with weak points in the command system, organisational structure, and armaments of the "Self-Defence Force". The authors support those who favour an enhancement of the "Self-Defence Force's" status, and note that Japan's armed forces still lack a Defence Ministry. The National Defence Agency is but a structural subdivision of the Prime Minister's Office and is not an independent body. The rank of the Chief of the Agency is much lower than that of Minister. As a result, all major statements on military issues are usually made by the Foreign Ministry.

The collection emphasises that there is excessive civilian control over the "Self-Defence Force", and an attempt is made to show that this downgrades the role of the military command. It is noted, for example, that the superior of the chiefs of staff of the armed forces (simultaneously their commanders) as well as the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staffs is a civilian—the Administrative Deputy of the Chief of the National Defence Agency (p. 162).

Despite an enormous military budget which was increased by 7.75 per cent in 1982, as compared with 1981, and will amount to 2,600 billion yen, the authors lament over its inadequacy. They point to the uneven distribution of allocations to different branches of the armed services to support their position. The ground forces account for 50 per cent of the military spending, and this correlation has remained unchanged for many years. The ground forces spend a great deal to maintain personnel, and this reduces the budget of the Navy and the Air Force. The book points out that now Washington is drawing Japan's attention to the need for developing the combat capability of the Navy and for improving the quality of the air defence. This is why the National Defence Agency began taking measures to alter the proportion in the military budget in favour of the Navy and the Air Force.

The authors note that in the sphere of

joint operations between the Japanese "Self-Defence Force" and US troops carried out in conformity with the "Guiding Principles of Japanese-US Cooperation in Defence", certain achievements have been attained in recent years. They also favour emergency legislation which would ensure more efficient combat operation of the "Self-Defence Force" in case of war (p. 165).

Giving much attention to the weak points of the "Self-Defence Force", to please Washington, which finances the Research Institute for Peace and Security, Japanese scholars are making every effort to force the government to take immediate measures to eliminate the aforementioned shortcomings in the troops and to increase military allocations considerably to guarantee a boost in military potential in conformity with US demands.

The authors justify the rearmament of Japan presently underway by changes in the domestic and foreign situation. This, in their opinion, demands alterations in Japan's military policy. They attempt to trace the evolution of public opinion in Japan as regards the problems of military buildup and the revision of the Constitution with the purpose of eliminating anti-war Article 9. They note that in 1956, when Hatoyama took office and diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union were restored, only 24 per cent of those polled were in favour of a constitutional amendment, while 42 per cent were against rearmament, and only 37 per cent supported militarisation. After the Liberal Democratic Party won the general election in June 1980, and Japan's ruling quarters embarked on the rearmament of the country, and also as a result of the indoctrination of public opinion, the number of those who favoured a constitutional amendment, according to the authors' data had reached 65 per cent by November 1980.

The authors admit that in spite of the stepped-up demands inside the LDP and by the mass media to amend Constitution, the majority of political leaders from the opposition still consider the Constitution inviolable. They are even against any discussion on the subject, regarding it as dangerous and militaristic (p. 166).

Japanese scholars point out that it is difficult to foresee when any amendments

to the Constitution might be adopted. The major opposition parties—the Socialist Party of Japan and the Communist Party of Japan—are against the “Security Treaty” and regard the existence of the “Self-Defence Force” as unconstitutional. The current alignment of political forces is such that, in spite of the victory at the 1980 election, the Liberal Democratic Party is still far from attaining the two-thirds majority necessary to pass amendments to or revise the Constitution. That is why, in the authors’ opinion, one can hardly expect any substantial increases in the “Self-Defence Force” or an enhancement of its status in the near future (p. 167).

The authors also deal with the concept of “comprehensive national security programme”, which has emerged of late. This concept implies a combination of diplomatic, economic, military and other measures to ensure Japan’s security. Japanese political scientists defend the stand taken by the government and are attempting to assert that the significance of military aspects in the general complex of measures to ensure Japan’s security is decreasing. Apparently, for this reason, the group of experts headed by Director of the Research Institute for Peace and Security Masamichi Inoki, which on the order of the government prepared a report on a complex of provisions for national security (July 1980), devoted so much space to the need for building up the combat might of the “Self-Defence Force” and for strengthening the Japanese-US military and political alliance. *Japan Times* wrote on this score: “In contrast with the lacklustre treatment of the other ingredients of a comprehensive national security programme, Mr. Inoki’s group is articulate and some-

times even bold in its advocacy of greater defence efforts in the narrow sense of the word.”⁵

It is self-evident that the Japanese government, using a wide range of measures under the sign of a “comprehensive national security programme”, is seeking to cover up the true nature of the military preparations afoot in the country to secure national accord on military policy issues, thus facilitating the adoption of political decisions aimed at a tangible buildup of military potential.

The report notes the convergence of viewpoints of the Foreign Ministry and the National Defence Agency of Japan on military matters: Foreign Ministry officials are now of the opinion that Japan should put forth much more military effort to discharge its commitments as a leading country of the capitalist world. They also believe that Japanese-US relations which are the cornerstone of Japanese foreign policy should be consolidated and further developed.

The authors of the Yearbook deliberately gloss over many aspects of Japanese military preparations. However by advocating a military buildup and a considerable increase in the military budget, they actually encourage the nuclear ambitions of some Japanese “hawks”, justifying the course of the Japanese government toward accelerated militarisation, something which is evoking an increasingly negative international response, and favour the further involvement of the Japanese Armed Forces in US global strategy.

V. BUNIN

⁵ *Japan Times*, July 5, 1980.

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BOOK ON SOCIALIZATION OF VIETNAMESE ECONOMY REVIEWED

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[Review by M. Ye. Trigubenko of book "Preobrazovaniye chastnoy promyshlennosti i trgovli vo V'yetname" [The Transformation of Private Industry and Trade in Vietnam] by Ye. P. Glazunov, edited by V. I. Shabalin, Moscow, Nauka, Glavnaya redaktsiya vostochnoy literatury, 1981, 215 pages]

The book under review is the first monograph published in the USSR which deals with a major aspect of building socialism in Vietnam, i. e., the transformation of private industry and trade along socialist lines.

The analysis follows the historical sequence of that process, first in North Vietnam (the Democratic Republic of Vietnam) and then, after reunification and the formation of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, in South Vietnam. Such an approach to the transformation of the private sector enabled the author of the book to show the continuity of the socio-economic policy pursued by the Communist Party of Vietnam and to compare differences and similarities in the social structure of society in the North and South of Vietnam, inasmuch as the period between the two processes of transformation was more than two decades.

The content of the book is broader than its title suggests. It contains a detailed analysis of such basic issues as specific features in the progress of the revolutionary process, the stages, character, and objectives of the Vietnamese national people's democratic revolution, its development into a socialist revolution, and the characteristics of the revolutionary process in the two parts of Vietnam. The book expounds the plan for building socialism and the economic strategy of the transitional period. It shows the role played by the internationalist factor in the revolutionary struggle of the Vietnamese people and in building socialism.

Glazunov notes that the process of development of socialist formation in the SRV mirrors the general regularities characteris-

ing all countries which have begun a radical revolutionary transformation of social relations. Among the factors accelerating this process is the internationalist assistance of the countries of the socialist community directed not only at shaping conditions favourable for establishing the economic foundations of socialism in individual

countries but also ensuring the protection of their gains. Diverse economic, cultural, scientific and technical assistance and assistance in consolidating the country's defence capability is of immense importance in strengthening the positions of socialism in Vietnam, which for more than twenty years repelled imperialist aggression and is now opposing the hegemonic ambitions of the Peking leaders.

While pointing out the features of the SRV's transition to socialism which are common to all socialist countries, the author shows their modification in the specific conditions of a developing country. By the beginning of the transitional period, the positions of the capitalist system in the North were extremely weak, while in the south, capitalism was more developed, especially in trade. However, it was developing under neocolonialism while South Vietnam was becoming a military and political bridgehead of the USA in Indochina. The role of national bourgeoisie was therefore limited. The Chinese capital represented by *huaqiao* and foreign capital held much stronger positions in the South Vietnamese economy.

The complicated aspects of analysing capitalist relations in backward countries consist in working out proper criteria of and a correct approach to the notion "private capitalist structure", and ways of distinguishing it from the private structure. In scholarly publications, the two notions are often confused. Capitalism in backward and especially dependent or enslaved countries is not developing in a "pure" form due to the vestiges of feudalism, precapitalist forms of social relations, insufficient division of labour between industry and agriculture, the prevalence of petty commodity production, and so on. In the course of socialist transformations, the Communist Party of Vietnam succeeded in elaborating a correct class approach based on Marxism-Leninism, and used the experience gained

by the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community.

From the very beginning, transformation occurred alongside the creation, with assistance from the socialist countries, of a socialist sector represented by large enterprises. The strengthening of the positions of the socialist sector in industry and trade created favourable conditions for the transformation of the private capitalist structure.

The military and political situation in Vietnam exerted a certain influence on the course and forms of transformation of the private sector. During the US aggression, the private sector reinforced its positions in the North, especially in trade; on the other hand, the process of transformation of state capitalism from elementary to higher forms, and the elimination of the bourgeoisie as a class accelerated.

The Communist Party of Vietnam took a differentiated approach to various representatives of bourgeoisie. With respect to the national Vietnamese bourgeoisie, the policy of peaceful transformation through different forms of state capitalism and cooperation was pursued. A policy of redemption was pursued with respect to foreign bourgeoisie, while the property and capital of the big compradore bourgeoisie linked with aggressive imperialist quarters were expropriated. At the same time, the bourgeoisie was invited to take part in productive labour, and some of its representatives were offered posts in the management of industrial enterprises. In the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, state capitalism generally assumed the form of the redemption of capital because the capitalists, former owners of enterprises, were unwilling to agree to other forms, mainly due to the unstable economic situation, particularly during the war.

In South Vietnam the expropriation of capital in industry and trade was carried out on a broader scale, inasmuch as the big compradore bourgeoisie had consolidated its positions there. The bourgeoisie in the South, especially the trade bourgeoisie, put up much stronger resistance to the transformations than was the case in the North in the 1950s. It had more stable, firmer ties with foreign monopolies.

The transformation of the trade bourgeois-

ie and the private sector in commerce, and the elimination of trade and usury capital which actually dominated all the private enterprises in Vietnam was the chief difficulty in the transformation of the capitalist structure both in the North and the South of Vietnam. On the whole, this problem has already been successfully solved, although, the existence of a large stratum of peddlers and their stronger position in recent years comprises a reserve for the emergence or, to be more precise, the restoration of the trade bourgeoisie. The book shows the measures taken by the state to check the growth of the private sector in trade.

Though the national bourgeoisie in the South was more numerous than in the North, its positions, the volume of capital and number of hired workers, were also much weaker than the position of the private sector represented by petty artisans and craftsmen. Due to the correct class policy pursued by the Communist Party of Vietnam, the national bourgeoisie participated in the National United Front, was an ally of the working class at different stages of the revolutionary struggle waged by the Vietnamese people, and after the liberation of South Vietnam, began participating in the restoration of the country and rehabilitation of its economy. The Party applied a policy of using, restricting and transforming the Vietnamese bourgeoisie. The transformation of private industry and trade in Vietnam occurred alongside the implementation of the economic policy of the Communist Party of Vietnam, and was in accord with the tasks of the initial stage of the transitional period, the main objectives being the normalisation and development of production with the assistance of all classes and structures, the enhancement of the standard of living, the achievement of a higher level of employment among the able-bodied population, and the ultimate elimination of unemployment.

The process of socialist transformation of the mixed economy in Vietnam is proceeding successfully, but it has not yet been completed. On the whole, the share of the socialist sector in the national income in 1980 was 49.2 per cent, and the gross output of state-owned and mixed state-private enterprises amounted to 70 per cent.

The basic tasks today are as follows: creation of an efficient mechanism of management for the mixed economy, elaboration of a price mechanism and taxation policy, setting up an apparatus for controlling the activities of the unorganised market and private production, and using the latter to provide the population with consumer goods and agriculture with the means of production.

It should be noted that the book under review makes a tangible contribution to the understanding of the complicated processes of Vietnam's transition to socialism and develops the doctrine of the socialist transformation of countries with undeveloped economies.

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BOOK ON CHINESE REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT 1903-1905 REVIEWED

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[Review by V. A. Vasil'yev of book "Kitay v gody probuzhdeniya Azii" [China in the Years of Asia's Awakening] by V. N. Nikiforov, Moscow, Nauka, 1982, 248 pages]

[Text]

The awakening of the peoples of colonial and semi-colonial countries which began early in the twentieth century was a turning point in world history. First Asia and then Africa, which joined the former after World War II, made great strides in overcoming political dependence on the industrialised capitalist countries and economic backwardness. As a result, the disgraceful colonial system of imperialism was almost completely eradicated in the 1960s.

After the first bourgeois revolution in Japan in the mid-19th century, it was only with the beginning of the new century and under the influence of the two major factors—the entry of world capitalism into the imperialist stage and the liberating impact exerted by the Russian Revolution of 1905—that a new stage of struggle waged by the peoples of Asia began.

Lenin stressed the epoch-making significance of the revolutionary upsurge in Asia which replaced the relatively peaceful period of world development of 1872-1904 when

"the West had finished with bourgeois revolutions. The East had not yet risen to them."¹ "The opportunists had scarcely congratulated themselves on the 'social peace' and on the non-necessity of storms under 'democracy'," Lenin wrote, "when a new source of great world storms opened up in Asia. The Russian revolution was followed by revolutions in Turkey, Persia and China."² "World capitalism and the 1905 movement in Russia," Lenin pointed out, "have finally aroused Asia. Hundreds of millions of the downtrodden and benighted have awakened from medieval stagnation to a new life and are rising to fight for elementary human rights and democracy.

"The workers of the advanced countries follow with interest and inspiration this powerful growth of the liberation movement, in all its forms, in every part of the world....

"The awakening of Asia and the beginning of the struggle for power by the advanced proletariat of Europe are a symbol of the new phase in world history that began early this century."³

The "awakening of Asia", as Lenin's term in Marxist historiography came to denote the development of the Eastern countries in the early 20th century. The book under review deals precisely with this time.

Already at the beginning of the 20th century, Russia's progressive public was following with sympathy the valiant struggle

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 18, p. 583.

² *Ibid.*, p. 584.

³ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 19, p. 86.

waged by the peoples of the East and their progressive leaders. The Marxist-Leninists rendered them much assistance. The study of the history of the liberation movement, including that of the peoples of the Far East, with all its specific features and stages, still remains an important task for Soviet historians.

V. Nikiforov's monograph deals with the revolutionary movement in China at an early stage of the above-mentioned process, i. e., in 1903-1905. The book is a continuation of the author's earlier monograph *The First Chinese Revolutionaries* (1980) in which he investigates the initial steps of the revolutionary-democratic movement in China in 1894-1902.

The earlier monograph analysed the period which ended after the rout of China by imperialism in 1900. Reaction was raging in the country; revolutionary organisations were crushed; and Sun Yatsen was in emigration in Japan. However, the bankruptcy of the ruling classes and the unresolved tasks China faced at that time—the winning of independence and the overcoming of its age-old backwardness—created a situation in which the rebirth of the revolutionary forces in Chinese society was inevitable.

The author, proceeding from available Chinese sources and making wide use of scientific works, demonstrates, step by step, how this rebirth was taking place in 1903-1905. The process began with purely nationalistic actions directed against imperialist powers rather than against the Manchu Qing government. Such was the movement for setting up a student army among the Chinese students in Japan and among teachers and students in Shanghai. The author regards the end of May 1903 as a chronological watershed, for this was the point at which the Shanghai paper *Subao* took a revolutionary stand (its anti-Manchu propaganda evoked a strong response and resulted in stratification among the participants in the patriotic movement, with the revolutionary wing emerging).

According to the author, nationalistic pamphlets, widespread in China, were also published during this critical period. Among their authors were Zou Rong, Chen Tianhua, Yang Chouren, and others. Not only the leaders of the Xinhai revolution of 1911-

1913, but also Mao Zedong and many other future members of the CPC were educated under their influence. In his monograph, the author shows that the concepts of the above-mentioned writers were reduced to slogans of the anti-Manchu revolution which did not exceed the framework of an upper crust bourgeois revolution; to an appeal to secure independence and catch up with the advanced states and to the demand for a republic (mainly, in the booklets by Zou Rong). At the same time, works by the above-mentioned ideologists were marked by Sinocentrism, extreme nationalism bordering on Great-Han chauvinism and racism, and lack of democracy or a programme for social transformations.

At the end of the 19th century, Sun Yatsen put forward Narodnik ideas aimed at averting the development of capitalism in China and introducing "equal rights to own land" (actual nationalisation of land was intended). These concepts were neither published nor included in the programme at that time. Zou Rong, Chen Tianhua, and Yang Chouren failed to reflect these views in their pamphlets. It was only in 1903-1905 that Sun Yatsen himself provided a clearcut formulation of his programme in "The Three Popular Principles".

As is shown in the monograph, the revolutionary movement in 1903-1904 took place mainly without Sun Yatsen's active participation and was at that time represented by much more moderate ideologists and leaders. For the first time since 1880, China witnessed the process of the formation of new revolutionary organisations which occurred in 1904. They were headed by Suang Xing, Song Jiaoren, Tao Cheng Zhang, and others. On the whole, they shared the views of Zou Rong and Chen Tianhua. When in the autumn of 1904, some of those organisations were crushed by the police, many leaders and activists fled to Japan. At that time, Sun Yatsen, who was not directly linked with revolutionary groups in China, was making a tour of the Pacific Ocean countries, the USA, and Western Europe carrying out propaganda and organisational revolutionary work among the Chinese emigres and students, and continuing the elaboration of his doctrine.

In his book, Nikiforov describes at length the methods used by the Chinese bourgeois

revolutionaries in the early 20th century. For the most part, they were counting on an armed uprising, hoping to use a handful of conspirators within the framework of the medieval fraternities in the Chinese countryside which, as a rule, were anti-Manchurian. Since those secret fraternities were marked by ignorance and mysticism, their members could only act as instruments in the hands of the bourgeois revolutionaries. The latter were preparing an uprising in the army. Nikiforov arrives at the conclusion that, although in Europe and Latin America the "military revolutions" were justly regarded as a classic example of an upper crust revolutionary movement which was far removed from the people, in China at the junction of the 19th and the 20th centuries, counting on the army was a more progressive move than relying on the rural fraternities. However, in their plans, both the revolutionary organisations which sprang up in China in 1904 and Sun Yatsen relied on support from the fraternities. At that time, only individual groups in China (for example, in the Hubei province where a number of soldiers joined the revolutionary movement) and a handful of Chinese students in Europe were thinking about using the army.

Nikiforov maintains that the units of the so-called new army which was formed in China early in the 20th century, modelled after its Western counterparts, were a suitable medium for the revolutionary movement. Among them there were literate young people, and in social composition they represented the lowest layer of property-owners in the countryside, people who were close to the masses of peasants. However, in the conditions obtaining in Chinese society at that time, a military revolution could only be a form of upper crust bourgeois revolution. The revolutionary soldiers had no programme of their own and were under the influence of Zou Rong, Chen Tianhua and other bourgeois nationalists.

Apart from preparations for an armed uprising against the Qing dynasty, the Chinese bourgeois revolutionaries of that period also resorted to terrorism against the Qing bureaucracy. Such forms of struggle which stemmed from a lack of trust in the revolutionary actions of the people and from despair, became especially intense during the periods of defeat suffered by the revolu-

tionary movement. As was noted in the book, the defeat of the majority of the Chinese revolutionary organisations was followed by a considerable number of acts of terrorism at the end of 1904 and the first half of 1905.

The 1905 Russian revolution exerted a strong direct influence on Chinese society, partially, the author believes, due to the fact that it followed immediately after the Russo-Japanese war which had a direct bearing on China and occurred on its territory. In his earlier book, *The First Chinese Revolutionaries*, Nikiforov noted that the revolutionary movement in Russia before the 1905 Revolution also evoked response in China, particularly affecting the 1901-1902 works by China's progressive thinkers. In 1903-1905, this influence increased. The participants in the Chinese revolutionary organisations, Cai Yuanpei, Zang Ji, Wu Yue and others sympathised with the struggle that was under way in Russia. The impact of the Russian revolution reached its climax in 1905-1906. *Min bao* (People's Herald), the organ of the revolutionary party, carried extensive information on the developments in Russia.

In Japan, Sun Yatsen met with Russian political activists, including N. Sudzilovsky, a Narodnik, and G. Gershuni, a socialist-revolutionary. Sun Yatsen's letters to Sudzilovsky, which were marked by sincerity, still exist. They revealed the true attitude of Sun Yatsen towards imperialist powers (in his works of that time, Sun was compelled to conceal it). All these facts shed more light on the significance Sun Yatsen always attached to the assistance given to China by internationalist revolutionary forces, as well as a factor of such prime importance as the Russian revolution. Against this background, Sun Yatsen's subsequent activities aimed at consolidating the alliance with Soviet Russia, with the USSR, become clearer.

The year 1905 was a year of major historical developments for China. A revolutionary situation took shape in the country: the lower classes did not want to live in the old way, while the upper classes were unable to continue ruling in the old way. The Qing government began talking about a constitution and sent a mission abroad to study the constitutions of foreign countries.

The revolutionary upsurge which previously was localised mainly in Central China spread to Southern China as well.

The creation of an all-China revolutionary party was the natural outcome. In August 1905, in Tokyo, Sun Yatsen who had returned from Europe, Huang Xing, Song Jiaoren, Chen Tianhua who fled from China and other supporters of the revolutionary movement, in particular, Chinese students in Japan, organised the Chinese League, which remained the basic party of Chinese revolutionaries until the Xinghai revolution.

Sun Yatsen was proclaimed the leader of the League, and his three popular principles were regarded as the new party's programme: nationalism (the overthrow of the Qing dynasty and national independence), democracy (bourgeois republic) and the people's well-being (a vague slogan concerning the "equilisation of the rights to land").

Nikiforov stresses that the recognition of Sun Yatsen as the leader was a major stride forward by the Chinese revolutionaries, inasmuch as Sun's views, though he was not consistent on a number of issues, were most progressive as compared with the other Chinese political doctrines of that time. According to the author, they "opposed the negative tendencies which were still widespread among the Chinese intelligentsia:

Confucian xenophobia, great-Han arrogance, and unwillingness to cast a sober glance at the contemporary situation".

However, even Sun Yatsen did not realise the need to rely on the peasants. Neither did he recognise at that time that there were more progressive forms of struggle than conspiracy. The majority of the League members did not yet recognise the "Three Principles" and stuck to the platform of Zou Rong and Chen Tianhua. This testified to the weakness and limited nature of the Chinese revolutionary movement and was fraught with difficulties.

Nikiforov concludes his book as follows: "Although Sun Yatsen was a symbol of the revolution, on the whole, the future revolution was developing as a much less democratic one than that envisioned by Sun Yatsen's programme" (p. 232).

The concluding pages of the monograph describe the setting up of the Chinese League and the first crisis it went through at the junction of 1905 and 1906. It would be only natural to expect that the author who, in his two monographs, has successfully covered two major stages in the revolutionary movement in China, will write another monograph dealing with the series of uprisings of 1907-1911 which preceded the Xinhai revolution.

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BOOK ON CHANGES IN JAPANESE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM REVIEWED

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[Review by A. I. Samsin, candidate of philosophical sciences, of book "Upravleniye v Yaponii. Organizatsiya i metody" [Management in Japan. Organization and Methods] by A. N. Kuritsyn, Moscow, Nauka, 1981, 230 pages: "'Nihonteki Keiei'--A Japanese Management System"]

[Text]

The monograph under review is a serious and critical study of current problems in the theory and practice of industrial corporation

management in Japan. Based on Marxist-Leninist methodology, the author shows the class orientation of bourgeois management and its goal of maximising the profits of the big monopolies.

The book begins with a detailed analysis of the sources of the theory and practice of the management system in Japan. Kuritsyn convincingly demonstrates that the conceptual mainstays, the methods and organisational structures of management, are based largely on tradition, customs, and the system of moral and ideological values that formed historically in the country. He points out that oriental religions, especially the socio-ethical doctrines of Shintoism, the ancient religion of Japan, played an important role

in the formation of the norms, precepts and social orientation of this system. The traditional dogmas of Buddhism were important in this respect, particularly the concept of the sinfulness of everything material, virtue of poverty, obedience and humility. The postulates of Zen-Buddhism such as "collective spirit", "loyalty", "shared aims", etc., exerted a strong influence on the development of the official ideology in Japan. The formation of the social psychology of broad sections of Japan's population was also influenced by the religious and philosophical teachings of Confucianism, which requires implicit obedience to seniors by age or social position, reverence of one's ancestors, and strict observance of traditional norms of family and social relations. Over the centuries, the ruling circles legalised these rules and made them obligatory for the working people because, in effect, these rules justified the class stratification of society and perpetuated it.

Many religious postulates and rules have lost their significance today, but a large number of traditions and customs have remained in an altered form and are now successfully used by the ruling classes to deceive the working people, to take the sting out of class struggle. The monograph examines in detail the evolution of traditional Japanese morality and principles of social orientation, stressing that the prime causes of this evolution are of a socio-economic and socio-political nature.

The so-called "new morality", one of the important aspects of which is the striving for material gain, has now become widespread in the country. The ruling classes make the possibility for the individual to attain these desired boons directly dependent upon the conscientious fulfilment by the individual of his "duties to the nation", in effect to capitalist enterprise. Individualism and consumerism are persistently linked with traditional Japanese moral precepts: group solidarity and zealous work. Using a wealth of factual material, the author shows how these social and ethical orientations are used in implementing concrete methods of personnel management in the big monopolies.

Much attention is given to a critical analysis of the theory and practice of personnel management. Personnel guidance is one of the most important functions of management because the worker, the employee, was and

remains the main productive, creative force, despite all the accomplishments in technology and automation.

The problem of personnel management is complex, including the hiring and placement of employees, the system of wages, vocational training, and various social measures. Japanese management makes a big effort to substantiate the integration of the aims of the capitalist corporation and the individual employee, to show them as supposedly fully coinciding. The author convincingly shows that in private enterprise, it is impossible to unite these aims in practice due to the antagonistic contradictions between labour and capital, and as long as they remain within capitalist economy, to unite the interests of the employers and the working class is an unattainable illusion. The grim capitalist reality of modern Japan bears out the unattainability of this social ideal. Nevertheless, theoreticians and managers are trying to gloss over this basic antagonistic contradiction and at the same time to find new methods of increasing the exploitation of working people.

To raise production efficiency, prime importance in Japan is given to the "human factor" and so-called human relations theory which is also quite widespread in Western bourgeois theories of management. The advantages of an "informal" structure and organisation, the emphasis on the creation of a favourable socio-psychological climate in small groups, etc., is one of the theses in the ideological arsenal of this theory.

Socio-psychological stimuli to influence the behaviour of hired labour are elaborated herein to prompt employees to participate actively in ensuring the growth and prosperity of the given capitalist enterprise.

The monograph examines specific Japanese methods of utilising hired industrial and office workers which are highly effective and explain the interest of Western specialists in Japanese experience of management. A traditional Japanese personnel policy is "employment for life" whereby the industrial or office worker works for one and the same company his whole life, from the moment of employment to retirement. This system is used mostly at big enterprises.

The monograph under review analyses in detail the sources and socio-psychological aspects of the system of "employment for

life". Citing the example of big industrial firms, the author convincingly shows that "employment for life" is a uniquely Japanese form of utilising labour which retains many features of the traditional feudal system of paternalism. Personnel are constantly told that belonging to the "clan" of the industrial enterprise is a great honour which not only imposes upon the employee grave responsibilities but also puts him on a higher plane than the workers of other enterprises. Japanese businessmen deliberately mould "company patriotism" in their employees, constantly impressing on them the idea that only "their" company is capable of showing concern for the workers' welfare, of protecting them from the adverse effects of the hostile environment. They are led to believe in the good intentions of the capitalist enterprise and that only their firm or company can guarantee the employee a stable social status (p. 45).

The book contains data from studies which show clearly the tenacity of the system of "employment for life". This stability is explained not so much by the influence of traditional morality or patriarchal customs as by material incentives and the desire of employers to keep their workers under their sole influence by all manner of handouts. Kuritsyn makes the well-founded conclusion that the system of "employment for life" allows Japanese employers to tie a considerable part of the working class to their firms, fettering them with moral obligations and material dependence, thereby ensuring a higher degree of exploitation. This system is advantageous to business and is one of the causes of Japanese industry's post-war growth. With the help of the system of "employment for life" Japanese employers, keeping skilled manpower on the job, intensifying long-term ties of employees with "their" company, and constantly fostering a spirit of "co-participation", succeed in exploiting intensively not only the diligence and industriousness of the Japanese worker but also the creative potential of every individual employee and the collective as a whole. "Employment for life" helps to a certain degree to gloss over the antagonistic nature of relations between labour and capital, while the illusory slogan "the enterprise is my home" is still believed in by many working people. In the long run, this belief takes the

tangible form of increased production efficiency (p. 51).

Japanese monopolies vigorously adhere to the principle of "employment for life", because it enables them to develop in their workers a spirit of company loyalty, a high level of labour discipline and interest in the growth of labour productivity. In this way, traditional paternalistic relations are preserved.

Of much interest are the sections in the monograph devoted to wages, staff training, and promotions. In Japanese monopolies, labour remuneration is determined according to age, length of service, and marital status. Along with "employment for life", this system encourages long-term ties of the worker with the company. Comparative figures show that the wages of Japanese working people are lower than, for instance, those of American or West German working people, while their norm of exploitation remains high. It is this that explains the relatively low production costs at Japanese enterprises. Periodically increasing wages and introducing all sorts of extras and bonuses, the employers create the appearance of concern for the well-being of hired labour while in reality increasing labour intensity to the maximum and raising norms of exploitation.

Clearly indicated in the monograph are the contradictory tendencies in the wage and salary systems within the leading branches of Japanese industry. In conditions of scientific and technological progress and the active introduction by firms of the most up-to-date equipment and technology cost of labour is growing. This objective tendency makes it necessary to take into account qualifications, education, degree of responsibility, and other factors in determining wages. The forced modernisation of the system of labour remuneration is taking place. The scope of this modernisation, however, is limited because Japanese monopoly capital is interested in preserving and perpetuating the traditional principle of "payment according to seniority" (*nenko seido*). This principle boils down to the freezing of wages and the levelling of incomes. It also makes for effective personnel management (pp. 62-64). We believe, however, that the author should have showed more extensively the growing social struggle by the Japanese working class against these obsolete principles of labour remuneration

which doom it to a low standard of living and increasing intensification of labour. It is known that in recent years the Japanese proletariat has come out against the monopolist policy of wage freezing and in support of its fundamental interests more often and in a more organised manner.

The practice of personnel training is another feature of Japanese management. The relatively limited nature of the labour market and the shortage of certain trades compels the employers to encourage each employee to master as many trades as possible. It is due to this universal training, as it were, of the Japanese worker that capitalist corporations succeed in meeting their requirements in skilled manpower by drawing on their own resources. This circumstance also determines a noticeable migration of the labour force within the firm, a migration that intensifies during periods of reorganisation of technological processes and the development of new types of products. Another reason for this flexibility in utilising personnel is to ensure their closer ties with the firm. The author has made a critical study of various methods of training and methods of the social education of industrial and office workers and members of the management. In particular, he rightly points out that the emphasis on "informal contacts" and contacts after work is actually directed at expanding the influence of the monopoly firm on its personnel. Also serving the aims of moulding "company patriotism" and the fullest dependence of the working people on the interests of big business is the tradition by which managers and foremen patronise young employees.

The process of decision-making holds one of the central places in Japanese managerial theory and practice. The so-called "ringi" system lies at the basis of the traditional Japanese methodology of decision-making. Key importance here is given to a thorough and detailed discussion of any problem that has arisen, and the establishment of the aim. Only after this are the methods of attaining it worked out. In the process of working out the decision, use is made of group discussion and of polling the views of the greatest possible number of the organisation's members. The decision thus adopted is considered to be a collective and voluntary one and is conceived to facilitate the removal of conflicts within the organisation while stimulating those

taking part in the attainment of the set goal.

Analysing the procedures and forms of managerial decision-making in modern Japanese corporations, Kuritsyn rightly notes their class apologetic essence. The book stresses that the decision-making practice utilising the "group spirit" and "corporate solidarity" of hired personnel is directed in the long run at maximising the profits of monopolies and averting socio-class collisions. Of interest are the author's views on the transformation of the methods and means of adopting managerial decisions depending on the degree of uncertainty of the situation in which the Japanese industrial firms have to function at the present stage. Unfortunately, these remarks are of a somewhat general and cursory nature (pp. 98-99).

Problems and prospects for automating management are studied in a special chapter. Japan holds the leading place in the world in automating computing operations (about 70 per cent of all computation work was already being performed by computers early in the 1970s). Along with increasing the level of socialisation of productive forces, the introduction of computers still further aggravated the conflict between labour and capital, increased the number of unemployed, office employees and engineers, and in many ways turned service personnel into an appendage of the computers. But in Japan, these social consequences do not manifest themselves so obviously as in the other developed capitalist countries. They are partly ironed out and glossed over to a considerable extent by the traditional methods of influencing personnel. The chapter devoted to questions of automating management contains extensive factual material that enables the author to draw important conclusions about the social aspects of the introduction of computer technology, especially as regards the methodology, design and operation of information and management systems in Japanese industrial companies.

Much attention in the monograph is given to a critical analysis of problems of quality control. These problems are more acute in Japan than in other countries of the capitalist world, because Japanese industry greatly depends on the import of raw materials, fuel and food. Moreover, this dependence increases with the growth of production. In recent

years, Japan has managed to improve the quality of many types of industrial output, this being one of the reasons for its market successes in the competition with other imperialist powers (for instance, in the "automobile war" with the United States).

The growing quality standard of Japanese industrial output is based first of all on the extensive introduction of the latest technology, the utilisation of foreign experience, and the perfection of the methods of organising work and management. The Japanese government plays a large role in this. In the post-war years, it has consistently pursued an appropriate economic policy which boils down to the adoption of legislative measures on quality control, to conducting an organisational reform of state-monopoly regulation, and to expanding the system of personnel training. This policy has encouraged and stimulated the performance of private companies in improving output quality.

The author makes a detailed study of various systems of standardisation and criteria for determining quality, as well as rational and effective methods of control. Special note is made of the importance of the "quality control clubs" that have become widespread in Japan. These clubs unite groups of workers under the supervision of a foreman or team leader. The sphere of their activity is diverse: elimination of the causes of discards, perfection of technological processes, modernisation of tools and equipment, raising labour discipline, and improving the organisation of work, etc. The vigour of workers in raising labour productivity and improving quality is encouraged morally and also materially. Thereby, monopoly capital

tries to convince the working people that they are directly involved in the interests of the firm and the management of its affairs. The monograph shows the class significance of these innovations: the intensification of production exploitation under the guise of "raising the quality of working life" and the striving of the monopolies to make the working class shoulder the main burden for economic troubles and difficulties.

The concluding chapter studies the active influence Japanese management has had on management theory and practice in the United States and other countries of the capitalist world. It investigates the specificity of Japanese methods of hired personnel management, their combination with Western methods of management, studying markets and expanding exports. Unfortunately, the Japanese practice of controlling market activity was not dealt with extensively in the monograph. In the Western capitalist countries, big business has long made use of so-called marketing services to study markets and prepare for the marketing of goods. In recent years, the theoretical provisions and organisational principles forming the basis of the marketing mechanism have been studied by scholars in various countries. But the question of whether the Japanese system of management has any equivalent of the Western concept of market control is left unanswered by the book.

On the whole, Kuritsyn's monograph is a topical study which without doubt will enhance scientific critique of bourgeois concepts of management.

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BOOK ON JAPANESE ECONOMIC PENETRATION IN LATIN AMERICA REVIEWED

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 3, Jul-Sep 82 (signed to press 12 Oct 82) pp 144-146

[Review by Yu. Ye. Yevgen'yev of book "Ekonomicheskoye proniknoveniye Yaponii v Latinskuyu Ameriku" by V. O. Kistanov, Moscow, Nauka, 1982, 174 pages]

[Text] Japan's foreign economic ties occupy an important place in international economic news in the Soviet press. Until recently Japan's relations with Asian countries, especially in Southeast Asia, were given the most attention. Less was said about Japan's economic expansion in Latin America. But this subject is of considerable interest because the penetration of the Latin American region by Japanese monopolies reflects important tendencies in present-day capitalism: uneven development, the resulting exacerbation of conflicts between developed and developing countries, the modernization of forms and methods of exploiting the "Third World" countries and a tendency to move operations requiring high labor, material and power input to these countries, as well as types of production which pollute the atmosphere.

In their penetration of Latin America, the Japanese monopolies have often led the capitalist world in the use of updated methods of taking over the economies of the developing countries with a view to local conditions.

In the postwar years Japan turned into one of the leading trade partners of the Latin American countries. The author notes that in 1978 Japan "ranked third after the United States and the FRG in exports to Latin American countries and second after the United States in imports" (p 7). More capital is being exported to Latin America. The Japanese monopolies are constantly crowding the United States, England and the FRG. Experts from the UN Economic Commission for Latin America have called regional ties with Japan the most dynamic sector of Latin American foreign economic activity and predict considerable activity in this area in the future.

The Latin American bourgeoisie is striving to use business relations with Japan as a counterbalance to U.S. expansion. The Japanese model of economic development is being carefully studied by members of the Latin American ruling classes, who are advertising it as the most suitable model for the "Third World" countries and as a means of escaping the permanent socioeconomic crisis.

The serious nature of all these topics testifies to the pertinence of V. O. Kistanov's monograph, in which he examines Japanese relations with Latin American countries and a broad range of domestic economic problems in Japan and Latin America.

Against the background of a comprehensive analysis of Japan's foreign economic ties as a whole, the author points out the place occupied in these ties by the Latin American countries. Abundant factual material is presented to illustrate the developmental tendencies of Japanese-Latin American relations in the area of foreign trade, the dynamics of changes in the trade structure and the means by which Japanese goods penetrate the Latin American market are examined, and the operational forms and methods of Japanese monopolies which have given Japan a strong position in the foreign trade of many states of this region are revealed. V. O. Kistanov stresses that "throughout the 1970's the percentage accounted for by all developed capitalist states in the foreign trade exchange of Latin American countries displayed a clear tendency toward decline, and most of this decline was accounted for by the EEC countries and, in part, the United States. Japan's share of this trade, however, did not decrease but even increased somewhat" (p 8). One specific reason was that "Japan, for a number of reasons, is a much more appealing trade partner than the other capitalist countries for the Latin American states" (p 11). In contrast to the United States, for example, it does not supply world markets with raw materials which compete with Latin American products, and in contrast to the EEC countries, it is not bound by a system of special relations to several developing countries whose access to Western European markets is facilitated by this system and whose goods therefore compete with similar goods from Latin America.

The intensive growth of Japanese exports to Latin America also promoted the broad-scale export of capital to various countries in this region from the beginning of the 1970's on, paving the way to once almost inaccessible markets for Japanese goods. "By 1980 virtually one out of every six dollars invested by Japan abroad was in Latin America," the author says, "and most investments were made in branches of the processing industry, which led to exports of the machines and equipment needed in these branches" (p 15). Another contributing factor was the increased financial and technical assistance given the developing countries by the Japanese government in the 1970's, which represented a substantial aid in the expansion of Japanese monopolies. The rapid growth of Japanese exports to Latin America, the author says, is also due to the greater number of restrictions Japanese goods have encountered in recent years in such traditional markets as the United States, Western Europe and Southeast Asia. This has motivated Japanese businessmen to seek new sales markets and to redirect a large portion of their growing exports to these markets. It is no coincidence that Japan is now exporting more goods to such seemingly untraditional markets as the Near and Middle East, Latin America and Africa.

The author of this book gives serious attention to a study of Japan's protectionist measures in the sphere of imports, helping to expose various Japanese propaganda myths about Japan's willingness to make all types of concessions to the developing countries in order to strengthen "friendly relations." In

addition to high customs duties, "non-tariff restrictions, which Japan is actively using with the aid of its complicated machinery of state-economic regulation and which affect virtually all types of imports to one degree or another, constitute an extremely serious obstacle to the expansion of Latin American exports to Japan" (p 48). The author feels that the most important of these restrictions are the system of import quotas and the numerous hidden barriers based on various Japanese and foreign standards and technical specifications, sanitary requirements, labeling and packaging regulations, etc. All of this was the reason for the statement that "Japan is pursuing the most rigid protectionist trade policy among the developed capitalist countries" at a 1979 conference of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council (p 49). Quoting from the ORIENTAL ECONOMIST, V. O. Kistanov notes that Latin American exports to Japan could have increased by 28 percent just in 1976 if there had been no trade restrictions (p 49).

Summing up his examination of Japan's trade relations with the countries of Latin America, the author points out their great reserves and tendency toward expansion. However, the obvious deficit in Latin American trade with Japan in the 1970's, the inaccessibility of the Japanese market to some Latin American products and Japanese discrimination against several traditional raw materials and foodstuffs will, in the author's opinion, prevent the stabilization of Latin American foreign trade revenues and the alleviation of Latin American currency and financial difficulties.

A thorough analysis of the export of Japanese private capital to the Latin American countries as the main form of Japanese economic expansion in the region occupies a significant place in the work. The author examines this aspect of expansion from the standpoint of the interaction of commodity exports with capital exports, thoroughly analyzing the causes and motives of the rapid growth of Japanese private investments in the Latin American region in recent years. As V. O. Kistanov points out, "the Japanese monopolies' desire to invest large sums in the countries of this region is based on the traditional factors which constitute the essence of imperialist foreign economic expansion: the search for sales markets, sources of raw materials and spheres of capital investment. The influence of these factors was seriously modified and intensified, however, by a number of severe crises which shook the world capitalist economy" (p 55). Japan's successful entry into the inter-imperialist competitive struggle for capital markets was made possible by the great potential it acquired during its accelerated postwar development. As a result of intensive economic expansion, Japanese overseas investments totaled 31.5 billion dollars in March 1980 (p 56). Japan is now one of the main world centers of the export of capital.

The increasing severity of the energy, raw material and food crises, the rise in wages, which the Japanese workers won in a stubborn class struggle but which has naturally raised the prices of Japanese goods and diminished their competitive potential in foreign markets, the exacerbation of the ecological crisis in the country, which has motivated Japanese concerns to move "dirty" and power-intensive production units out of the country--all of this has caused Japanese monopolies to take more interest in the developing states.

In addition to all of these general factors, there are also certain specific reasons, the author points out, why Japan has engaged in broader expansion in Latin America. One is the growth of anti-Japanese feelings in Southeast Asia due to the neocolonial behavior of Japanese monopolies. "According to Japanese businessmen," V. O. Kistanov writes, "Latin America's lack of a colonial past connected with Japan is a guarantee that the operations of Japanese monopolies in this part of the world will not be affected by the factors characteristic of Southeast Asia" (p 57). Latin America's industrial progress, which is significant in comparison to the progress of the Asian and African countries, also makes it a more appealing sphere for the investment of Japanese capital in the processing industry. Several Latin American countries, especially Brazil, Mexico and Argentina, are also regarded by Japanese businessmen as a more stable zone in the social sense than, for example, Southeast Asia, where the national liberation movement has recently made great advances.

The structure of Japanese investments in Latin America and their distribution among individual countries and groups of countries in this region are examined in detail in this work. The more detailed examination of Japan's economic penetration of Brazil seems quite valid because "Japanese ruling circles regard it as a bridgehead for the successful penetration of other Latin American countries and, in the more distant future, the markets of the United States, Europe and even Africa" (p 66).

It is essential to note that the author examines the dialectical connection between Japan's economic penetration of Latin America and the expansion of other leading imperialist states, demonstrating that this penetration is part of the general neocolonial policy of world imperialism in the Latin American countries and that it is adding more tangles to the "Latin American knot" of inter-imperialist conflicts in the struggle for sales markets, sources of raw materials and spheres of capital investment. The comparison of the Japanese monopolies' activity in the region with the activity of their American and Western European competitors and the discussion of the strong and weak points of Japanese companies in their attempts to penetrate, reinforce and expand their sphere of influence are interesting in this context. Japanese capital in Latin America has resorted to a system of participation which has been tried and tested in other regions and which differs from the practice of U.S. and Western European companies of establishing their own overseas branches. "Less than 0.4 percent of all Japanese capital invested in the economies of the Latin American states by the middle of the 1970's was accounted for by purely Japanese enterprises. Furthermore," the author says, "the distribution of investments in 1975/76 proves that this tendency is still strong" (p 97). Japanese corporations are often satisfied with a relatively small share of the stock of joint enterprises in Latin America (although this complicates their manipulation of dividends, prices and credit) because this allows them to hide more effectively behind national labels, reduces the risk of nationalization and gives them greater tax benefits, better access to government loans and subsidies and a better chance of receiving government contracts.

Japanese investors can also influence the business policies of joint companies by taking advantage of their dependence on Japanese equipment, expertise and

management methods. The high percentage of Japanese executives in these companies is another contributing factor.

In this work, V. O. Kistanov carefully examines the role of Japan's so-called government aid to the Latin American states, which takes the form of relatively insignificant gifts and subsidies, yen loans (mainly for the development of the industrial infrastructure) and technical assistance, which is acquiring increasing importance and is being used by Japanese monopolies to broaden and strengthen their position in Central and South America. "The purpose of Japanese technical assistance," the author correctly notes, "is to bind the recipient with the fetters of technical and other types of dependence and to ultimately expand possibilities for the sale of Japan's own goods, the investment of its own capital and the acquisition of its own supplies of raw materials without any particularly sizeable financial or material expenditures" (p 131).

The author also examines the evolution of the Latin American public's feelings about Japanese expansion, from the "warm welcome" it received when it was regarded as a counterbalance to American and other domination to the harsh criticism to which it was subjected when the imperialist essence of Japanese exports of capital to this region became increasingly evident. The author does not confine his discussion to the current stage of Japanese expansion in Latin America but also tries to predict the scales and directions of this expansion, especially with regard to the export of capital.

It is particularly significant that the author discusses a matter which has not been researched enough as yet in Soviet scientific literature: Japanese emigration to Latin America and the role of the Japanese community in this region as a basis of support for Japanese monopolistic capital's expansion (pp 132-146). His analysis and logical criticism of the attempts of Japanese ruling circles to create a "favorable image" for Japan in the developing countries in order to camouflage and "soften" the neocolonial nature of Japan's relations with this group of countries are also distinguished by a novel approach. These attempts are reflected, in particular, in the propaganda that Japan is particularly "close" to the developing countries, the praise of the "Japanese model" of economic development, etc. The author is correct in his assumption that the attempts of "Japanese monopolistic capital to earn dividends from its allegedly unique position in relation to the developing countries are not original in essence. They are nothing other than an integral part of the general neocolonial policy of world imperialism, which is aimed at keeping the developing countries within its sphere of influence with the aid of economic, political and ideological measures" (p 154).

In conclusion, the author writes that "the further expansion of economic ties between the Latin American states and the socialist countries could be an important way of reducing Latin America's dependence on the monopolies of the United States, Western Europe and Japan because the main principles of socialist foreign economic policy, in contrast to the policy of the capitalist states, are mutual advantage and equality."

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ACADEMIC CONFERENCE ON FAR EASTERN LITERATURE HELD IN LENINGRAD

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[Report on 10th Conference on Far Eastern Literature and Culture, in Leningrad in February 1982]

[Text] The 10th academic conference on "Theoretical Aspects of the Study of Far Eastern Literature" was held in Leningrad in February. Experts on the literatures of the foreign East meet for these conferences every other year. The reports presented at this anniversary conference covered a long period of time--from the days when myths were invented to the present day--in the history of the Far Eastern region of Eurasia. This time there was an approximately equal number of reports on the Chinese, Japanese and Mongolian literatures, and reports were also presented on the Tibetan and Manchurian literatures, on the mutual influence of Shinto and Buddhism and on the interpenetration of European and Oriental literatures.

The conference was called to order by Professor V. M. Solntsev, chairman of the organizing committee and deputy director of the IV [Institute of Oriental Studies] of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Another opening speech was presented by Professor Ye. P. Chelyshev, head of the Department of the Literature of the Foreign East of the IV, USSR Academy of Sciences, who discussed the future objectives of these scholarly readings which have been going on for 20 years and have become a tradition. In light of imperialism's ideological offensive, he stressed the need to strengthen methodological and political aspects in the analysis of the literature of the foreign East and the need to actively influence the development of aesthetic sensibilities in these countries.

Literary processes in China in the last few years were discussed in the reports entitled "The Contemporary Chinese Novella (1979-1980)" (B. L. Riftin, IMLI [Institute of World Literature imeni A. M. Gor'kiy], USSR Academy of Sciences), "The Recent Works of Ai Qing" (L. Ye. Cherkasskiy, IV, USSR Academy of Sciences) and the following reports by researchers from the IDV [Institute of the Far East], USSR Academy of Sciences: "An Inquiry into the Social Impact of Contemporary Chinese Drama" (I. V. Gayda), "Characteristics of the Contemporary Literary Tale in China" (N. Ye. Borevskaya), "Chinese Literature in 1981" (V. F. Sorokin) and "The Life and Posthumous Fate of Lao She" (A. A. Antipovskiy).

The authors of these reports cited specific passages from literature to trace the literary process in a country emerging from the chaos of the "Cultural Revolution."

Chinese literature of the 1920's through 1950's was the subject of the reports by O. B. Bolotina (DVGU [Far Eastern State University]), "The World in Images and Images in the World"--about the works of Wu Zuxiang, and by N. A. Lebedeva (IV, USSR Academy of Sciences), "Ye Shengtao's Method of Writing"--exemplified by his stories of the 1920's. An interesting report on "The Genres of Drum-Accompanied Melodies ("guqu") in the Literary System of Sung Narratives" was presented by N. A. Speshnev (LGU [Leningrad State University]), using the works of Lao She as examples.

Medieval and ancient Chinese literature was the subject of the reports by G. B. Dagdanov (Buryat Institute of Social Sciences of the SO [Siberian Department], USSR Academy of Sciences)--"The Buddhist Hymns of Wang Vzia (701-761)," illustrating the poet's unique attitude toward Buddhism; Pang Ying (LGU)--"Some Results of an Analysis of the Text of the First Chapter of 'Dream of the Red Chamber,' Preserved in the LO [Leningrad Department] of the IV, USSR Academy of Sciences"; M. Ye. Kravtsova (LO, IV, USSR Academy of Sciences)--"Some Features of Chinese Pastoral Lyrics of the Early Medieval Era," illustrating the themes of the individual who loses his way and the dualism of the Chinese thinkers--the immortality of nature and the mortality of man; Ye. A. Torchinov (Museum of the History of Religion and Atheism, Leningrad)--"The Chapters About the Power of Truth in Zhang Boduan's 'Wu zheng pian' as a Literary Monument."

Contemporary Japanese literature was discussed in informative reports by A. A. Dolin (IV, USSR Academy of Sciences)--"Gendaishi Poetry During the Period of the 'Economic Miracle'"--and M. P. Gerasimova (IV, USSR Academy of Sciences)--"Neosensualism as a Sign of Japanese Modernism (the Early Literary Experiments of Kawabata Yasunari)." In the first report, patriotism as a distinctive feature of postwar Japanese poetry is illustrated with quotations from the works of the most prominent contemporary poets, and the second speaker discussed the complex phenomenon of Japanese modernism, the representatives of which tried to depart from national traditions and use the European literary style in a struggle against proletarian literature.

Some thoughts about "Pseudoclassical Poetry in the Works of 'National Scholars,'" illustrated with quotations from "Tales of the Western Mountains," by Takebe Ayatari, who played an important part in the creation of the new genre of "books for reading" and the refined style characteristic of this genre, were set forth in the report by I. V. Mel'nikova (LGU).

Some reports were about the Zen culture--a phenomenon which has influenced the development of Japanese literature greatly. Ye. S. Shtayner ("Iskusstvo" Publishing House, Moscow) illustrated this in a report entitled "The Essence of Zen in the Love Poems of Ikkyu Sozana," a 15th century poet who went against the wishes of the monastic order by suggesting that poetry should be closer to life.

The reports by A. M. Kabanov, "Classical Chinese Poetry in Japan and the Literature of the 'Five Monasteries,'" and V. N. Goreglyad (both from the LO, IV, USSR Academy of Sciences), "Sugawara Michizane in Life and Legend," brought their audience closer to the roots of this phenomenon. These speakers' interesting way of conveying their material deserves special mention.

"Problems of Shinto-Buddhist Interaction in Traditional Japanese Poetry" were the subject of the report by L. M. Yermakov (VGBIL [All-Union State Library of Foreign Literature]).

In a report on "The First Japanese Translation of 'The Tryst' by I. S. Turgenev," T. N. Tsoktoyevea (LGU) illustrated the interaction of the Russian and Japanese literatures and the influence of the former on the origins of modern Japanese literature as exemplified in the works of Futabatei Shimei (1864-1909).

Four reports were about Mongolian literature. L. G. Skorodumova (Moscow State University) used V. Injinash's novel "The Red Chamber of Tears" to illustrate some distinctive features of the genre, the writer's innovations in plot structure, composition, language and style and his contribution to the development of national traditions while using the descriptive methods of the Chinese classics.

Oral folklore was the subject of the reports by S. Yu. Neklyudov (IMLI, USSR Academy of Sciences)--"The Epic Monster in Mongolian Folklore," based on the materials of little-researched East Mongolian oral tradition--and K. N. Yatskovskaya (IV, USSR Academy of Sciences)--"Songs of the Western Mongols," telling of the author's work in the field in 1980 and her conclusions about the existence of an "anthology" of Derbet folksongs, recorded for use by singers and for future generations in the "Blue Debter," which apparently consisted of numerous cycles.

In her report on "The Seasons in the Poetry of D. Ravjaa and D. Natsagdorj," L. V. Bukina cites passages from the works of two brilliant representatives of modern Mongolian literature in an apt discussion of the development of philosophical thinking in this country--from the contemplative Buddhist view of nature, exemplified by D. Ravjaa (1803-1856), to the optimistic and metaphorically inspired view of the eternal issue of life and death, exemplified by D. Natsagdorj (1906-1937).

The report by A. D. Tsendina (IMLI, USSR Academy of Sciences) on "The 'Tales of Shukasaptati' in Mongolia" demonstrated the influence of the Indian "frame story" on the Mongolian tradition of the 17th-19th centuries, specifically as illustrated in the "Seventy Tales of the Parrot" ("Shukasaptati"), which had a definite, even if not very perceptible, influence on the development of Mongolian literature.

Some speakers discussed non-traditional literatures: Tibetan and Manchurian. Ye. D. Ogneva (IV, Tajik SSR Academy of Sciences, Dushanbe) reported on "The 'Treatise on Water' of Tibetan Author Konchog Danbi-Donme," a work based on Indian and Tibetan sources, in which the adoption and adaptation of foreign

material are conducted in the customary spatial images (landscapes, in this case) for the given cultural zone. T. A. Pang reported on "The Composition and Contents of the Manchurian Anthology 'Tangu Meien'--'100 Chapters.'"

The concluding report, entitled "Our Conferences Over the Last 20 Years," was presented by V. V. Petrov (LGU) and contained interesting statistics attesting to the professional growth of the participants in the work in Leningrad, the more thorough study of foreign literatures, the expansion of the research zone, the dramatic growth of interest in recent literary processes, etc.

The first conference (1963) was called "The Alekseyev Lectures," the second was called "Foreign Literary Genres and Styles" and the third and all subsequent conferences have been called "Theoretical Aspects of the Study of Far Eastern Literature."

Therefore, Soviet literary scholars and experts on the foreign East can point with pride to their success over the last 20 years.

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OBITUARY OF FAR EAST HISTORIAN A. M. DUBINSKIY

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 3, Jul-Sep 82 (signed to press 12 Oct 82) p 149

[Text] Aleksandr Markovich Dubinskiy, doctor of historical sciences, professor, member of the Academic Council of the Institute of the Far East, USSR Academy of Sciences, senior research consultant at the institute, a member of the CPSU since 1928 and a scholar who made a significant contribution to the study of the history of international relations in the Far East and the national liberation movement of the peoples of East and Southeast Asia, died at the age of 77 on 11 July 1982 after a long and serious illness.

A. M. Dubinskiy was born on 11 February 1906. He began his academic career in 1938 at Saratov University after graduating from the Moscow Institute of History, Philosophy and Literature. His first published works came out in 1939-1942.

A long period of his life, from 1944 to 1967, was connected with teaching and scholarship in the Higher Party School of the CPSU Central Committee.

A. M. Dubinskiy wrote several major works, such as "Voyna na Tikhom okeane" [The War in the Pacific] (1945), "Kitay. 1918-1949" [China. 1918-1949] (1950), "Narodnaya antiimperialisticheskaya i antifeodal'naya revolyutsiya v Kitaye" [The Popular Anti-Imperialist and Antifeudal Revolution in China], "Razvitiye kapitalizma v Indii vo vtoroy polovine XIX v." [The Development of Capitalism in India in the Second Half of the 19th Century] and others. He wrote the chapter entitled "International Relations in the Far East During the War in the Pacific (1941-1945)" for the book "Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya na Dal'nem Vostoke (1870-1945)" [International Relations in the Far East (1870-1945)], published in 1951.

A. M. Dubinskiy was one of the writers of many chapters and sections of collective Soviet histories--"Vsemirnaya istoriya" [World History], "Noveyshaya istoriya" [Contemporary History] and "Istoriya mezhdunarodnogo rabocheho i natsional'no-osvoboditel'nogo dvizheniya" [The History of the International Workers and National Liberation Movement]. He wrote the monograph "Osvoboditel'naya missiya Sovetskogo Soyuza na Dal'nem Vostoke" [The Liberating Mission of the Soviet Union in the Far East]. His book "Sovetsko-kitayskiye otnosheniya v period yaponno-kitayskoy voyny 1937-1945 gg."

[Soviet-Chinese Relations During the Japanese-Chinese War of 1937-1945], containing a vivid description of the Soviet Union's assistance of China during the years of struggle against Japanese aggression, was published in 1980.

For a long time A. M. Dubinskiy was a member of the academic councils of the Higher Party School of the CPSU Central Committee and the Institute of the Far East of the USSR Academy of Sciences, the Scientific Council of the History Department of the USSR Academy of Sciences on "International Relations and the Foreign Policy of the USSR," the National Pacific Committee (USSR Academy of Sciences), the editorial board of the "People's Republic of China Almanac," the writing team for several volumes of "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [The History of World War II, 1939-1945] and the editorial councils of the Mysl' and Progress publishing houses.

A. M. Dubinskiy was always distinguished by exceptional scholarly integrity and diligence.

All those who knew Aleksandr Markovich will always remember him as an exacting and principled scholar and teacher, a highly qualified Orientologist and a constant advocate of friendship and cooperation among the countries and peoples of the Far East.

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